Although empathy has been implicated in both academia and pop culture as nearly analogous to morality, some philosophers and psychologists have taken issue with this assessment. It has been argued that from an ethical perspective, empathy is biasing, myopic, and perhaps more trouble than it is worth. In this paper, I first address whether empathy is a necessary baseline trait for having some degree of ethical motivation. Based on the differing moral experiences of sociopaths and autistic individuals, as well as empathy’s unique ability to motivationally bridge the gap between self and other, I conclude that empathy is a required trait for the moral agent. Assuming empathy is present in the moral experience, I then delineate the negative and positive effects empathy has on the ethical outcome of actions. Empathy does appear to cause prejudiced biasing and derogation of self-respect, but it also acts as a powerful motivator for other-oriented action and provides ethically valuable information about mind-states. Ultimately, I conclude that empathy cannot be a standalone ethical trait, but when filtered through reason, it can be invaluably useful.

Since the 2008 financial crisis, business leaders' ethical behaviors have been under scrutiny. These leaders face uncertainty regarding ethical leadership behaviors and their impact. Because small business leadership involves multiple facets of behavior and decision-making, small business leaders may have an insufficient understanding of the impact of ethical leadership behaviors on the sustainability of their businesses. The purpose of this correlational study was to examine the relationship between ethical leadership and financial, social, and environmental sustainability in small businesses. Integrated social contracts theory was the theoretical framework. The participants consisted of 80 members of a chamber of commerce located in Miami, Florida who had experience with ethical leadership and more than 1 year of ownership or management of a business. The data collection instrument was a self-designed Likert scale survey with items based on the research literature and also included financial measures such as return on assets, net profit margin, and net revenue. Correlation analysis and Bonferroni corrected significance calculation indicated significant relationships (p < .001) between some ethical leadership behaviors and social and environmental sustainability; however, no statistically significant correlations were identified between ethical leadership and financial sustainability. The implications for positive social change include small business leaders partnering with local leaders to implement ethics and sustainability into community programs to create a basis for increased trust in local business leaders to improve consumer confidence.

The purpose of this study was to examine how students perceive the most common methods of recruitment for research participation, and whether these recruitment strategies are perceived by the participants to be coercive. Ethical research guidelines prohibit the use of coercion in recruiting participants. Previous studies in this area have either focused on the perceptions of the researchers, or have approached the concept of coercion in a limited way. This study treated coercion as a multidimensional construct and examined student perceptions. Additionally, participant responses indicated which recruitment practices resulted in a decision to participate in the research. Findings indicate that some of the most common research recruitment methods are perceived by students to be coercive.

Wittgenstein once remarked that the same kind of reasoning that occurs in ordinary conversations about works of art can be found “in Ethics, but also in Philosophy.” That observation has been almost entirely overlooked by his commentators. What is aesthetic reasoning? What does it look like in conversations about art? And where might we find examples of such reasoning “in Ethics”? To set the stage for my answers, I begin with an overview of the early Wittgenstein’s view of ethics and aesthetics, emphasizing two ideas that were retained in his later view of aesthetic reasoning: the moral importance of non-moral descriptions, and the power of a “picture” to regulate action and thought. I illustrate those ideas by considering the moral influence of Tolstoy’s parable of the Good Samaritan on Wittgenstein. Next, I examine the passage in which Wittgenstein introduced aesthetic reasoning, and I articulate some general features of that concept. I also contend that we learn more about aesthetic reasoning by understanding Wittgenstein’s invention of the language-game concept as his reasoning aesthetically “in Philosophy.” Furthermore, I argue that the later Wittgenstein’s notions of aspect perception and grammatical pictures further inform aesthetic reasoning, revealing that it involves the introduction of grammar that can draw a person’s attention to unnoticed aspects of an object and equip him with further descriptions of that object. To illustrate that characterization of aesthetic reasoning, and to offer an example of such reasoning “in Ethics,” I return to Tolstoy’s parable and show that my interacting with it in a particular way involves aesthetic reasoning. Finally, I argue that aesthetic reasoning continues to occur in ethics in that it is woven into discussions of stories in bioethics classes. A student can have her grammatical picture of the case that a story presents reshaped as she sees and accepts aspects of that story that she had not noticed, and this, in turn, might influence her ways of seeing and responding morally to other cases. I close by considering whether aesthetic reasoning occurs in ethics in other ways, and I articulate some implications of my work for further Wittgenstein studies.

I wish to determine when one is justified in paternalistic interferences that override a subject’s autonomy. In order to lay the groundwork for discussing paternalistic interferences with autonomous decisions, I first consider different conceptions of autonomy, welfare, and paternalism, and determine which I mean to use. In particular, I proceed with Dworkin’s characterization of autonomy as a combination of authenticity and self-determination; Nussbaum’s capabilities theory in order to determine welfare; and a definition of paternalism as being an interference with a subject’s liberty or autonomy that is motivated exclusively by consideration for that subject’s own good or welfare. Once I have working definitions for autonomy, welfare, and paternalism, I consider arguments justifying paternalistic interferences. Because I especially wish to determine when paternalistic interferences that conflict with a subject’s autonomous decision are justified, I begin with Scoccia’s arguments for using hypothetical consent — which is based on what would maximize the subject’s welfare — to justify paternalistic acts. Using Scoccia’s argument, I consider a few cases in which concerns for welfare may justify paternalistic acts overriding the subject’s autonomy. However, hypothetical consent does not go very far in justifying paternalistic acts. Therefore, I also consider arguments justifying paternalism in cases where the subject is not necessarily fully autonomous when making or acting upon a decision. For example, Carter argues that paternalistic acts are justified if autonomy has been waived through prior or subsequent consent. Additionally, I look at justifying paternalism when the subject’s autonomy is compromised through involuntariness or incompetence.

I consider Derek Parfit's claim that our partial and impartial reasons are only roughly commensurable. Parfit's philosophy draws heavily on Henry Sidgwick's dualism of practical reason, and I examine how well Parfit's arguments in Reasons and Persons and On What Matters handle the difficulties that come with Sidgwick's dualism. I also defend Parfit's conclusions against Allen Wood's accusation that he relies on intuitions about cases that lack morally relevant information. This charge overlooks the more fundamental differences in their two moral theories. I conclude that if we accept Parfit's conception of what reasons we have, we ought to accept his further claim that our fundamental reasons cannot be weighed against one another. If this is the case, we will always have sufficient reason to be both moral and self-interested in most situations.

Presented here is a critical analysis of the administration, measurement, and application of justice on an international scale. To develop a general framework through which to analyze an international theory of justice, I will start by laying out the differences between the cosmopolitan conception of justice and Thomas Nagel’s political conception of justice. I will offer my own hybrid account that designates nation-states, rather than individuals, as the primary actors of justice. An examination of how justice is measured is necessary for conceptualizing relevant compensation systems and intervention schemes. I investigate justice as measured by Ronald Dworkin’s equality of resources and justice as measured by Amartya Sen’s capability approach, both of which differ in their treatment of non-democratic and corrupt nation-states. I advocate the expansion of political freedoms and a compensation scheme based on the use of natural resources to provide a system of international justice that encourages the preservation of native tradition and respects the nature of cultural difference.

According to retributivism, what justifies punishment is a wrongdoer's desert. Critics argue that retributivists fail to provide sufficient justification for punishment. Herbert Morris offers the type of justification critics demand, providing an account of punishment that: 1) values autonomy, and 2) appeals to the principle of fairness. Punishment, in this account, restores equilibrium of benefits and burdens with respect to autonomy. Since punishment largely ignores the autonomy of the victim, however, punishment alone seems unable to ensure justice. In order to provide a more complete account of justice, I contend that one must be committed to retributivism and restoration. Indeed, restoration of the victim’s autonomy may be understood to be part of a completed deployment of the rationale for punishment.

How would a housing system work in a just society? How do we account for differences in opportunity according to one’s birthplace? These two questions, both a result of our recent housing crisis, can be addressed through inquiries into policy, economics, history, or other forms of social sciences. In this paper I attempt to address these questions instead through a philosophical lens by examining the principles that guide the distribution of goods in our society. It is from such a theory that we can construct the fairest government or economic policies. Theories of distributive justice try to account for the fairest distribution of goods in a society. I take one such theory, John Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness, and apply it to the distribution of housing. I begin by deconstructing the core principles of Rawls’ theory and analyzing how each applies to housing. Then I make an argument about the fairness of these outcomes. My conclusion is, in fact, Rawls theory does not adequately account for the importance of housing in our society. In doing so, I hope to demonstrate the inequalities that face families throughout our society by illustrating the profound impact of housing on one’s well-being as well as one’s opportunity to succeed.

If one can do a good thing, ought one do it? In this paper, I argue that capability is a strong source of moral obligation that can, in proper doses, override things like property rights. I will build a hypothetical case based on a fictional invention called the Replicator with enormous potential for use as a humanitarian tool and I’ll use it to display the way that capability to aid imposes powerful moral obligations on both individuals and organizations. Ultimately, I will use the model that I will develop to demonstrate that some real-world entities are not satisfying their moral responsibilities with regards to aiding the global poor, and will suggests ways in which they can fulfill those obligations.