With growing connectivity in the modern era, the risk of encrypted data stored in hardware being exposed to third-party adversaries is higher than ever. The security of encrypted data depends on the secrecy of the stored key. Conventional methods of storing keys in Non-Volatile Memory have been shown to be susceptible to physical attacks. Physically Unclonable Functions provide a unique alternative to conventional key storage. SRAM PUFs utilize inherent process variation caused during manufacturing to derive secret keys from the power-up values of SRAM memory cells.
This thesis analyzes the effect of supply ramp-up times on the reliability of SRAM PUFs. We use SPICE simulations as the platform to observe the effect of supply ramp times at the circuit level using carefully controlled supply voltages during power-up. We also measure the effect of supply ramp times on commercially available SRAM ICs by performing reliability and uniqueness measurements on two commercial SRAM models. Finally, a hardware implementation is proposed in a commercial 16nm FinFET technology to establish the design flow for taping out a custom SRAM IC with separated peripheral and core power supplies that would allow for experimental evaluation of sequenced power supplies on the SRAM PUF.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UMASS/oai:scholarworks.umass.edu:masters_theses_2-1859 |
Date | 29 October 2019 |
Creators | Ramanna, Harshavardhan |
Publisher | ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst |
Source Sets | University of Massachusetts, Amherst |
Detected Language | English |
Type | text |
Format | application/pdf |
Source | Masters Theses |
Rights | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
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