Abstract
With a focus on the three contracts¡Xranging from the common stock contract to the more sophisticated contracts of convertible debt and staged financing stock, this study aims at studying the moral hazard concerning a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur in their venture financing.
The two objectives of the present study are: to compare the optimal levels for a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur when they are fully informed or when they are under moral hazard, given that the two parties are in the same type of contract; to compare the optimal levels for a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur of the three contracts.
This study intends to construct a utility maximum model for a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur in the three contracts and to work out the optimal levels for a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur when they are fully informed or when they are under moral hazard.
The conclusion is as follows:
1. Of the three contracts, the optimal effort levels for a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur under full information are all larger than those under moral hazard.
2. Of the three contracts, a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur¡¦s optimal effort levels are: The optimal effort levels for convertible debt are larger than those for common stock, and the optimal effort levels for common stock are larger than those for staged financing stock.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:NSYSU/oai:NSYSU:etd-0811105-151610 |
| Date | 11 August 2005 |
| Creators | Chen, Hou-geng |
| Contributors | Jeun-sheng Lin, Tru-gin Lau, Shan-non Chin |
| Publisher | NSYSU |
| Source Sets | NSYSU Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Archive |
| Language | Cholon |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0811105-151610 |
| Rights | campus_withheld, Copyright information available at source archive |
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