Theory is vital for our scientific understanding of the social world. Building, developing, and evaluating theory are therefore central practices within the social sciences. This study performs an evaluation of rational choice theory within the field of political participation. This is a theoretical framework that has had significant problems reconciling theoretical prediction with empirical findings, causing what is called the paradox of participation. For more than sixty years rational choice theorists have tried to develop new formulations of the theory to avoid this paradox. The purpose of this study is to forward this debate by providing a new perspective on rational choice theory that is purely theoretical. Using the evaluative criteria of falsifiability and leverage, the study finds that a theory using both collective and selective incentives, while also allowing the formulation of the theory to change depending on the form of political participation one wants to explain provides the most promising approach. However, the evaluation does reveal some issues in connection to selective incentives. A potential alternative solution to the paradox is therefore briefly discussed, yet a more thorough exploration of this venue is left to future research.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:uu-431756 |
| Date | January 2020 |
| Creators | Stendahl, Elin |
| Publisher | Uppsala universitet, Statsvetenskapliga institutionen |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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