Thesis (LLD)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Ownership, and especially the ownership of land, consists of rights as well as duties.
The social responsibilities of the owner depend on the prevailing needs of the public (as
expressed in legislation) and are subject to change. Section 25(1) of the Constitution
impliedly recognises the social obligations of the property owner insofar as it confirms
that ownership can be regulated by the state in the public interest. Section 25(1) also
sets requirements for the interference with property rights and, in so doing, recognises
that the social obligations of the property owner are not without boundaries.
In its landmark FNB decision the Constitutional Court gave content and structure
to a section 25(1) challenge. The Constitutional Court held that deprivations will be
arbitrary for purposes of section 25(1) if the law of general application does not provide
sufficient reason for the deprivation or is procedurally unfair. The Constitutional Court
elaborated that ‘sufficient reason’ had to be determined with reference to eight
contextual factors which reflect the complexity of the relationships involved in the
dispute.
With reference to section 25(1) and FNB this dissertation considers the
constitutional implications of two types of statutory interference with the owner’s right to
use, enjoy and exploit his property. Firstly, the dissertation considers the owner’s
statutory duty in terms of the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act
103 of 1977 to demolish unlawful and illegal building works in certain instances.
Secondly, the dissertation considers the limitations imposed by the National Heritage
Resources Act of 25 of 1999 and the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE) on the owner’s right to demolish historic or
unlawfully occupied structures.
This dissertation argues that building and development controls, historic
preservation laws and anti-eviction legislation are legitimate exercises of the state’s
police power. Generally, these statutory interferences with ownership will not amount to
unconstitutional deprivation of property. Nevertheless, there are instances where
regulatory laws cannot be applied inflexibly if doing so results in excessive interferences
with property rights. The FNB substantive arbitrariness test indicates when the law imposes disproportionate burdens on land owners. Furthermore, the non-arbitrariness
tests shows when it might be necessary to mitigate disproportionate burdens, imposed
in terms of otherwise legitimate regulatory laws, by way of German-style equalisation
measures, which are comparable to the constitutional damages granted by South
African courts.
This dissertation concludes that in the past century the South African legal system
has progressed from the apartheid regime, which protected the rights and interests of
the white minority, to a constitutional regime which safeguards the rights of all South
Africans. There are two legal developments that may lead to positive change in the next
century, namely active pursuance of the notion that ownership consists of rights and
duties and the development of equalisation-style measures, incorporated into
legislation, to alleviate excessive burdens imposed on property owners in the public
interest. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Eiendomsreg, veral eiendomsreg op grond, bestaan uit regte sowel as pligte. Die
sosiale verantwoordelikhede van die eienaar word bepaal deur die heersende
behoeftes van die publiek (soos in wetgewing beliggaam) en is onderhewig aan
verandering. Artikel 25(1) van die Grondwet erken implisiet die sosiale verpligtinge van
die eienaar in soverre dit bevestig dat eiendomsreg nie ʼn absolute reg is nie en dat dit
deur die staat in die openbare belang gereguleer kan word. Artikel 25(1) koppel
vereistes aan statutêre beperkings wat op die eienaar se regte geplaas kan word en
erken daardeur dat die sosiale pligte van die eienaar nie onbegrens is nie.
In die invloedryke FNB-beslissing het die Grondwethof inhoud en struktuur aan
grondwetlike analise ingevolge artikel 25(1) gegee. Die Grondwethof het bepaal dat ʼn
ontneming arbitrêr sal wees vir die doeleindes van artikel 25(1) as die algemeen
geldende reg nie genoegsame rede vir die ontneming verskaf nie of as die
ontnemingsproses prosedureel onbillik was. Die Grondwethof het uitgebrei dat
‘genoegsame rede’ bepaal moet word met verwysing na agt kontekstuele faktore wat
die kompleksiteit van die verhoudinge wat in die geskil betrokke is, weerspieël.
Met verwysing na artikel 25(1) en FNB oorweeg hierdie proefskrif die grondwetlike
implikasies van twee tipes statutêre beperkinge wat deur wetgewing op eienaars se
regte geplaas word. Eerstens neem die proefskrif die eienaar se statutêre plig ingevolge
die Wet op Nasionale Bouregulasies en Boustandaarde 103 van 1977 om onwettige en
onregmatige geboue en bouwerke te sloop, in oënskou. Tweedens oorweeg die
proefskrif die beperkinge ingevolge die Wet op Nasionale Erfenishulpbronne 25 van
1999 en die Wet op die Voorkoming van Onwettige Uitsettings en Onregmatige
Besetting van Grond 19 van 1998 op die eienaar se reg om historiese en onregmatige
bewoonde strukture te sloop.
Die proefskrif betoog dat bou- en ontwikkelingsbeheermaatreëls, historiese
bewaringswette en uitsettingsvoorkomingswetgewing legitieme uitoefening van die staat
se polisiëringsmag is. In die algemeen sal hierdie statutêre inmenging nie uitloop op
ongrondwetlike ontneming van eiendom nie. Nietemin is daar gevalle waar die
regulerende wette nie onbuigsaam toegepas kan word nie indien dit tot uitermatige inmenging met die eienaar se regte lei. Die FNB-toets vir substantiewe arbitrêre
ontneming dui aan wanneer ‘n wet ʼn disproporsionele las op grondeienaars plaas.
Verder wys die FNB-toets wanneer dit nodig mag wees om oneweredige laste, wat deur
andersins regmatige regulerende wette opgelê is, te versag. Dit kan gedoen word deur
middel van ʼn statutêre maatreël, geskoei op Duitse voorbeeld, wat vergelykbaar is met
grondwetlike skadevergoeding wat deur Suid-Afrikaanse howe toegeken is.
Hierdie proefskrif kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat die Suid-Afrikaanse regstelsel oor
die afgelope eeu ontwikkel het van die apartheidsbestel, wat die regte en belange van
die wit minderheid beskerm het, tot die huidige grondwetlike bestel wat die regte van
alle Suid-Afrikaners beskerm. Twee ontwikkelinge kan tot positiewe verandering in die
volgende eeu lei, naamlik aktiewe bevordering van die gedagte dat eiendomsreg uit
regte en verpligtinge bestaan en ontwikkeling van statutêre maatreëls wat die
uitermatige las wat in die openbare belang op eienaars geplaas word, te verlig.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:netd.ac.za/oai:union.ndltd.org:sun/oai:scholar.sun.ac.za:10019.1/20260 |
| Date | 07 March 2012 |
| Creators | Strydom, Janke |
| Contributors | Van Der Walt, A. J., Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Law. Dept. of Public Law. |
| Publisher | Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University |
| Source Sets | South African National ETD Portal |
| Language | en_ZA |
| Detected Language | Unknown |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | xiv, 462 p. |
| Rights | Stellenbosch University |
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