This thesis examines the question of how primitive states form. The first part of the thesis defines a state. I then analyse Hobbes�s Theory of the Commonwealth by Acquisition (TCA), expounded in Leviathan. I conclude that this theory fails as an answer to the question of how primitive states form as it suffers from at least five major flaws. I go on to explain, modify and correct Hobbes�s TCA through techniques that have been used in modern critiques of Hobbes�s Theory of the Commonwealth by Institution. The result is the strongest possible answer that Hobbes can give to the question of how primitive states form. I conclude that his attempt fails as even if the technical aspects of his theory can be fixed, the overall problem of empirical falsification occurs. I then put forward my own theory, based on the modified Hobbesian theory. The major innovation is the replacement of individuals with groups in the Hobbesian State of Nature. This move answers the problem of empirical falsification, at least initially. The theory also helps to explain several of the more technical problems with Hobbes�s theory. The resulting theory is a Hobbesian theory of primitive state formation. The next step in the thesis is to match the Hobbesian theory of primitive state formation to the empirical evidence of primitive state formation, represented by anthropology. I analyse the anthropological literature and put forward that at least one recent research program in anthropology matches my Hobbesian theory of primitive state formation. I conclude that Hobbesian theory, based on the TCA can be successfully modernised into a plausible answer to the question of how primitive states formed.

This study mainly investigates the reason of living in civil society, the motives of people to live under the government and necessity of commonwealth by design to live in peace based on modern social contract theories of Hobbes and Locke. Hobbes has a decisive role for developing a western political thought and Locke goes a step further to put superiority of the community and latitude of thought in his theory. In order to examine these topics, similarities of both philosophers in terms of their effort on setting free political thoughts from medieval world view, and their differentiations regarding considerations on human nature, desires and rights of men, formation of the society and the role of government are focused on.

This paper explains the relationship and different arguments concerning freedom of speech. It uses Swedish newspaper columns, such as editorial pages, as its main source. The paper is mainly based upon the work of John Stuart Mill and his book On Freedom and Thomas Hobbes work Leviathan. The main focus is to see if there’s any connection between the Swedish newspapers and the theories which in itself is based upon the two works. The method that was used throughout this thesis was a content analysis which means that all of the newspaper articles and columns were analyzed and put into three different categories with category number one being based upon John Stuart Mill and his ideas, and number three being based upon Thomas Hobbes. Number two worked as a middle way and combined both of the theories. In those separate categories they were read and analyzed after arguments. Arguments that were often recurring were the main focus and were also the ones that were used for the final conclusion. The conclusion was based on the articles and the output was that the majority of the articles actually went on the same line as John Stuart Mill and that a few would like to see some kind of restriction on freedom of speech.

Government / This report aims to broaden the horizon of research questions in international relations by encouraging a greater appreciation for the complexity of individual and collective motivations. More specifically, the report focuses on why the honor motive is ignored in the discipline and why it deserves more attention. / text

This thesis examines the question of how primitive states form. The first part of the thesis defines a state. I then analyse Hobbes�s Theory of the Commonwealth by Acquisition (TCA), expounded in Leviathan. I conclude that this theory fails as an answer to the question of how primitive states form as it suffers from at least five major flaws. I go on to explain, modify and correct Hobbes�s TCA through techniques that have been used in modern critiques of Hobbes�s Theory of the Commonwealth by Institution. The result is the strongest possible answer that Hobbes can give to the question of how primitive states form. I conclude that his attempt fails as even if the technical aspects of his theory can be fixed, the overall problem of empirical falsification occurs. I then put forward my own theory, based on the modified Hobbesian theory. The major innovation is the replacement of individuals with groups in the Hobbesian State of Nature. This move answers the problem of empirical falsification, at least initially. The theory also helps to explain several of the more technical problems with Hobbes�s theory. The resulting theory is a Hobbesian theory of primitive state formation. The next step in the thesis is to match the Hobbesian theory of primitive state formation to the empirical evidence of primitive state formation, represented by anthropology. I analyse the anthropological literature and put forward that at least one recent research program in anthropology matches my Hobbesian theory of primitive state formation. I conclude that Hobbesian theory, based on the TCA can be successfully modernised into a plausible answer to the question of how primitive states formed.

Thesis (Diplomarbeit)--Universität München. / Includes bibliographical references (p.[181]-200).

Dans "Les passions de l’âme", Descartes fait de l’admiration « la première de toutes les passions ». L’admiration n’est plus, comme dans la tradition antique du Thaumazein, la passion distinctive du philosophe, elle devient le premier moment de la vie affective de l’homme dans son rapport aux choses extérieures. Passion de la première rencontre, l’admiration ne serait finalement que la passion de l’enfance – condamnée à se dissoudre dans la connaissance à laquelle elle donne lieu. Une telle disparition est-elle pour autant inéluctable ? Qu’est-ce qui doit être supposé de la nature de l’admiration pour qu’il soit acceptable de la faire durer dans le temps ? L’admiration est-elle une passion dynamique qui incite à penser ou au contraire un affect statique qui empêche l’exercice de la raison ? L’analyse cherche à mettre au jour la manière dont l’admiration est devenue un problème central de l’anthropologie classique. La promotion cartésienne de l’admiration, loin d’être un geste singulier, se trouve ainsi réinscrite dans son contexte théorique. À partir de textes philosophiques, médicaux, moraux et esthétiques du XVIIe siècle, il s’agit de se demander si,loin d’être seulement subie, comme le corrélat affectif d’une ignorance inaugurale,l’admiration peut également faire l’objet d’une maîtrise technique susceptible de la produire et de la reproduire indéfiniment à des fins stratégiques ou récréatives. Dès lors qu’elle est soustraite à la stricte exigence épistémique, l’admiration peut en effet se présenter comme la finalité spécifique de l’existence mondaine aussi bien que des productions artistiques du grand siècle, que l’on peut alors considérer comme le siècle de l’admiration. / In The Passions of the Soul, Descartes presents wonder as «the first of all passions». Wonderis no longer, as it used to be in the antic tradition of thaumazein, the philosopher’s distinctive passion, but the first moment in a man’s emotional life, regarding his relationship to external items. As the passion of the first encounter, wonder appears reducible to the childhood’s passion - condemned to dissolve itself in the knowledge it enables. Is such a disappearence unavoidable ? How must one think the nature of wonder to make admissible its duration intime ? Is wonder a dynamic passion spuring one to start thinking or on the contrary, a static effect preventing the exercice of reason ?The analysis tries to uncover the way wonder became a central problem in classic anthropology. Cartesian’s promotion of wonder, far from being a singular act, is fully put inits theoretical context. Based on philosophical, medical, moral and aesthetics texts from the17th century, we ought to ask if, far from being only suffered - as the emotional correlate ofan inaugural ignorance -, wonder can be technically masterd and likely to be produced andreproduced endlessly, for strategic or recreational purposes. When substracted from the strict epistemic requirement, wonder can actually present itself as the specific end of the social existence or of the artistic productions of the Great Century - which can be now regarded asthe century of wonder.

This paper is a case study on Bradley E. Manning, famous for leaking classified intelligence to media, or in the charge sheet’s words: “knowingly give intelligence to the enemy, through indirect means.” My opinion is that this sort of dilemma is a question of values, how you view the world and, most important of all, human rights and the philosophy of rights. Therefore I decided to sort out the arguments regarding the issue of freedom of speech versus the state’s need for protection. To do this I performed a pro et contra analysis from John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty and Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan, this building my theory on which I lean my other work upon. Furthermore, I performed a case study on Manning where I compared the charges and the defense with the arguments of Mill and Hobbes. Ergo: I applied my theory on an existing conflict between freedom of speech and the state’s need for protection to see which arguments that are used in the charge against Manning and if one could derive this from the argumentation analysis consistent of Mill and Hobbes.   Words: 11474

Justice, and what is just, have been discussed by many with no true definition to go by and both political and moral theories alike have tried to find the right definition of what justice is supposed to be. This study will use three political theories to tackle the question if the american election system can be considered just or unjust. The three theories are John Rawls’s Justice as fairness, Thomas Hobbes and the social contract and lastly Robert Nozick’s libertarianism. To analyse the framing of question a normative ‘givet-att’ analyse method will be used, to form arguments from the values presented in the three different theories of justice. The conclusions drawn from the analysis are in the cases of Rawls and Hobbes theories quite similar, on how the election system should be interpreted. Nozick’s theory on the other hand gives a different conclusion compared to the other two. However, the goal of this study is not to find one true answer to whether the election system can be called just or not, but rather to show it from different perspectives of justice and how that can affect the view of the election system.

In recent years, The Swedish Moderate Party have repeatedly used the term social contract. What do they mean by this concept that has its roots in the philosophers during the Enlightenment? These thinkers lived in a different time with political problems of ther time. To answer the reserach question, the Moderates' new proposal for an idea program has acted as a research object and a discriptive idea analysis have been done on the text. To then analyze this material, different Ideal types have been used that have been inspired by Enlightenment philosophers and given diffrent types of contract theories. Central points of the social contract theory have been examined and similair ideas as to the philosophers has been found in the idea proposal, some more than others. New ideas have also been seen that can be linked to the social contract. Finally, it is discussed whether the concept has to some extent lost its meaning or whether it is relevant that the concept does not mean the same thing today as three hundred years ago.