In this thesis a version of the ethical theory of
utilitarianism is defended. The version defended is called
‘objectivist compatibilist utilitarianism’, or ‘OCtJ’. On this
version, utilitarian metaethics includes the propositions that
there is an objective, intrinsic property of goodness entifying,
motivating, and grounding ethics, and that act and rule
utilitarianism are compatible since under plausible
interpretations both true. While this metaethical theory has
perhaps not been stated explicitly before, theories in this vein
have been popular since the mid—l9th century, and have been
expounded by philosophers such as J.S. Mill and G.E. Moore.
OCU will be defended by examination of six influential
objections to various of its hypotheses. In each case, thorough
conceptual analysis, aided by consultation of relevant scientific
facts about human nature, will reveal that the objection is
seriously flawed. In the process of dispatching these negative
considerations, a comprehensive positive ethical theory will
emerge. Most other currently popular ethical theories are not
comprehensive, but instead take no position (or several, which
amounts to the same thing) on one or more of the major issues
that any comprehensive ethical theory must deal with. OCU thus
emerges as one of only a very few contemporary comprehensive
ethical theories — and on balance the most plausible of the lot. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UBC/oai:circle.library.ubc.ca:2429/6872 |
| Date | 05 1900 |
| Creators | Sleigh, Nicholas Campbell |
| Source Sets | University of British Columbia |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, Thesis/Dissertation |
| Format | 2923598 bytes, application/pdf |
| Rights | For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use. |
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