The amounts of theories that deal with naval warfare are many. Several of those are developed under the previous century when tactics and technology were in the eve of development. Many of modern thinkers within science of war often refer to older but recognized theories. The purpose of this essay is to examine if the old but recognized theories are of current interest in modern naval warfare. The questions that are used in this essay are, what is the characteristics of the war of Yom Kippur with Mahan’s offensive and Corbett’s defensive as a starting-point and are there any of the theories that are prominent. The examination is then carried out through analysing Mahan’s offensive and Corbett’s defensive. With their theories as a starting-point the characteristics of Mahan’s offensive and Corbett’s defensive are to be found within the war of Yom Kippur. The conclusions show that there are characteristics of Mahan’s offensive and Corbett’s defensive within the war of Yom Kippur. The defensive is striking on the political strategic level. The offensive is conspicuous on the military strategic and tactical level.

The principles of war have been questioned for a long time. Many scientists and military officers believe that they are too wide-ranging, contradictory or even invalid. Nonetheless, the principles of war have been institutionalised in several military doctrines and are used in military education. The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether the principles of war can explain the outcome of modern maritime warfare. Since the principles of war cannot be regarded as one theory, Liddell Hart’s theory of the principles of war is chosen for this analysis. Using a case study method, the Battle of Baltim in the Yom Kippur War and the sinking of the ARA General Belgrano in the battle of the Falklands Islands are analysed against the theory. Although Liddell Hart’s theory was developed by analysing land warfare, the principles of war are regarded as universal and generally applicable and therefore may be used for analysing maritime warfare. The result of the analysis shows that Liddell Hart’s principles of war can explain the outcome of modern maritime warfare. The principlessecurity, mobility, concentration and surprise are observed in both cases to varying degrees and they are significant in explaining the outcome of the event. Even though Liddell Hart’s theory can explain the outcome, it is shown that the principle of mobility rarely will be fully achieved in submarine operations because of the lack of self-defence systems against enemy weapons.

Henry Kissinger is considered to be one of the most influential diplomats of U.S. history. During the decade he spent directing the U.S. foreign affairs from one of the top level positions, he achieved many important successes. His power extended far beyond the normal competence of the secretary of state. His personal skills, which were an important asset in obtaining such an influential position, combined with the complicated internal political situation in the United States. At the time Kissinger entered the Middle East conflict as an important actor, the Nixon Administration fought against charges connected with the Watergate affair and the president consequently had little time and energz to devote to the foreign policy. Henry Kissinger could thus became the creator of American diplomacy and its main representative. The documents about the Yom Kippur War and the U.S. engagement in the region, which were declassified much later and which this thesis make use of, show that the real power of Henry Kissinger was much broader than widely believed.

<p>Yom Kippurkriget 1973 kan sägas vara det första sjökriget då sjömålsrobotar nyttjades av krigets respektive parter. Hur påverkade denna teknikutveckling av sjömålsroboten Israels sjötaktiska agerande? Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka hur teknikutvecklingen av sjömålsroboten har påverkat Israels sjökrigföring, samt undersöka huruvida det är tekniken som styr taktiken, eller tvärtom. Detta sker med en komparation av israelernas sjökrigföring under två krig, sexdagarskriget 1967 samt Yom Kippurkriget 1973. Analysverktyg för denna jämförelse utgörs av Wayne P. Hughes och Christopher Werners teorier angående samspelet mellan teknik och taktik. Denna teori och empiri redogörs deskriptivt med kvalitativ textanalys. Jämförelsen leder fram till att israelernas sjötaktiska agerande förändrades. I bägge krigen rådde god teknisk analys vilket påverkade deras taktik. Tekniken under Yom Kippurkriget möjliggjorde dock en offensivare taktik än agerandet under sexdagarskriget. Teknikutvecklingen av sjömålsroboten ledde således fram till en effektiv taktikanpassning. Undersökningen leder även fram till att teknik och taktik ständigt påverkar varandra.      </p> / <p>The Yom Kippur War in 1973 is known to be the first naval war when surface-to-surface missiles were used by both sides. How did this development of technology affect the tactical actions of Israel?</p><p>This paper examines how the development of technology, in form of the surface-to-surface missile, has affected the naval warfare of Israel and if technology affects tactics or vice versa. To find answers, the Israelis tactical actions are compared, in two wars, Six-Day War in 1967 and Yom Kippur war in 1973. Theories regarding the interplay between technology and tactics, by Kevin P. Hughes and Christopher Werner, are used as tool for the analysis.</p><p>The result of the study shows that the tactical actions of Israel did change by the development of technology. Common in both wars is the fact that analyses of technology were carried out and affected their tactical actions. Technology during the Yom Kippur War though made more offensive tactics possible, than during the Six-Day War.</p><p>Thus development of the surface-to-surface missile did lead to an effective adaptation of tactics. The result of the study also shows that tactics and technology constantly affects each other.     </p>

Yom Kippurkriget 1973 kan sägas vara det första sjökriget då sjömålsrobotar nyttjades av krigets respektive parter. Hur påverkade denna teknikutveckling av sjömålsroboten Israels sjötaktiska agerande? Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka hur teknikutvecklingen av sjömålsroboten har påverkat Israels sjökrigföring, samt undersöka huruvida det är tekniken som styr taktiken, eller tvärtom. Detta sker med en komparation av israelernas sjökrigföring under två krig, sexdagarskriget 1967 samt Yom Kippurkriget 1973. Analysverktyg för denna jämförelse utgörs av Wayne P. Hughes och Christopher Werners teorier angående samspelet mellan teknik och taktik. Denna teori och empiri redogörs deskriptivt med kvalitativ textanalys. Jämförelsen leder fram till att israelernas sjötaktiska agerande förändrades. I bägge krigen rådde god teknisk analys vilket påverkade deras taktik. Tekniken under Yom Kippurkriget möjliggjorde dock en offensivare taktik än agerandet under sexdagarskriget. Teknikutvecklingen av sjömålsroboten ledde således fram till en effektiv taktikanpassning. Undersökningen leder även fram till att teknik och taktik ständigt påverkar varandra. / The Yom Kippur War in 1973 is known to be the first naval war when surface-to-surface missiles were used by both sides. How did this development of technology affect the tactical actions of Israel? This paper examines how the development of technology, in form of the surface-to-surface missile, has affected the naval warfare of Israel and if technology affects tactics or vice versa. To find answers, the Israelis tactical actions are compared, in two wars, Six-Day War in 1967 and Yom Kippur war in 1973. Theories regarding the interplay between technology and tactics, by Kevin P. Hughes and Christopher Werner, are used as tool for the analysis. The result of the study shows that the tactical actions of Israel did change by the development of technology. Common in both wars is the fact that analyses of technology were carried out and affected their tactical actions. Technology during the Yom Kippur War though made more offensive tactics possible, than during the Six-Day War. Thus development of the surface-to-surface missile did lead to an effective adaptation of tactics. The result of the study also shows that tactics and technology constantly affects each other.

Approved for public release; distribution in unlimited. / This thesis examines the evolution of NATO as an institution in the International System by reference to Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty of 1949. Initially, the thesis considers NATO from an international relations perspective. It then proceeds to examine the institutional evolutionary process of the Alliance since its inception and implementation in 1949. Furthermore, it explores the significance and the meaning of the aforementioned Articles. This thesis utilizes the case study method and refers to four distinct events that have shaped allied policies and strategies: the Suez Crisis of 1956, the establishment of the politico-military consultation process, the Yom Kippur War (1973), and the end of the Cold War (1989-1991). It also examines the allied policies after the events of September 11, 2001. Moreover, it identifies a general pattern of events pertinent to crisis creation inside NATO when the organization is facing a defense issue outside the Euro-Atlantic area. Finally, the thesis concludes that NATO is more than an ordinary military Alliance, as advocated by its longevity, agility and adaptability, which allows the Alliance to maintain a central position in the International System as a robust politico-military organization. / Lieutenant Commander, Hellenic Navy

Israel have been a particularly war-ridden state, since its inception in 1948 the Israelis had already fought five different wars in its first 30 years of existence. This essay aims to investigate the cause of two of these wars that had both been fought with Egypt. The 1967 six-days war and the Yom-Kippur war of 1973.To try and answer this question this essay uses Stephen Van Everas stability theory which tries to explain how states act when presented with a first move advantage. The study concludes that the main causes of these wars was hasty and truncated diplomacy combined with a lucrative first-strike advantage. The six-day war started as a result of Egyptian posturing turned to dreams of conquest and the Yom-kippur as a result of bitter resentment for the new status quo and total lack of diplomatic negotiations.