Ko, Chiu Yu. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 81-83). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.7 / Chapter 3 --- Model --- p.10 / Chapter 4 --- Finite Stage Model --- p.15 / Chapter 4.1. --- "Stage with deadline: G(n, z)" --- p.15 / Chapter 4.2 --- "Stage without deadline G(n,∞)" --- p.32 / Chapter 5 --- Infinite Stage Models --- p.40 / Chapter 5.1. --- "Stage with deadline G(∞,z)" --- p.40 / Chapter 5.2 --- "Stage without deadline G(∞,∞)" --- p.40 / Chapter 6 --- Non-convex Example --- p.49 / Chapter 6.1 --- Risk loving players --- p.49 / Chapter 6.2 --- Indomitable players --- p.52 / Chapter 7 --- Application --- p.64 / Chapter 8 --- Conclusion --- p.67 / Chapter 9 --- Appendix --- p.70 / Chapter 9.1 --- Alternative assumption of recognition of the first proposer --- p.70 / Chapter 9.2 --- "Proof of equilibrium for finitely repeated Rubinstein, bargaining problem" --- p.72 / Chapter 9.3 --- Proof for general risk loving bargainers --- p.76 / Chapter 9.4 --- Definition of security equilibrium --- p.77
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:cuhk.edu.hk/oai:cuhk-dr:cuhk_325997 |
Date | January 2007 |
Contributors | Ko, Chiu Yu., Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Economics. |
Source Sets | The Chinese University of Hong Kong |
Language | English, Chinese |
Detected Language | English |
Type | Text, bibliography |
Format | print, v, 83 leaves : ill. ; 30 cm. |
Rights | Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) |
Page generated in 0.0022 seconds