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Agency Decision-Making for Climate Change: Cost-Benefit Analysis, the Precautionary Principle, and the Bounds of Rationality

Climate change tests the limits of human understanding of complexity and uncertainty. It challenges assumptions about our presumed power of control over this planet. This paper examines the theory of how governmental executive branch agencies make regulation decisions about climate change using the decision-making methodologies of cost-benefit analysis and the precautionary principle, and as influenced by perceptions of the bounds of human rationality and ability to deal with risk and uncertainty.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:CLAREMONT/oai:scholarship.claremont.edu:pomona_theses-1074
Date01 May 2013
CreatorsCarr, Laura
PublisherScholarship @ Claremont
Source SetsClaremont Colleges
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typetext
Formatapplication/pdf
SourcePomona Senior Theses
Rights© 2012 Laura Carr

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