This thesis aims to provide a comprehensive theory of age discrimination that can guide the direct and indirect age discrimination provisions of the Equality Act 2010. The Act holds that unequal treatment on the grounds of age and measures that are on their face age-neutral but have the effect of disadvantaging particular age groups are lawful only if the treatment can be shown either to be a 'proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim' or if the treatment fits into a specifically prescribed exception. In this way, the proportionality test distinguishes justified and unjustified age-differential treatment with only the former legally permissible. I outline and defend a pluralist theory of age discrimination that assists in making the distinction between justified and unjustified age-differential treatment. The theory identifies the principles that explain when and why age-differential treatment wrongs people and the principles that can justify this treatment. It is a pluralist theory because it recognises that age-differential treatment can wrong people for a number of different, overlapping reasons, and these different reasons should inform how we apply age discrimination law. The pluralist theory of age discrimination theory can improve legal reasoning in age discrimination cases by articulating the relevant principles and competing interests that are at stake in age discrimination claims. In constructing the theory, I adopt the reflective equilibrium method. This requires that I 'test' my starting moral intuitions against other beliefs, seeking coherence among these beliefs, and revising the beliefs as a result of particular challenges to them. In applying this method, I identify the following five principles to form a pluralist theory of age discrimination: equality of opportunity, social equality, respect, autonomy and efficiency.

This thesis is concerned with the ontology, epistemology, and methodology of intuitions in philosophy. It consists of an introduction, Chapter 1, and three main parts. In the first part, Chapter 2, I defend an account of intuitions as appearance states according to which intuitions cannot be reduced to beliefs or belief-like states. I argue that an account of intuitions as appearance states can explain some crucial phenomena with respect to intuitions better than popular accounts in the current debate over the ontology of intuitions. The second part, Chapters 3 to 5, is a reply to Timothy Williamson's (2004, 2007) view on the epistemology and methodology of intuitions. The practice of appealing to the fact that we have an intuition as evidence from thought experiments has recently been criticised by experimental philosophers. Williamson argues that since thought experiments reliably lead to knowledge of the content of our intuition, we can avoid this criticism and the resulting sceptical threat by appealing to the content of the intuition. I agree that thought experiments usually lead to knowledge of the content of our intuition. However, I show that appealing to the fact that we have an intuition is a common and useful practice. I defend the view that for methodological reasons, we ought to appeal to the fact that we have an intuition as initial evidence from thought experiments. The third part, Chapter 6, is devoted to a paradigm method involving intuitions: the method of reflective equilibrium. Some philosophers have recently claimed that it is trivial and could even accommodate scepticism about the reliability of intuitions. I argue that reflective equilibrium is not compatible with such scepticism. While it is compatible with the view I defend in the second part of the thesis, more specific methodological claims have to be made.

Este trabalho discute a teoria do direito de Ronald Dworkin, desde sua gênese até seus desenvolvimentos mais recentes, com o objetivo específico de aferir a influência que esta sofreu da filosofia política de John Rawls e de sua concepção de justiça. Essa influência foi especialmente sentida na metodologia inicialmente concebida por Dworkin para responder às tradicionais questões de teoria geral do direito, já que estas teriam sido mal resolvidas pelos positivistas. O que se verifica é que tal método se baseia na idéia de equilíbrio reflexivo de Rawls. Essa intensa convergência que inicialmente se verifica é progressivamente afastada na medida em que Dworkin caminha rumo a um liberalismo abrangente, defendendo uma continuidade entre a moralidade política e a ética, e Rawls reinterpreta sua teoria para defender uma limitação desta ao domínio do político. / This paper will discuss Ronald Dworkins legal theory since its genesis till its most recent studies, aiming specifically assess how this theory was influenced by John Rawls political philosophy and his conception of justice. This influence was specially noticed in the methodology first conceived by Dworkin to respond to the traditional issues of jurisprudence, since these ones had been unresolved by the legal positivism. What can be verified is that such method is based on Rawls idea of reflective equilibrium. This strong convergence, that is initially observed, is gradually deviated insofar as Dworkin moves towards to a comprehensive liberalism, defending continuity between morality and ethics, and Rawls reinterprets his theory to defend a limitation of it to the domain of the political.

Este trabalho discute a teoria do direito de Ronald Dworkin, desde sua gênese até seus desenvolvimentos mais recentes, com o objetivo específico de aferir a influência que esta sofreu da filosofia política de John Rawls e de sua concepção de justiça. Essa influência foi especialmente sentida na metodologia inicialmente concebida por Dworkin para responder às tradicionais questões de teoria geral do direito, já que estas teriam sido mal resolvidas pelos positivistas. O que se verifica é que tal método se baseia na idéia de equilíbrio reflexivo de Rawls. Essa intensa convergência que inicialmente se verifica é progressivamente afastada na medida em que Dworkin caminha rumo a um liberalismo abrangente, defendendo uma continuidade entre a moralidade política e a ética, e Rawls reinterpreta sua teoria para defender uma limitação desta ao domínio do político. / This paper will discuss Ronald Dworkins legal theory since its genesis till its most recent studies, aiming specifically assess how this theory was influenced by John Rawls political philosophy and his conception of justice. This influence was specially noticed in the methodology first conceived by Dworkin to respond to the traditional issues of jurisprudence, since these ones had been unresolved by the legal positivism. What can be verified is that such method is based on Rawls idea of reflective equilibrium. This strong convergence, that is initially observed, is gradually deviated insofar as Dworkin moves towards to a comprehensive liberalism, defending continuity between morality and ethics, and Rawls reinterprets his theory to defend a limitation of it to the domain of the political.

Aging-friendliness work uses a model of eight core domains to assess and achieve communities in which people are more equipped to age well, and remain in their community as they age. These domains are broken into the built environment (i.e., Housing, Transportation) and the social environment (i.e., Communication, Social Inclusion, Employment). This dissertation is centered on the efforts to make communities more aging-friendly, and focuses specifically on the Livable Lexington initiative. This dissertation utilized an exploratory study of a pre- and posttest evaluative design to pilot intergenerational discussion groups as a potential intervention. Intergenerational discussion groups were developed with the goal of changing community members’ perceptions of how aging-friendly their community is, and were a way of operationalizing Rawlsian concepts such as the Veil of Ignorance and Wide Reflective Equilibrium, with the end goal of Intergenerational Equity. The three outcome variables in the study were perceptions of 1) ability to age in place, with regard to domains, 2) overall aging-friendliness, and 3) ability to engage and participate in community activities (such as decision making). Recruited from an initial aging-friendly needs assessment developed by AARP, the intergenerational discussion groups (n = 40) exposed participants to an environment that allowed them to lead discussion around what would make their assigned core domains (i.e, housing, transportation, social inclusion, communication, employment, etc.) more aging-friendly. Participants in the discussion groups perceived a greater ability to age in place, with respect to the social environment (p < .001), as well as a greater ability to engage and participate in community activities (p < .001). Additionally, participants perceived their community as more aging-friendly after the intervention (p < .001). The participants, however, did not perceive a greater ability to age in place, with regard to the built environment (p < .001). Throughout the discussion, the results are tied back into the literature and theory, and reasons for the adverse result in the built environment are also discussed (while more time is often necessary to notice changes in the built environment). Implications for this research, as well as future recommendations are discussed, as well.

<p>International regulations target a global reduction of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions through the allocation of national reduction targets and the definition of mechanisms to achieve these targets. One of these mechanisms is international emissions trading, these trading programs have been the targets of widespread criticism since they were introduced into the policy-making arena. The point of departure in this study has been that the trading raises questions about morality, since it implies signals, which legitimates pollution. The main purpose with this study has been to find out if emissions trading systems can be morally justified with the method of wide reflective equilibrium. From the study it was found that the moral intuition; it is wrong to pollute the environment, and perform activities, which legitimates pollution, finds support from the different theories within environmental ethics and Kantian ethics. But, it was also found that there are a number of background theories, such as neo-classical economic thinking, liberalism, and utilitarianism, that supports the notion of emissions trading. The paper argues that even though the concept of CO2-emissions trading raises moral questions it can be morally defended on the basis of rationality. When the theory about specification is applied to the concept of emissions trading it is possible to reach a situation were a wide reflective equilibrium is achieved.</p>

<p>The objective for this study is to examine whether it is possible to use the method of reflective equilibrium in order to enhance the usefulness of public debates as a support for political decision-making. Since public debates from political quarters are seen as an important tool for policy-making, the need for a rational assessment of the views put forward in such debates are important. And since reflective equilibrium aims for coherence between judgments on different levels – intuitions, principles and theories, which all are put forward in public debates – the point of departure for this theses is that this method could be useful for the matter of bringing some kind of structure to public debates.</p><p>The analysis in this study shows that there actually are similarities between the method of reflective equilibrium and the course of public debates, since they both are characterized by the fact that viewpoints are mutually scrutinized in the light of one another. Further, it is argued that a more systematic applying of the method of reflective equilibrium would further the justification force of the outcome of public debates, since the method stresses the need of rationality and the importance of taking all relevant opinions into consideration. Therefore, the conclusion is that applying reflective equilibrium to public debates could make the political decision-making more democratic.</p>

The objective for this study is to examine whether it is possible to use the method of reflective equilibrium in order to enhance the usefulness of public debates as a support for political decision-making. Since public debates from political quarters are seen as an important tool for policy-making, the need for a rational assessment of the views put forward in such debates are important. And since reflective equilibrium aims for coherence between judgments on different levels – intuitions, principles and theories, which all are put forward in public debates – the point of departure for this theses is that this method could be useful for the matter of bringing some kind of structure to public debates. The analysis in this study shows that there actually are similarities between the method of reflective equilibrium and the course of public debates, since they both are characterized by the fact that viewpoints are mutually scrutinized in the light of one another. Further, it is argued that a more systematic applying of the method of reflective equilibrium would further the justification force of the outcome of public debates, since the method stresses the need of rationality and the importance of taking all relevant opinions into consideration. Therefore, the conclusion is that applying reflective equilibrium to public debates could make the political decision-making more democratic.

International regulations target a global reduction of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions through the allocation of national reduction targets and the definition of mechanisms to achieve these targets. One of these mechanisms is international emissions trading, these trading programs have been the targets of widespread criticism since they were introduced into the policy-making arena. The point of departure in this study has been that the trading raises questions about morality, since it implies signals, which legitimates pollution. The main purpose with this study has been to find out if emissions trading systems can be morally justified with the method of wide reflective equilibrium. From the study it was found that the moral intuition; it is wrong to pollute the environment, and perform activities, which legitimates pollution, finds support from the different theories within environmental ethics and Kantian ethics. But, it was also found that there are a number of background theories, such as neo-classical economic thinking, liberalism, and utilitarianism, that supports the notion of emissions trading. The paper argues that even though the concept of CO2-emissions trading raises moral questions it can be morally defended on the basis of rationality. When the theory about specification is applied to the concept of emissions trading it is possible to reach a situation were a wide reflective equilibrium is achieved.

Submitted by Maicon Juliano Schmidt (maicons) on 2015-07-17T18:36:17Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Daniel Ortiz Matos.pdf: 818253 bytes, checksum: 1c10bf270484c56dc65366f04aed9820 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-07-17T18:36:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Daniel Ortiz Matos.pdf: 818253 bytes, checksum: 1c10bf270484c56dc65366f04aed9820 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-12-17 / Nenhuma / Este trabalho é uma leitura (moral) da concepção teórica de Ronald Dworkin acerca dos princípios jurídicos. O ponto central é compreender a atuação dos princípios na teoria dworkiniana da decisão judicial tentando desvelar seu modelo de justificação subjacente. A exposição está subdividia em três partes. Na primeira, destinada ao célebre debate Hart-Dworkin, procura-se entender donde surgiu a ênfase aos princípios, não com uma repetição do embate argumentativo, mas, sobretudo, demonstrando as limitações teóricas e filosóficas do empreendimento hartiano e como os princípios as evidenciam. Na segunda, desenvolve-se um panorama geral da principiologia jurídica em Dworkin, relacionando com os conceitos-chave de sua teoria, tais como: a crítica à discricionariedade judicial; a tese dos direitos; a tese da (única) resposta correta; a comunidade de princípios e a concepção do “Direito como Integridade”. Na terceira e última, a discussão se voltará ao Coerentismo, especificamente, ao procedimento do equilíbrio reflexivo de Rawls e a sua incorporação na teoria da decisão de Dworkin, sendo, para tanto, indispensável à atuação dos princípios para a coerência do sistema jurídico e para a verificabilidade da correção das respostas judiciais. / This master's thesis is a (moral) reading of the theoretical conception of Ronald Dworkin about the legal principles. The main point is to understand the role of the principles in dworkinian theory of judicial decision trying to reveal its underlying justification model. This thesis is subdivided into three parts. In the first one, addressed for the famous Hart-Dworkin debate, the goal is to try to understand whence came the emphasis on principles, not as a repetition of the argumentative struggle, but, above all, demonstrating the theoretical and philosophical limitations of the hartian project and how the principles evidence them. In the second part, it is developed an overview of the legal set of principles in Dworkin, relating to the key concepts of his theory, such as: the critique of the judicial discretion; the thesis of the rights; the thesis of (only one) correct answer; the commonality of principles and the "Law as Integrity" conception. In the third and last part, the discussion will turn to Coherentism, specifically to the procedure of Rawls' reflective equilibrium and its incorporation in Dworkin's adjudication theory, and, therefore, indispensable to the role of the principles for the legal system coherence and to the verifiability of the correction of judicial responses.