1973 was a period in the history of the Atlantic Alliance when United States and European interests diverged to an unprecedented degree. Kissinger's Year of Europe initiative (1973/74) and the associated proposal, originally for a new Atlantic Charter and later for a less far-reaching declaration of principles, was an American attempt to inspire an explicit restatement of Alliance obligations. The intention was to take account of changes in the Atlantic relationship consequent upon EEC enlargement, economic pressures, and a dwindling of US domestic support for commitments to Europe at a time of detente with the USSR and the Watergate debacle. But the problems which the US sought to resolve were exacerbated by events, by different priorities in Europe, and by the attitude of France, which chose to interpret American proposals as a diplomatic offensive rather than an attempt to address Alliance problems. Closer US-Soviet relations, the eclipse of European interests during the 1973 Middle East war, and different approaches to the energy crisis created real tension between the allies. It increased - temporarily - the rival attractions of greater European cooperation before leading to recriminations within the Nine members of the EEC and eventual French isolation in the face of Paris's continued hostility to Kissinger's prescription for renewed cooperation. This thesis re-evaluates these events. It looks at the background to 1973 and the prevailing wisdom on such concepts as Atlantic partnership and interdependence. It examines the view that the US initiative was misinterpreted because of unwillingness to jeopardise newly-established European objectives for greater cooperation. It describes how the difficulties were resolved by enhancing - albeit only marginally - the importance of consultation within the Alliance and permitting a degree of US influence within European political cooperation on issues affecting US interests. Finally, it touches on possible comparisons with the early 1990s.

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This thesis deals with Britain's attitude towards European security under the Callaghan government from 1976 to 1979. That period saw Cold War tensions grow and détente lose its momentum as Britain struggled with economic weakness while trying to maintain its international influence. Concentrating on Cold War Europe, this thesis asks two questions: what policy did the Callaghan government adopt towards European security, and what role did Britain play in the Atlantic Alliance? It draws three conclusions. First, under Callaghan, Britain sought to maintain a traditionally influential role in Europe. To achieve that goal, it attempted to sustain a major military contribution to NATO and to foster good US-UK relations. Nevertheless, this policy was complicated by acute economic crisis and defence expenditure cuts. Britain's credibility in the Alliance was seriously diminished and policymakers had to offset reductions in British hardware contributions with diplomatic contributions. Secondly, Britain's role as a mediator in the Alliance contributed to its stability during the presidency of Jimmy Carter. Carter's inconsistent foreign policy and lack of consultation with allies caused confusion and tensions soon after his inauguration. This gave the British room to work for the maintenance of Alliance unity and, as a result, the US-UK special relationship was strengthened. Thirdly, regardless of Britain's response to its economic trails, and its collaboration with the US, Callaghan's preference for status quo, and his lack of strategy towards European security other than the maintenance of the stability of the Alliance under American leadership, hampered Britain's attempts to retain influence. As Britain's power waned, West Germany's rose as German leaders gained status in the defence policy making process of the Alliance by arguing for a new response to the changing East-West military balance and the decline of détente.

This thesis focuses on the role foreign policy played in legitimizing the early French Fifth Republic from 1958 to 1960. I argue that President Charles de Gaulle employed foreign policy in the service of gaining public support for his new government and the new republic. Many historians have argued previously that his foreign policy of grandeur, as it came to be called, was used to recast international politics and France's role in them. My work diverges from these previous interpretations by arguing that Gaullist foreign policy served, in many instances, overarching domestic goals, not French international interests. I see foreign policy as inseparable from the broader domestic ambition to craft a persuasive narrative of renewal and national unity under Gaullist stewardship. In the process, my study puts de Gaulle's foreign policy into the context of his larger aspiration to precipitate constitutional reform and, thereafter, ensure popular support. De Gaulle exploited opportunities to use foreign policy in order to shape public opinion, both domestically and internationally. These efforts, as my research reflects, helped foster public support for the new regime and, by portraying national renewal, further discredited the preceding Fourth Republic.

Manlio Brosio è stato l’unico italiano a ricoprire il ruolo di Segretario Generale della NATO, il quarto in carica dalla fondazione dell’Alleanza, per sette lunghi anni (1964-’71). Durante gli anni della sua guida, l’Alleanza Atlantica dovette fronteggiare alcune fra le più cruciali sfide, a cominciare dal ritiro della Francia gaullista. Da quel momento di potenziale crisi si originarono tuttavia due differenti processi: la riorganizzazione e il trasferimento delle sedi NATO da Parigi a Bruxelles, e, soprattutto, il ripensamento politico dell’Alleanza, a mezzo dello studio che prese il nome di “Esercizio Harmel”. Brosio stesso confessava i propri dubbi circa la capacità della NATO di “sopravvivere alla détente”, a cominciare dai pensieri e timori puntualmente affidati ai suoi diari. Dopo aver tracciato l’evoluzione del pensiero brosiano, intrecciata alla sua carriera diplomatica, la tesi si focalizza poi sull’esame di come il torinese abbia affrontato il ruolo di Segretario Generale, “con coscienza atlantica e cuore italiano”. Instancabile nel suo lavoro, traghettò l’Alleanza in salvo dalla crisi, con una fine ricerca del consenso politico all’interno del Consiglio Atlantico. Con metodo e serietà che gli furono ampiamente riconosciuti, fu in grado di evitare che l’Alleanza “mantenesse il proprio guscio ma perdesse la sostanza”. / Manlio Brosio was the only Italian NATO Secretary General; he was the fourth in charge, from August 1964 through September 1971, his office being one of the longest so far. During Brosio’s seven-year term, the Atlantic Alliance had to face some of the most crucial challenges since its foundation, the first being the withdrawal of the Gaullist France from the military integrated structure, in 1966. Two different processes originated from that moment of potential crisis: the reorganisation and transferral of the NATO Headquarters from Paris to Brussels, and the political rethinking of the Alliance as a whole, through the study which goes under the name of Harmel Report. Projecting the Alliance on the new international framework of improved East-West relations, the Secretary General himself was reflecting upon the key-question “Will NATO survive détente?”; indeed, in his personal diaries (all now published) Brosio revealed his own doubts, fears and sense of inadequacy for the tasks ahead. Having retraced the evolution of Brosio’s political thought and career, the work then focuses on how he approached his difficult position, always honouring his “Atlantic conscience alongside an Italian heart”. Untiring in his work, he steered the Alliance through and out of the potential crisis, always striving to reach consensus in any decision taken during the Council meetings; his seriousness and meticulous method have been widely acknowledged. He finally managed to preserve the fundamental “political ingredient” of the Alliance and to avoid that it “maintain its shell but lose its essence”.

Tentant de sortir du seul modèle connu et qui s’offre aux partenaires européens, à savoir l’OTAN, l’UE se fonde sur un système original et spécifique qui se veut plus efficace devant les défis de sécurité d’aujourd’hui et de demain. En parallèle, l’Alliance atlantique, qui tire pour beaucoup, sa légitimité de l’Histoire du continent européen, essaie de se maintenir en tant qu’acteur privilégié en matière de défense et de sécurité collective. L’objectif de cette thèse est de défendre l’idée de la pertinence de l’Union européenne en tant qu’acteur majeur dans le domaine de la défense et de sécurité tout en mettant en évidence les différences fondamentales entre celle-ci et l’action de l’Alliance atlantique. Ce travail de recherche fournit une analyse doctrinale et conceptuelle, à la fois « éclectique et pluraliste », pour répondre à la question de l’établissement de relations entre plusieurs institutions internationales de sécurité à partir des comportements étatiques en matière de sécurité et de défense collective. Cette analyse ne peut se faire sans se fonder sur les développements politiques et techniques ayant marqué ces vingt-cinq dernières années. Ces faits constituent des éléments tant explicatifs qu’évaluatifs du processus par lequel ces institutions naissent ou se modifient. Ils contribuent également à mettre en lumière les mécanismes d’interdépendance étroite entre l’Alliance atlantique et le processus de la PESD de l’Union européenne, et par ailleurs, de souligner l’originalité de cette dernière. Cette interdépendance existe sur le plan politique et dans ses différents aspects militaires (stratégique, opérationnel et tactique), ainsi que dans le volet technico-industriel ; elle résulte directement tant de la double appartenance historique des États membres à des instruments multilatéraux de sécurité, d’événements politiques majeurs touchant le continent européen, que des efforts entrepris pour faire converger les intérêts nationaux et, donc, le façonnage d’une culture stratégique. / The European Union bases its security system on genuine and specific approach which would allow the face the forthcoming challenges. Meanwhile it has attempted to untangle from the unique model of collective security in the Euroatlantic area, that is to say NATO. This study aims to defend the relevancy of the EU as a major international actor in a large scale of security missions. Moreover it highlights the main differences between the EU vis-à-vis the Alliance’s activities. It is based on a theoretical and conceptual analysis which uses both an eclectic and pluralist approach in order to provide answers on how States’ behavior in defense and collective security matters influences the setting up of relations between several international security institutions. This analysis derives from the political and technical developments that influenced the security landscape the last twenty-five years. These facts help to explain and to evaluate the process by which such institutions arise and develop. They finally contribute to highlight the tight and original interdependency of the between the Atlantic Alliance and the European Security and Defense Policy of the European Union. This interdependency is real from political, military (strategic, operational and tactical) and technical-industrial perspectives ; it directly originates from the historical dual belonging to the multinational security frameworks, from major political events on the European continent, as much as a joint effort to focus on common interests and the shaping of a strategic culture.

Approved for public release; distribution in unlimited. / This thesis examines the evolution of NATO as an institution in the International System by reference to Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty of 1949. Initially, the thesis considers NATO from an international relations perspective. It then proceeds to examine the institutional evolutionary process of the Alliance since its inception and implementation in 1949. Furthermore, it explores the significance and the meaning of the aforementioned Articles. This thesis utilizes the case study method and refers to four distinct events that have shaped allied policies and strategies: the Suez Crisis of 1956, the establishment of the politico-military consultation process, the Yom Kippur War (1973), and the end of the Cold War (1989-1991). It also examines the allied policies after the events of September 11, 2001. Moreover, it identifies a general pattern of events pertinent to crisis creation inside NATO when the organization is facing a defense issue outside the Euro-Atlantic area. Finally, the thesis concludes that NATO is more than an ordinary military Alliance, as advocated by its longevity, agility and adaptability, which allows the Alliance to maintain a central position in the International System as a robust politico-military organization. / Lieutenant Commander, Hellenic Navy

This thesis focuses on the ethical aspects of soldiers of the Army of the Czech republic participating in the foreign operations, not only in relation to the legality and legitimacy of military intervention, but also from the point of view of practical ethical questions of soldiers sent to perform tasks in these operations. The first part of this thesis introduces the Army of the Czech Republic as a tool to ensure national security and national sovereignty, built with emphasis to fulfill military traditions, virtues and professional ethics. Later, in historical and contemporary contexts summarizes the basic ethical solutions for the legitimate use of force to resolve international conflicts. The second part reflects the umanitarian and security operations taking place in the former Yugoslavia, Iraq and Afghanistan as the consequences of massive human rights violations, ethnic violence and global terrorism. In the context of the ethical and Christian dimension of legitimate use of military means, summarizes the basic issues while solving security threats and enforcing national interests.

The main aim of this dissertation is to analyze selected economic activities and economic relations occurring between the European Union and China. This dissertation is divided into four main chapters to ensure coherence and continuity throughout the research. The first chapter deals with the historical development of mutual cooperation between Europe and China. This chapter emphasizes recent events. The most extensive part of this work, the second section, addresses key areas of cooperation between the EU and China. Most of the research focus is devoted to trade economic relations and investment relations. Further, the second chapter addresses controversial areas within the mutual EU-China relations. In contrast with the second chapter, which looks at the mutual relations from the perspective of the whole EU, the third chapter distinguishes bilateral relations between two EU countries and China. The purpose of the third chapter is therefore to highlight the different approach of individual EU member countries. In the last chapter, I try to assess the growing influence of both the EU and China within the global economy. Finally, I outline the possible future development of the research topic.