Thesis (PhD) -- University of Stellenbosch, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Philosophy has traditionally been concerned with the question of reason and
rationality, as its central focus. From the perspective of the modern
metaphysical tradition, this focus has developed around the theme of
subjectivity in general, and the assumption of an ahistorical transcendental
subject in particular. The idea of reason was thus foundational for the
articulation and validation of the notions of truth and freedom. From the
perspective of modernity, reason has thus been the condition of the possibility
of enlightenment, freedom and moral progress.
The debate between Habermas and the representatives of postmodern thinking
represents the latest chapter regarding the question of reason, its limits, and its
possibilities. What makes this debate particularly challenging is that Habermas,
while he defends the idea of reason against its critique by the postmodernists,
is actually in agreement with them in their dismissal of the tradition of
metaphysical thinking.
In view of his defense of the idea of reason, however, Habermas has invariably
been accused of defending an outmoded and discredited form of philosophical
thinking, while his opponents have generally been hailed as progressive
thinkers who have succeeded in effecting a radical break with the conceptual
legacy of the metaphysical tradition.
In my dissertation I argue that the exact opposite position is the case, namely,
that it is Habermas, and not his postmodern opponents, who has effected a
radical break with metaphysical thinking. It is his ability to transform the idea of
reason, from a transcendental into a postmetaphysical concept, in terms of which the question of reason and rationality, and the related ideas of truth and
knowledge, are recast in fallibilistic terms, that, in my view, represents the
overcoming of metaphysics.
The postmodern turn, on the other hand, in view of its reluctance to consider the
question of reason from an alternative model of rationality, finds itself still
trapped within a form of transcendental thinking in which it seeks to enquire into
the (im)possibility of reason, in the absence of a transcendental subject.
In the final analysis, I argue that it is postmetaphysical rather than postmodern
thinking, that offers us a practical alternative to the problematic conception of
reason, bequeathed by the tradition of metaphysical thinking. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die fenomeen van die rede en die betekenis van rasionaliteit vorm tradisioneel
'n sentrale fokus van die filosofie. Vanuit die perspektief van die moderne
metafisiese tradisie het hierdie fokus ontwikkel rondom die tema van
subjektiwiteit in die algemeen, en die aanname van 'n a-historiese
transendentele subjek in die besonder. Die rede was dus fundamenteel vir die
artikulasie en legitimering van die konsepte van waarheid en vryheid. Vanuit die
perspektief van moderniteit was die rede dus die voorwaarde vir die
moontlikheid van verligting, vryheid, en morele vooruitgang.
Die debat tussen Habermas en die verteenwoordigers van postmoderne denke
verteenwoordig die mees onlangse hoofstuk van die verhaal van die vraag na
rede en rasionaliteit - die beperkings daarvan, asook die moontlikhede daarvan.
Hierdie debat bied besondere uitdagings omdat Habermas, terwyl hy die idee
van rede verdedig teen die kritiek van die postmoderniste, eintlik met hulle
saamstem vir sover hulle die tradisie van metafisiese denke verwerp.
In die lig van sy verdediging van die idee van rede, is Habermas egter
voortdurend daarvan beskuldig dat hy 'n uitgediende en gediskrediteerde vorm
van filosofiese denke bly voorstaan, terwyl sy opponente in die algemeen
voorgehou is as progressiewe denkers wat suksesvol 'n radikale breuk gemaak
het met die konseptuele erfenis van die metafisiese tradisie.
In my dissertasie beweer ek dat die teenoorgestelde inderwaarheid die geval is,
naamlik dat dit Habermas, en nie sy postmoderne opponente nie, is wat hierdie
radikale breuk met metafisiese denke suksesvol uitgevoer het. Dit is sy verrnoe
om die idee van die rede te transformeer vanaf 'n transendentale na 'n post- metafisiese konsep, in terme waarvan die vraag na rede en rasionaliteit, en die
verwante idees van waarheid en kennis, omskep is in fallibilistiese beg rippe,
wat, soos ek aantoon, 'n (die!) suksesvolle transendering van die metafisika
bewerkstellig.
Die postmoderne wending, aan die ander kant, in die lig van die traagheid
daarvan om 'n alternatiewe en verruimde konsepsie van rasionaliteit te
ontwikkel, bly vasgevang in 'n vorm van transendentele denke waarin dit
probeer om ondersoek in te stel na die (on)moontlikheid van die rede ten
aansien van die afwesigheid van 'n transendentele subjek.
Uiteindelik beweer ek dat dit die post-metafisiese eerder as die postmoderne
denke is wat aan ons 'n praktiese alternatief bied vir die problematiese konsep
van die rede, soos ons dit qeerf het by die tradisie van metafisiese denke.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:netd.ac.za/oai:union.ndltd.org:sun/oai:scholar.sun.ac.za:10019.1/53008 |
| Date | 04 1900 |
| Creators | Cloete, Michael |
| Contributors | Van Niekerk, A. A., Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Social Sciences. Dept. of Philosophy. |
| Publisher | Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University |
| Source Sets | South African National ETD Portal |
| Language | en_ZA |
| Detected Language | Unknown |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | 231 p. |
| Rights | Stellenbosch University |
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