The principles of war have been questioned for a long time. Many scientists and military officers believe that they are too wide-ranging, contradictory or even invalid. Nonetheless, the principles of war have been institutionalised in several military doctrines and are used in military education. The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether the principles of war can explain the outcome of modern maritime warfare. Since the principles of war cannot be regarded as one theory, Liddell Hart’s theory of the principles of war is chosen for this analysis. Using a case study method, the Battle of Baltim in the Yom Kippur War and the sinking of the ARA General Belgrano in the battle of the Falklands Islands are analysed against the theory. Although Liddell Hart’s theory was developed by analysing land warfare, the principles of war are regarded as universal and generally applicable and therefore may be used for analysing maritime warfare. The result of the analysis shows that Liddell Hart’s principles of war can explain the outcome of modern maritime warfare. The principlessecurity, mobility, concentration and surprise are observed in both cases to varying degrees and they are significant in explaining the outcome of the event. Even though Liddell Hart’s theory can explain the outcome, it is shown that the principle of mobility rarely will be fully achieved in submarine operations because of the lack of self-defence systems against enemy weapons.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:fhs-7585 |
| Date | January 2018 |
| Creators | Llorente af Forselles, César |
| Publisher | Försvarshögskolan |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | Swedish |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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