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O Desenvolvimento Inacabado do Brasil: O BNDE e a Conven??o do Desenvolvimento de 1952 a 1978. / The Unfinished Development of Brazil: BNDE and the Growth Convention from 1952 to 1978.

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Previous issue date: 2006-10-26 / Coordena??o de Aperfei?oamento de Pessoal de N?vel Superior / This dissertation assesses the impact of the Growth Convention on the creation of Brazil s National
Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDE) as well as the impact that the Growth Convention
had on the strategies and programs of the BNDE from 1952 until 1978. Conversely, the dissertation
also evaluates the influence that the BNDE had on the evolution of the Growth Convention over
this period. Much of the information used to analyze the relationship between the BNDE and the
Growth Convention was collected through personal interviews with individuals involved in the creation
of the BNDE and the development of its policies.
In discussing the BNDE s development from 1952 to 1978, this dissertation uncovers two significant
findings. First, all of the administrations that governed Brazil during this period attempted to benefit
from the BNDE, regardless of whether or not they were seen publicly as supportive of the BNDE.
Second, by consistently producing high-quality work, the BNDE was able to gain the trust of the various
administrations many of which were initially wary of the BNDE and enhance its own autonomy
as an institution.
Chapter one discusses the concepts and goals of the Growth Convention, a term coined by Brazilian
economist Antonio Barros de Castro to describe the economic and social growth strategy in Brazil
between 1930 and 1980. The chapter also draws upon the economic and philosophic theories of Adam
Smith and John Maynard Keynes to discuss the Growth Convention theories.
Chapter two analyzes the impact that the military coup of April 1964 had on the BNDE personnel and
its policies. Specifically, interviews with employees of the BNDE at the time of the coup illustrate that
BNDE officials were concerned that the policies of the Castello Branco administration would jeopardize
the Bank s economic and social development initiatives.
Chapters three through five delve into three periods in the development of the BNDE. The first period
described in chapter three begins with the foundation of the BNDE in 1952 and continues through
the Plan of Goals formulated and implemented by the Bank during the Juscelino Kubitschek administration.
Chapter four starts with the turbulent administration of J?nio Quadros and continues through the governments
of Jango Goulart, Castello Branco, Costa e Silva, and M?dici, until October 1970, when
Minister Reis Velloso appointed Marcos Vianna as President of the BNDE during the Economic
Miracle. The common denominator of these very distinct administrations discussed in chapter four
was that Brazil enjoyed widespread economic growth despite the fact that the country had abandoned
the democratic process during this period. Another similarity among these administrations was that
none of them adopted long-term growth strategies such as the Plan of Goals formulated during the
Juscelino Kubitschek administration.
Chapter five covers the eight year tenure (1970-1978) of Mr. Reis Velloso as Minister of Planning and
Mr. Marcos Vianna as President of BNDE. It was during this period that the National Development
Plan II was formulated and implemented, continuing Brazil s national growth strategy.
Finally, the conclusion of the dissertation provides some reflections on why Brazil may have been
unable to sustain its course toward greater economic growth with social justice, fiscal transparency,
and inflationary control. / Esta disserta??o analisa como a Conven??o do Crescimento influenciou no processo de cria??o
do Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econ?mico e Social BNDES, e na determina??o de suas
estrat?gias e programas at? o ano de 1978, quando termina a execu??o do II Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento
− II PND. Em conseq??ncia da forma como foi feita sua institucionaliza??o, o BNDES
tamb?m influenciou, e muito, a Conven??o do Crescimento. Com esse objetivo, utilizei, inicialmente,
a metodologia de hist?ria oral, para as entrevistas realizadas, pois s?o as pessoas que fundaram e consolidaram
o Banco que v?o contar essa hist?ria.
No cap?tulo conceitual, apresento a defini??o filos?fica do conceito de Conven??o e a sua utiliza??o
por te?ricos de linhas distintas como Adam Smith e Keynes. A partir da?, comento o artigo do
economista Ant?nio Barros de Castro sobre a Conven??o do Crescimento, ocorrida no Brasil de 1930
a 1980.
Antes de passar para a periodiza??o hist?rica, descrevo, no segundo cap?tulo, o reflexo do golpe
militar de 1964, sobre os quadros do BNDES. Relato tamb?m a maneira como esse pessoal percebeu a
pol?tica do Governo Castello com o Banco e seus temores sobre o futuro do processo do desenvolvimento.
Minha disserta??o est? dividida em tr?s per?odos. O primeiro, descrito no terceiro cap?tulo, come?a
com a funda??o do Banco e vai at? o final do Plano de Metas, formulado e executado pelo
BNDE durante o governo de Juscelino Kubitschek. No quarto cap?tulo procuro descrever o conturbado
governo de J?nio Quadros e os governos de Jango Goulart, Castello Branco, Costa e Silva e Garrastazu
M?dici. Finalizo este cap?tulo quando o Ministro Reis Velloso, em outubro de 1970, nomeia Marcos
Vianna para a presid?ncia do BNDE em pleno Milagre Econ?mico . O que aglutina per?odos de
governos t?o distintos ? a manuten??o do prop?sito, por todos, do crescimento, apesar do Pa?s ter abandonado
o processo democr?tico. Outro motivo para a reuni?o destes governos ? a aus?ncia de planos
de longo prazo como o Plano de Metas.
Enfoco no quinto cap?tulo os oito anos de mandato em que o Minist?rio do Planejamento e o
BNDE foram administrados por Reis Velloso e Marcos Vianna, quando o II PND foi planejado e executado
no governo de Ernesto Geisel, a partir de 1974.
Duas hip?teses foram confirmadas durante a pesquisa. A primeira, que os governos procuraram
utilizar, cada um ? sua maneira, o potencial da institui??o. A outra, ? que a busca de autonomia e qualidade,
pelo BNDE, ao inv?s de assustar o poder executivo, aumentava sua confian?a nos quadros
t?cnicos do Banco.
Na conclus?o re?no evid?ncias que comprovam as hip?teses citadas no par?grafo anterior e te?o
algumas reflex?es sobre as causas que impediram o Brasil de continuar o seu processo de crescimento,
incorporando, ao mesmo tempo, maior justi?a social e maior transpar?ncia fiscal, com a infla??o controlada.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:IBICT/oai:localhost:tede/639
Date26 October 2006
CreatorsLima, Marco Antonio Albuquerque de Araujo
ContributorsCastro, Ana C?lia
PublisherUniversidade Federal Rural do Rio de Janeiro, Curso de P?s-Gradua??o em Desenvolvimento, Agricultura e Sociedade, UFRRJ, Brasil, Ci?ncias Sociais Aplicadas
Source SetsIBICT Brazilian ETDs
LanguagePortuguese
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion, info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
Formatapplication/pdf
Sourcereponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRRJ, instname:Universidade Federal Rural do Rio de Janeiro, instacron:UFRRJ
Rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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