<p>Denna uppsats behandlar daglig väderpåverkan på anmälda respektive avslutade sjukskrivningar i tolv svenska regioner under perioden 1987-1990. Väderdata från SMHI består av soltid, temperatur och nederbörd. Sjukskrivningsdata är kopplade till väderstationsdata. Undersökningarna är differentierade för tre dimensioner: påbörjade/avslutade sjukskrivningar, sommar-/vinterhalvår samt kvinnor/män. Vi har funnit att sol har en signifikant dämpande effekt för anmälda sjukskrivningar under sommarhalvåret.</p><p>Kvinnor reagerar dessutom till skillnad mot män på väderomslag i soltid över vinterhalvåren när det gäller att avsluta sjukskrivningar.</p>

Denna uppsats behandlar daglig väderpåverkan på anmälda respektive avslutade sjukskrivningar i tolv svenska regioner under perioden 1987-1990. Väderdata från SMHI består av soltid, temperatur och nederbörd. Sjukskrivningsdata är kopplade till väderstationsdata. Undersökningarna är differentierade för tre dimensioner: påbörjade/avslutade sjukskrivningar, sommar-/vinterhalvår samt kvinnor/män. Vi har funnit att sol har en signifikant dämpande effekt för anmälda sjukskrivningar under sommarhalvåret. Kvinnor reagerar dessutom till skillnad mot män på väderomslag i soltid över vinterhalvåren när det gäller att avsluta sjukskrivningar.

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My study examines the relationship between principal and agent in a moral hazard setting where the principal has the ability to monitor the actions of the agent at an interim stage of the project. I show that monitoring can induce the agent to exert higher levels of effort and can result in a reallocation of project payoffs between the two parties. This reallocation is not a one-way street: Situations exist where monitoring encourages greater effort from the agent, resulting in greater project payoffs for both principal and agent. For projects that are characterized as high-risk, high-reward projects where agent involvement is costly, monitoring is often the optimal strategy; this is an explanation for why venture capital type investments are the subject of intense monitoring. When the principal can share monitoring results at an interim stage with the agent, the agent is able to modify his effort levels in certain situations for the benefit of both parties.

Venture Capital Contracts with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection Abstract This study offers a discussion on the agency theory of venture capital, including the cases of one venture capitalist and one entrepreneur, one venture capitalist and two entrepreneurs, and two venture capitalists and one entrepreneur. The first model compares the effort levels of the two parties, one venture capitalist and one entrepreneur, when there is a double moral hazard problem. The results are as follows:(1)the effort levels under double moral hazard are lower than those under full information¡Ano matter if the contract is common stock or convertible debt ; (2) a suitably chosen convertible debt contract outperforms a common stock contract; and (3) in the equilibrium, the venture capitalist¡¦s net compensation is equal to his cost of capital. Secondly, the study extends to a double side moral hazard problem between one venture capitalist and two entrepreneurs. The results show: (1) the effort levels under double moral hazard are still lower than those under full information in the model; (2) one venture capitalist and two entrepreneurs will come up with a double moral hazard problem if they sign the common stock contract; and (3) the incentive to lessen the double moral hazard problem is the total profit shared conditionally by one venture capitalist and two entrepreneurs. Finally, this study develops a joint investment framework with an adverse selection problem. One entrepreneur is informed about the project¡¦s potential profitability but two venture capitalists are not .The results show:(1)if the entrepreneur reveals his private information, the individual management cost of two venture capitalists will be equal; (2)if the entrepreneur does not reveal his private information, the individual management cost of the two venture capitalists will be higher in an uncooperative situation; and (3)if the entrepreneur does not reveal his private information, the venture capitalists¡¦ effort levels will be higher in case their management knowledge is of substitutive nature than that of complementary nature. Key words¡Gventure capital, moral hazard, adverse selection

Thesis (Ph. D.)--North Carolina State University, 1999. / Spiral bound. Includes vita. Also available on the Internet. Includes bibliographical references (p. 206-214) and abstract.

Bachelor-Arbeit Univ. St. Gallen, 2004.

Master-Arbeit Univ. St. Gallen, 2008.

Master-Arbeit Univ. St. Gallen, 2005.

Univ., Diss.--Zürich, 2001.