Abstract With a focus on the three contracts¡Xranging from the common stock contract to the more sophisticated contracts of convertible debt and staged financing stock, this study aims at studying the moral hazard concerning a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur in their venture financing. The two objectives of the present study are: to compare the optimal levels for a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur when they are fully informed or when they are under moral hazard, given that the two parties are in the same type of contract; to compare the optimal levels for a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur of the three contracts. This study intends to construct a utility maximum model for a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur in the three contracts and to work out the optimal levels for a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur when they are fully informed or when they are under moral hazard. The conclusion is as follows: 1. Of the three contracts, the optimal effort levels for a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur under full information are all larger than those under moral hazard. 2. Of the three contracts, a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur¡¦s optimal effort levels are: The optimal effort levels for convertible debt are larger than those for common stock, and the optimal effort levels for common stock are larger than those for staged financing stock.

Zugl.: Hohenheim, Univ., Diss., 2006

University, Diss.--St. Gallen, 2004.

Köln, Universiẗat, Diss., 2008.

Bachelor-Arbeit Univ. St. Gallen, 2006.

Master-Arbeit Univ. St. Gallen, 2008.

Diss. Nr. 2944 Wirtschaftswiss. St. Gallen, 2004. / Literaturverz.

Zugl.: Greifswald, Univ., Diss., 2009

Master-Arbeit Univ. St. Gallen, 2008.

The high-water mark provision in hedge fund managers' compensation raises concerns of investors, because they are worried about that fund managers would take unnecessarily high risk in the fund investment. In this paper, we theoretically analyze the optimal strategies for hedge fund managers who choose to maximize the expected power utility from fees in both discrete-time and continuous- time models. The results show that when approaching the fee payment date, hedge fund managers would take as much risk as they are allowed to in the fund investment. However, if hedge fund managers are given more time, they tend to be more conservative. In the continuous-time model, the optimal allocation of the fund in the risky asset depends on market conditions, which are measured by the state price density.