In the first chapter, I examine the effect of social learning on social norms of cooperation. To this end I develop an 'anti-social learning' game. This is a dynamic social dilemma in which all agents know how to cooperate but a proportion are informed and know of privately profitable but socially costly, or uncooperative, actions. In equilibrium agents are able to infer, or learn, the payoffs to the actions of prior agents. Agents can then learn through observation that some socially costly action is privately profitable. This implies that an informed agent behaving uncooperatively can induce others to behave uncooperatively when, in the absence of observational learning, they would have otherwise been cooperative. However, this influence also gives informed agents an incentive to cooperate - not cooperating may induce others to not cooperate. I use this model to give conditions under which social learning propagates cooperative behaviour and conditions under which social learning propagates uncooperative behaviour. In the second chapter, I present a co-authored model of a self-fulfilling price cycle in an asset market. In this model the dividend stream of the economy's asset stock is constant yet price oscillates deterministically even though the underlying environment is stationary. This creates a model in which there is rational excess volatility - 'excess' in the sense that it does not reflect changes in dividend streams and 'rational' in that all agents are acting on their best information. The mechanism that we uncover is driven by endogenous variation in the investment horizons of the different market participants, informed and uninformed. On even days, the price is high; on odd days it is low. On even days, informed traders are willing to jettison their good assets, knowing that they can buy them back the next day, when the price is low. The anticipated drop in price more than offsets any potential loss in dividend. Because of these asset sales, the informed build up their cash holdings. Understanding that the market is flooded with good assets, the uninformed traders are willing to pay a high price. But their investment horizon is longer than that of the informed traders: their intention is to hold the assets they purchase, not to resell. On odd days, the price is low because the uninformed recognise that the informed are using their cash holdings to cherry-pick good assets from the market. Now the uninformed, like the informed, are investing short-term. Rather than buy-and-hold as they do with assets purchased on even days, on odd days the uninformed are buying to sell. Notice that, at the root of the model, there lies a credit constraint. Although the informed are flush with cash on odd days, they are not deep pockets. On each cherry that they pick out of the market, they earn a high return: buying cheap, selling dear. However they don't have enough cash to strip the market of cherries and thereby bid the price up. The final chapter is on identifying the role of privilege in determining inter- generational mobility. The intergenerational elasticity of income is the standard measurement economists use for intergenerational mobility. It is not clear how we should interpret intergenerational elasticities. Particularly, high intergenerational elasticities could either reflect inequality of opportunity or the importance of genetically heritable characteristics in determining genes. Behavioural geneticists have long been using a twin based variance decomposition method, the ACE model, to estimate the genetic heritability of various characteristics. It is not clear, however, what this approach implies for intergenerational mobility of equality of opportunity. I develop a novel method that extends the methodology used in behavioural genetics to identifying how much of the intergenerational elasticity of income is determined by the presence (absence) of environmental privileges associated with being children of high (low) earners. Using this approach we can examine the counterfactuals of giving a poorer child the environment of a richer child; equalising the privileges associated with family income; and equalising the family environmental factors not associated with parental income. Furthermore, this method allows us to identify how good parental income is as a measure of family environment. The model I develop nests the behavioural genetics model allowing us to relax some of the identifying assumptions used in the standard ACE model. Finally, I apply this method to data on the income elasticities between American males of different types of relation: fraternal twins, identical twins and father-son relationships. The results of this application suggest that a 1 percent increase in the privilege associated with parental income increases child income by about 1 tenth of a percent. Equalising, to the mean, the environmental privileges across the population results in about a 30 percent drop in the intergenerational elasticity of income and a 5 percent drop in the variance of income across the population. These results must be treated tentatively as the twin data comes from a separate survey to the data on intergenerational elasticities.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Case Western Reserve University, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 162-170). Also available online.

Thesis (M.A.)--Carleton University, 1994. / Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Conflict within and between social groups is a conspicuous feature of cooperative animal societies. Theoretical and empirical research aims to understand the role of within- and between-group conflict in the evolution of cooperative behaviour, but these forms of conflict are rarely studied together. Eviction as a means of within-group conflict resolution can have important implications for the individuals involved, and the wider population through effects on dispersal, gene flow, and population structure. Intergroup conflict, although prevalent in many social species, is relatively understudied outside of humans and chimpanzees, but could play an important role in the evolution of cooperative behaviours. However, currently there is a lack of understanding of the causes and consequences of within- and between-group conflict to be able to draw conclusions on theoretical links to their role in social evolution. In this thesis, I use a wild population of banded mongooses, Mungos mungo, to investigate the causes and consequences of eviction and intergroup conflict in a highly cooperative species. First, I show that eviction in banded mongooses is triggered by reproductive competition in both sexes (Chapter 2). Second, I find that, once the decision to evict has been made, younger females and those older, more closely related females are preferentially evicted (Chapter 3). This surprising result is explained by a theoretical model which shows that, where individuals are capable of resisting eviction, the usual prediction of positive kin discrimination can be reversed. Third, I show that eviction has demographic effects, with consequences for group size and recruitment (Chapter 4). Finally, I show that intergroup conflict is stimulated by intensified resource competition, and that the consequences of intergroup conflict can have measureable costs to both individuals and groups in the long- and short-term (Chapter 5). This work shows that the means of resolving within-group conflict at an individual level can resonate to affect demography and dynamics at higher levels, and that the nature and intensity of intergroup conflict has the potential to influence patterns of cooperation and conflict within groups. I suggest that within- and between-group conflict may often be intimately linked, and that recognising this link could help to advance our conceptual understanding of their role in the evolution of cooperative behaviour.

The maintenance of cooperation and altruism in the face of manipulation by exploitative cheaters that reap the benefits of cooperative acts without paying the associated costs is a conundrum in evolutionary biology. Cheaters should spread through a population causing it to crash, yet cooperation is common. There are many models and theories that attempt to explain this apparent contradiction. The social amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum, like many microbial species has been used as a model organism to test these theories and to begin to understand the genetic mechanisms behind social behaviours. The aim of this PhD project is to quantify the interactions that occur between naturally-occurring genotypes during social competition in order to identify the types of cheating behaviours and to understand the evolutionary consequences of such behaviours. I first demonstrate that there is a social hierarchy of genotypes and that cheaters can increase their own fitness by increasing their own spore allocation or decreasing their partner's allocation the precise nature of which is dependent upon unique interactions between each competing pair. I also show that the outcome of social competition is dependent upon the physical environment where it can be significantly reduced, or even avoided by segregation of genotypes during development. Finally, it is demonstrated in a collaborative project that much of the observed social behaviour can be explained in terms of the production of and response to developmental signals.

Collaborative processes are widely used to harness resources for addressing community problems. Despite their positive potential, collaborative projects can fragment. Sources of fragmentation include participant misperception of facts, difficulties in defining the problem, and misunderstandings among stakeholders. Disruptions from these elements may impede a group's progress in fostering and implementing agreements. Theoretical and empirical research from conflict resolution has shown that discussing participant interests and the use of facilitation techniques can help negotiators engage in innovative problem solving. Interests are participants' underlying needs, concerns, and desires that shape how individuals perceive issues and the stances they take. Less attention has been given to designing multi–party collaborative processes so that participant interests are explicitly defined and addressed. This comparative case study used mixed methods to examine the role of interests on the evolution of five successfully implemented multi-party collaborative cases. The research examined how participant interests were identified, how facilitation techniques were used, and how stakeholders' interests were addressed in each case. Results show that in all cases, identifying participant interests helped participants understand the central problems, seek information, and use creative problem solving. The use of techniques such as clarifying questions and shared learning experiences in the context of regular face-to–face meetings fostered participant understanding of the issues and each others' interests. In four of the five cases, participants' understanding of other stakeholders' interests affected their perspective on the issues, improved understanding of individual barriers, shaped the agreement, and motivated participants to stay committed to the project. Project staff members and participant leaders used facilitation techniques for identifying actors'’ substantive interests and clarifying issues. These techniques addressed participant relationship and process interests. In the cases with higher levels of fragmentation, participant interests were connected to values, individuals used competitive bargaining tactics, and trust influenced the willingness of participants to share interests. Facilitation techniques were crucial for encouraging trust building among stakeholders and for managing disruptions. These findings indicate that managers will increase problem solving capacity in collaborative processes by explicitly using negotiation-–based facilitation techniques to identify and address participant interests.

Multiple group memberships are the rule rather than the exception. Locally operating groups frequently offer the advantage of providing social recognition and higher marginal benefits to the individual, whereas globally operating groups may be more beneficial from a social perspective. Within a voluntary contribution environment we experimentally investigate the tension that arises when subjects belong to a smaller local and a larger global group. When the global public good is more efficient individuals first attempt to cooperate in the global public good. However, this tendency quickly unravels and cooperation in the local public good builds up. (author´s abstract) / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

Die vorliegende Arbeit gliedert sich in zwei Teile. Der erste Teil widmet sich der Fragestellung inwiefern formelle Gruppeneigentumsrechte Herkunftsgemeinschaften vor unautorisierten Verwendungen ihrer traditionellen kulturellen Ausdrucksweisen (TKAs) schützen können. Kapitel 2 und 3 führen hierzu einen ökonomischen Vergleich fünf so genannter sui generis Rechte zum Schutz jener TKAs durch und leiten Politikempfehlungen ab. Zum einen bilden die Beiträge eine Rangfolge der Transaktionskosten, die bei Verhandlung über Verwendungen der TKAs entstehen können. Zum anderen vergleichen die Kapitel, ob die Schutzpräferenzen der Ursprungsgemeinschaft durch die Modelgesetze geschützt wären. Hierbei zeigt sich, dass ein Prinzipal-Agenten-Problem auftritt sollten staatliche Behörden über zu viel Verhandlungsmacht verfügen. In diesem Fall werden Bürokraten eher ihre eigenen Interessen als die der Eigentümer der TKAs durchsetzen. Letztendlich existiert zwischen beiden Effekten ein klarer Trade-Off: Je mehr ein Gesetz die Schutzinteressen der Ursprungsgemeinschaften schützt desto höher sind seine Transaktions- und somit sozialen Kosten. Der zweite Teil dieser Arbeit behandelt – auf Basis ökonomischer Laborexperimente – den Fragenkomplex wie Gruppenmitglieder öffentliche Güter im Kontext kulturellen Eigentums – so wie TKAs – bereitstellen. Der Fokus liegt hierbei auf dem Einfluss sozialer Identität auf das Ausmaß an positiver sowie negativer Reziprozität der Individuen als Determinanten der sozialen Wohlfahrt. Die bedingte Kooperation der Gruppenmitglieder sowie das gegenseitige Bestrafungsverhalten untereinander bilden hierfür Maße für positive und negative Reziprozität. Kapitel 4 zeigt, dass Individuen unter dem Einfluss sozialer Identität grundsätzlich divergierende Kooperationspräferenzen abhängig davon mit wem sie interagieren aufzeigen. Auf Basis eines Within-Subject-Designs und mehreren ein-Perioden Spielen in Strategiemethode, zeigt der Beitrag, dass Individuen in identitäts-homogenen Gruppen (In-Group) die Präferenz für eine höhere bedingte Kooperation und weniger Eigennutzorientierung als in einer heterogenen Gruppe (Out-Group) zeigen. Zusätzlich neigen Individuen in heterogenen Gruppen eher zu einem vollständigen Trittbrettfahrerverhalten. Somit könnten Politikinstitutionen, die den Zusammenhalt einer Gruppe betonen, die soziale Wohlfahrt steigern. Auf der Basis eines zehn-Perioden-Spiels zeigt Kapitel 5, dass hauptsächlich vergleichsweise höhere Erwartungen an die Kooperation der Mitglieder in einer In-Group als an die in einer Out-Group Wohlfahrtsgewinne in homogenen Gruppen im Zuge mehrperiodischer Interaktionen auslösen. Die bedingte Kooperation – hier die Erwiderung der eigenen Erwartungen an die Kooperation der Gruppenmitglieder durch eigene Beiträge – ist hingegen in In- und Out- Groups ähnlich. Insgesamt belegt dieser Beitrag somit, dass Erwartungen der Individuen der entscheidende Faktor für das Beitragsverhalten der Gruppenmitglieder unter sozialer Identität ist. Kapitel 6 analysiert inwiefern die Möglichkeit einer gegenseitigen Bestrafung die Kooperationsbereitschaft unter dem Einfluss sozialer Identität ändert. Hierzu verwendet der Beitrag ein-Perioden-Spiele in Strategiemethode sowohl mit als auch ohne Bestrafung. Es zeigt sich, dass die Antizipation einer Bestrafung in heterogenen Gruppen zur größten Anhebung der Kooperationsbereitschaft führt, was am deutlichsten durch das Verhalten der Free-Rider ausgelöst wird. Darüber hinaus hebt die Bestrafungsinstitution unterschiede in der Kooperationsbereitschaft zwischen homo- und heterogenen Gruppen auf, die sich typischer Weise zugunsten homogener Gruppen verlagert. Letztlich deuten die Ergebnisse darauf hin, dass im Vergleich zu einer Situation in der ausschließlich eine Bestrafungsinstitution vorliegt, eine zusätzliche Identitätszuschreibung die Wohlfahrt zusätzlich erhöht. Mit Fokus auf negativer Reziprozität untersucht Kapitel 7 die Frage inwiefern soziale Identität das Bestrafungsverhalten gegenüber Gruppenmitgliedern beeinflusst, die weniger zum öffentlichen Gut beitragen als der Bestrafende. Hier zeigt sich, dass Mitglieder identitäts-homogener Gruppen seltener und in geringerer Höhe bestrafen, als es in heterogenen Gruppen der Fall ist. Darüber hinaus ist das Bestrafungsverhalten in heterogenen Gruppen signifikant stärker durch Ärger-ähnliche Emotionen motiviert als in homogenen Gruppen. Insgesamt zeigt der zweite Teil dieser Dissertation, dass Identitätszuschreibungen sowohl positive als auch negative Reziprozität beeinflussen und somit die soziale Wohlfahrt bei der Bereitstellung öffentlicher Güter – auch im Kontext kulturellen Eigentums – beeinflussen. Diese Ergebnisse sind demzufolge für Verhaltensabschätzungen im Rahmen von Politikempfehlungen relevant, die sich auf Situation mit dem Charakter öffentlicher Güter beziehen.

The present work approaches the matter of the Law of Property and its social function according to John Rawls theory of justice, having the intention to understand what the role of the property is to the author, the ways of property which are considered fair by him and, if it answers to the principles of justice and property which fitted with its social purpose. For such, it deals with, firstly, in chapter 1, the conteporary conception of law of property, which is inserted within a more humanitary, cooperative pespective of society and reciprocity, longing to a socialeconomical harmony and the effectiviness of certain human necesseties to improve the pespective of the citizens lives. Carrying on in this chapter, it is studied Locke s concept of private property to demonstrate the points where his theory disagree with John Rawls theory, thus it brings more individual view of property and it adopts a restricted conception of this right. Locke defends the unlimited accumulation of wealth, being the property turned, only, to the individual growth of the owner and to benefit the business, and then not existing a distributive and cooperative justice. Macpherson criticizes Locke s theory since it is extremely individualist. Chapter 2 aims to analyse the main ideas of Rawls theory of justice, seaching for the main and fundamental concepts so that chapter 3 is well-understood. Rawls supports the distributive justice and encourages the social cooperation. For this author, the basic liberties are inegotiable and the object of his theory is the basic structure of the society as an equitative system of social cooperation among free and iqual citizens. In order to reach this, the individuals make an agreement under the veil of ignorance to formulate the principles of justice which will run the institutions of a democratic constitutional fair society. Chapter 3 fights against the matter of the law of property for this author, a big suppoter of the distributive justice and of the social cooperation, which understands the law of property as basic good, because it helps to accomplish the expectations of the citizens lives, and it must also be capatible to the other rights and liberties which belong to a social system to provide a honored life. Rawls thought was a target for criticism by Robert Nozick, whom rescued Locke s theory of appropriation, not agreeing with the notion of distributive justice and of social cooperation, counteracting in several points to the Rawls theory of justice. However, according to the philosophers Álvaro de Vita, Will Kimlicka and Van Parijs, the defense of John Rawls theory was made, because they support the thought of this author, abova all objections shown by Nozick. Thus, the right of property must have a social mean to promote certain basic needs of the individuals, and this is clear in Rawls work so that he believes in social cooperation, in the effectiviness of human dignity, of self-respect, of self-steem and of their own citizenship, through a distributive justice. / O presente trabalho aborda a questão do direito de propriedade e sua função social a partir da teoria da justiça de John Rawls, com a intenção de compreender qual o papel da propriedade para o autor, as formas de propriedade consideradas justas para ele e, se atende aos princípios da justiça a propriedade que cumpre com uma finalidade social. Para tanto, trata-se, primeiramente, no capítulo 1, a concepção contemporânea de direito de propriedade, o qual está inserido numa perspectiva mais humanitária, cooperativa, de sociabilidade e reciprocidade, buscando a harmonia econômico-social e a efetivação de certas necessidades humanas para melhorar as perspectivas de vida dos cidadãos. Dando continuidade a este capítulo, é estudado o conceito de propriedade privada de Locke, com a finalidade de demonstrar os pontos em que sua teoria contrapõe-se à teoria de John Rawls, pois traz uma visão mais individualista de propriedade e adota uma concepção restrita deste direito. Locke defende a acumulação ilimitada de riquezas, estando a propriedade voltada, unicamente, para o crescimento individual do proprietário e para beneficiar o comércio, inexistindo uma justiça distributiva e cooperativa. Macpherson critica a teoria de Locke por ser extremamente individualista. O capítulo 2 intenciona analisar as principais idéias da teoria da justiça de Rawls, buscando-se os conceitos principais e fundamentais para que o capítulo 3 seja mais bem compreendido. Rawls defende a justiça distributiva e incentiva a cooperação social. Para este autor, as liberdades básicas são inegociáveis e o objeto de sua teoria é a estrutura básica da sociedade como um sistema equitativo de cooperação social entre cidadãos livres e iguais. Para que isso seja alcançado, os indivíduos realizam um acordo, sob o véu da ignorância , para formular os princípios da justiça que regerão as instituições de uma sociedade constitucional democrática justa. O capítulo 3 enfrenta a questão do direito de propriedade para o autor, grande defensor da justiça distributiva e da cooperação social, que entende o direito de propriedade como um bem básico, pois auxilia nas realizações das expectativas de vida dos cidadãos, devendo ser compatível com os demais direitos e liberdades pertencentes a um sistema social para proporcionar uma vida digna. O pensamento de Rawls foi alvo de crítica de Robert Nozick, o qual resgatou a teoria da apropriação de Locke, não concordando com a noção de justiça distributiva e de cooperação social, contrapondo-se em inúmeros pontos à teoria da justiça ralwsiana. Mas, com base nos filósofos Álvaro de Vita, Will Kymlicka e Van Parijs foi realizada a defesa da teoria de John Rawls, pois defendem o pensamento deste autor, acima das objeções apresentadas por Nozick. Asim, o direito de propriedade deve ter uma finalidade social para promover certas necessidades básicas dos indivíduos, e isso, percebe-se na obra de Rawls, pois ele acredita na cooperação social, na efetivação da dignidade humana, do auto-respeito, da auto-estima e da própria cidadania, por meio de uma justiça distributiva.

Theoretical-empirical work is focused on innovation education with using cooperative learning. The theme of labour is evaluation in cooperative learning and his specifics. The theoretical part is devoted to the description of cooperative learning, school rating and especially the evaluation of cooperative activities. The empirical part is a report from the action research of own lessons at the second level of elementary school, describes the transformation of teaching by introducing work in cooperative groups and monitors pupils' involvement in teaching in relation to the evaluation criteria. Part of the research is an analysis of pupils' self-image and a reflection of cooperative activities.