Univ., Diss--Wien.

Thesis advisor: Susan Shell / One of Hobbes’s most provocative claims is that he is the first to articulate a true civil science. I argue on the basis of internal and external textual evidence that De Cive sheds a unique light on this statement and deserves careful study in isolation from his other works. Hobbes argues there that Socrates initiated a sea change in politics in which a mode of governing by divine mystery falls before the withering philosophical critique of his dilettante heirs. Afterward, regimes are forced to defend their power with rational arguments, and neither statesmen nor philosophers have been able to replace the old consensus with a solid foundation. Hobbes means to be the first to do so. The new civil science Hobbes proposes, lacking any physics or psychology on which it could be based, turns out to be a science of power modeled closely on the metaphor of repairing an artifact. The craftsman must possess adequate, not complete, knowledge of the parts and their interactions to repair or improve an artifact; the civil scientist likewise can perform his craft with just a working knowledge of human beings and their interactions. Just as the artisan depends on a prior understanding of the purpose of his artifact in order to judge its quality, the civil scientist must also presuppose some goal to be achieved that is not supplied by the scientific method itself. Hobbes provides arguments that internal political stability ought to be the scientist’s goal, but these are not scientific arguments on his terms. Contrary to Hobbes’s reputation as advancing a vision of science as complete, I show that his science turns out to be progressive and open to future revision. It must nevertheless maintain the appearance of certainty, as post-Socratic political instability is above all a conflict of ideas, and that battle can only be won by science rendering the final verdict in every argument. Hobbes’s definitional method appears to yield certain conclusions, but actually admits of improved definitions and therefore improved conclusions. It preserves the appearance of certainty while accommodating change and progress in human knowledge. Civil science breaks down the commonwealth into individuals and arrives at an abstract understanding of them sufficient to achieve its goal. It then shapes those individuals so that they fit together well. Human beings need to be oriented away from problematic transcendent interests and taught to recognize cosmopolitan mutual humanity and to cease categorizing others according to prejudicial pre-scientific categories. All human interactions, down to basic familial bonds, have to be reinterpreted according to the only reliable model of human interaction: consent to dominion. Hobbes borrows the language of natural law in order to package this teaching, which he justifies primarily on grounds of narrow self-interest, but then also as moral principles and divine commands in order to satisfy different readers. So shaped, individuals can be reassembled without disturbing existing peaceful relations to produce the internally stable, rational commonwealth. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2015. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

This thesis has three parts. The purpose of the first part is to analyse the origin, general characteristics, context and meaning of A Dialogue. I also include a history of the editions of this work, and a discussion on how the scholars have understood it. My intention is to explore the possibility of adding to their comments some additional reasons for Hobbes??? intentions in writing A Dialogue. In order to do all this, I have to take into account two main questions: ??? First, the relation between Hobbes (his life, ideas, aspirations, enemies) and A Dialogue; and ??? Second, the specific problem posed to Hobbes by common law. These issues correspond to the three chapters of Part One of the thesis. The second part of the thesis is divided into nine chapters; it analysis the content of A Dialogue section by section, trying to explain Hobbes??? interpretation of English law and legal history. According to Hobbes, an analysis of the rational principles expressed by both common and civil (Roman) law in England shows the indivisible nature of sovereignty. History, supposedly, confirms this. In the third part of the thesis I locate Hobbes??? legal philosophy as a science, according to the same deductive principles, which he states, are applied to geometry. Hobbes intends to make jurisprudence a form of scientific knowledge to reinforce the idea that sovereignty cannot be shared. While pursuing this philosophical enterprise, Hobbes wants to square his science of politics with English legal history. Hobbes argues that in England, except for the period during the civil wars, there has always been only one absolute ruler of the country. By taking this stand, Hobbes, indirectly calls for changes in the English constitutional order, to be made by advocating the authority of the past, and not only by advocating the application of reason.

Thomas Hobbes is a major thinker in the tradition of natural law theorizing, but there is much debate over where he breaks with the tradition preceding him. In this study, we argue Thomas Hobbes is best understood as a modern thinker with one foot in the older tradition of natural law exemplified by Thomas Aquinas and Francisco Suarez. / text

This thesis has three parts. The purpose of the first part is to analyse the origin, general characteristics, context and meaning of A Dialogue. I also include a history of the editions of this work, and a discussion on how the scholars have understood it. My intention is to explore the possibility of adding to their comments some additional reasons for Hobbes??? intentions in writing A Dialogue. In order to do all this, I have to take into account two main questions: ??? First, the relation between Hobbes (his life, ideas, aspirations, enemies) and A Dialogue; and ??? Second, the specific problem posed to Hobbes by common law. These issues correspond to the three chapters of Part One of the thesis. The second part of the thesis is divided into nine chapters; it analysis the content of A Dialogue section by section, trying to explain Hobbes??? interpretation of English law and legal history. According to Hobbes, an analysis of the rational principles expressed by both common and civil (Roman) law in England shows the indivisible nature of sovereignty. History, supposedly, confirms this. In the third part of the thesis I locate Hobbes??? legal philosophy as a science, according to the same deductive principles, which he states, are applied to geometry. Hobbes intends to make jurisprudence a form of scientific knowledge to reinforce the idea that sovereignty cannot be shared. While pursuing this philosophical enterprise, Hobbes wants to square his science of politics with English legal history. Hobbes argues that in England, except for the period during the civil wars, there has always been only one absolute ruler of the country. By taking this stand, Hobbes, indirectly calls for changes in the English constitutional order, to be made by advocating the authority of the past, and not only by advocating the application of reason.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 527-562).

Submitted by Renata Lopes (renatasil82@gmail.com) on 2016-10-06T11:51:10Z No. of bitstreams: 1 rodrigochavesdemellorodriguesdecarvalho.pdf: 375865 bytes, checksum: 02416ee6051281383449855f83e6d645 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Diamantino Mayra (mayra.diamantino@ufjf.edu.br) on 2016-10-06T12:31:40Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 rodrigochavesdemellorodriguesdecarvalho.pdf: 375865 bytes, checksum: 02416ee6051281383449855f83e6d645 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-10-06T12:31:40Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 rodrigochavesdemellorodriguesdecarvalho.pdf: 375865 bytes, checksum: 02416ee6051281383449855f83e6d645 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-03-18 / A partir da leitura das obras de Thomas Hobbes e Baruch Spinoza, o presente trabalho tem por objetivo refletir sobre a relação entre apropriação do mundo e realização da liberdade humana, vendo-a como uma relação fundamental ao desenvolvimento da filosofia política moderna. Mais especificamente, objetivamos visualizar como uma problemática historicamente secular - a que correlaciona homem, liberdade e desejo (cupiditas) –apresentou-se de forma central no debate filosófico do século XVII, levando-o a solucionar-se em sentidos ontológicos diametralmente opostos. / From the readings of the works of Thomas Hobbes and Baruch Spinoza, this MA thesis aims at the analysis of the relation between the appropriation of the world and the realization of human freedom, understanding this relation as a fundamental aspect to the development of modern political philosophy. More specifically, we aimed at seeing how a historically secular problem – related to man, freedom and desire (cupiditas) – is presented in the centre of the philosophical debate from the seventeenth century, leading it to ontological resolutions diametrically opposite.

[pt] Thomas Hobbes, ao enunciar, no Leviatã, que a riqueza e prosperidade de todos os membros individuais são a força da república, toma o termo riqueza sob dois sentidos distintos: o de uma coleção de bens — sentido substantivo — e o de poder de obtenção de bens futuros — sentido transitivo. Embora o último, ao longo dos séculos desde Hobbes, tenha-se eclipsado pelo primeiro, a importância fundamental do conceito de crédito no jogo das trocas sociais aponta que uma análise da riqueza que enfatize seu caráter transitivo, em sua relação com a expectativa quanto ao tempo futuro, é necessária para que se possa entender, em toda a sua complexidade, a atribuição de valor aos bens, bem como para realinhar a análise econômica à finalidade da Política. A riqueza, enquanto signo de expressão do poder, refaz, assim, o entendimento da ideia de pobreza, que deixa de denotar essencialmente um estado de escassez material, para ser entendido sobretudo como estado de miséria e servidão. / [en] Thomas Hobbes, when enunciating, in Leviathan, that wealth and riches of all the particular members are the strenght of the Commonwealth, takes the term riches in two distinct senses: that of a collection of goods — a substantive sense — and that of power of obtaining future goods — a transitive sense. Although the latter, over the centuries since Hobbes, has been eclipsed by the former, the fundamental importance of the concept of credit in the dynamic of social exchanges points out that an analysis of riches that emphasizes their transitive character, its relation to the expectation of future time, is necessary in order to understand, in all its complexity, the attribution of value to the goods, as well as to realign the economic analysis to the purpose of the Policy. Riches, as signs of power expression, transform, thus, the understanding of the concept of poverty, which ceases to denote essentially a state of material scarcity, to be understood above all as a state of misery and servitude.

This thesis will inquire into the practicable strategies that Thomas Hobbes described in his major works of political philosophy, on the one hand, to allow his sovereign to ensure civil peace, and on the other, to enable his sovereign to defend the commonwealth. In terms of civil peace, the exercise of Hobbes's sovereign's 'absolute' authority is tempered by, and contingent on, its practical efficacy for securing and maintaining a peaceful commonwealth. To that end, I will argue that Hobbes's sovereign is obliged to rule according to the natural laws, and entailed in this obligation are coinciding liberties which Hobbes believed that subjects must perceive themselves to possess, and which sovereigns must respect, in order for peace to be realised. However, rather than situating the purpose of Hobbes's project in terms of civil peace alone—as the vast majority of his interpreters have—I consider alongside the purpose of civil peace, and contrast it with, the purpose of defence. Evident from this comparison is that the means by which Hobbes's sovereign must ensure the capability of the commonwealth to defend itself from foreign nations simultaneously undermines and counteracts his otherwise proto-liberal system. Distinct from other prominent interpretations, I will argue that this ambivalence is not a result of an imbalance between subjects' rights contra sovereign's rights, nor yet of an unsupervised agonistic counter-balance between the two. Instead, the affirmation of subjects' inalienable rights are depicted by Hobbes as a practically ineffective means by which to ensure defence. There exists a necessary ambivalence within Hobbes's theory of sovereignty itself and is to be managed solely according to the sovereign's ideally prudent and practicable judgment. Ultimately, I will characterize Hobbes as arguing that the unfortunate necessity of preparedness for foreign defensive wars is best mitigated by the sovereign's prudent and minimal exercise of the commonwealth's power in carrying out this intended purpose.

Thesis advisor: Richard Cobb-Stevens / The right of revolution in the social contract theories of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke is a curious topic. This paper discusses the differences and similarities between the two philosophers’ discussions of this topic. It is argued that Hobbes and Locke differ most drastically on the notion of who the sovereign is. While Hobbes prefers to establish the sovereign as a demigod, Locke understands the sovereign as a mortal, and thus fallible, man. It is because of this distinction that Hobbes and Locke disagree on the notion of the right of revolution. Furthermore, the American Founding Fathers, including James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, inherited Locke’s perspective on this matter when arguing for the independence of the colonies. Finally, it is the conclusion of this paper that this notion of the right of revolution continues today, when observing the numerous political revolutions around the world. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2011. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: College Honors Program. / Discipline: Philosophy.