This thesis investigates the events leading up to and following the first North Korean nuclear test, which took place in 2006, in order to examine first, whether the test helped the North Korean regime survive, and second, how this unilateral action acted as a balance to the United States’ policy of oppression. The thesis will also attempt to shed some light on the validity of the Western International Relations (IR) theories by ascertaining the balance of threat and applying the notion of “two-level games” to the nuclear conundrum. Through the lens of these IR theories, the research described in the thesis addresses three smaller questions: (1) how did the nuclear test stabilize Pyongyang’s integrity as a balance to the threat of a potential American military attack?; (2) how was the test used as a bargaining mechanism to urge the Bush administration to shift away from its hostile stance and towards a policy of engagement?; and (3) how did the test influence the security environment of the Northeast Asian region?
Finally, the thesis considers various reasons why the nuclear deadlock in which we currently find ourselves will not be resolved in the foreseeable future, and it suggests that resolution of the nuclear stalemate can only occur once comprehensive deal-making incentives between Washington and Pyongyang are adopted. / Graduate / 0615 / lomulos@yahoo.co.kr
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:uvic.ca/oai:dspace.library.uvic.ca:1828/5601 |
| Date | 25 August 2014 |
| Creators | Cho, Chanhyun |
| Contributors | Wu, Guoguang |
| Source Sets | University of Victoria |
| Language | English, English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Rights | Available to the World Wide Web |
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