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Summary This article examines the constitutionality of the common-law rule that one person may kill another in defence of property. This rule is mostly associated with Ex parte Minister van Justisie: In re: S v Van Wyk. The authors draw a clear distinction between the use of violence (including homicide) in defence of life and limb, on the one hand, and in defence of property, on the other. Most decided cases illustrate the close link between the private defence of defending life and of protecting property. The Constitutional Court recently declared unconstitutional s 49(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act (allowing blameless killing to effect arrest). No court has yet pronounced on the Van Wyk rule. Authors differ about its constitutionality. In this article, following the two-phased approach to constitutional interpretation, the authors conclude that the rule is unconstitutional: The serious limitation of rights which the rule causes is not justifiable in terms of s 36 of the Constitution.

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This thesis has three parts. The purpose of the first part is to analyse the origin, general characteristics, context and meaning of A Dialogue. I also include a history of the editions of this work, and a discussion on how the scholars have understood it. My intention is to explore the possibility of adding to their comments some additional reasons for Hobbes??? intentions in writing A Dialogue. In order to do all this, I have to take into account two main questions: ??? First, the relation between Hobbes (his life, ideas, aspirations, enemies) and A Dialogue; and ??? Second, the specific problem posed to Hobbes by common law. These issues correspond to the three chapters of Part One of the thesis. The second part of the thesis is divided into nine chapters; it analysis the content of A Dialogue section by section, trying to explain Hobbes??? interpretation of English law and legal history. According to Hobbes, an analysis of the rational principles expressed by both common and civil (Roman) law in England shows the indivisible nature of sovereignty. History, supposedly, confirms this. In the third part of the thesis I locate Hobbes??? legal philosophy as a science, according to the same deductive principles, which he states, are applied to geometry. Hobbes intends to make jurisprudence a form of scientific knowledge to reinforce the idea that sovereignty cannot be shared. While pursuing this philosophical enterprise, Hobbes wants to square his science of politics with English legal history. Hobbes argues that in England, except for the period during the civil wars, there has always been only one absolute ruler of the country. By taking this stand, Hobbes, indirectly calls for changes in the English constitutional order, to be made by advocating the authority of the past, and not only by advocating the application of reason.

This paper justifies and delineates a common law right to privacy. The first part of the paper reviews the current state of the law of privacy. The second part defines privacy by distinguishing privacy rights from those otherwise protected by the common law. The paper argues that the appropriate organizing principle behind the legal concept of privacy is the idea of control over one’s interactions with others. The third part argues that protection of privacy at common law is justified both pursuant to the demands of the Charter and with a theoretical understanding of private law based on a Kantian notion of Right. The final part argues that such an analysis determines the substantive nature of the protection that should be afforded at common law, namely that privacy should be protected from both intentional and negligent interference.

This paper justifies and delineates a common law right to privacy. The first part of the paper reviews the current state of the law of privacy. The second part defines privacy by distinguishing privacy rights from those otherwise protected by the common law. The paper argues that the appropriate organizing principle behind the legal concept of privacy is the idea of control over one’s interactions with others. The third part argues that protection of privacy at common law is justified both pursuant to the demands of the Charter and with a theoretical understanding of private law based on a Kantian notion of Right. The final part argues that such an analysis determines the substantive nature of the protection that should be afforded at common law, namely that privacy should be protected from both intentional and negligent interference.

Inaug.-Diss.--Frankfurt am Main. / Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Bibliography: p. 129-132.

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