During the Six-day war, Israel unexpectedly defeated four enemies and emerged victorious in only six days. This study attempts to examine how this was accomplished and the extent to which Sweden, also a small state, might be able to apply the lessons learned from Israel’s use of air power. To this end, the present study’s analysis draws on the theoretical perspectives of two widely known and acknowledged air power scholars, Robert A. Pape and John A. Warden. Their respective theories ”Coercion by Denial” and ”The Enemy as a System” on the use of air power seem in important ways to be in opposition to one another. However, study findings indicate that Israel combined elements from both approaches and neither theory can alone provide sufficient guidance for a small state. Therefore, the two theoretical perspectives were found to be complementary, where drawing on certain key dimensions of each could be the most favourable for a small state such as Sweden. In particular, the results of the analysis underline the importance of achieving air superiority. This study concludes that the uniqueness of each nation’s strategic context indicates the potential need for new theoretical insights, better tailored for small states.

The research regarding the six day war and the aerial operations named Operation Moked is extensive but there are certain shortcomings in the research that examines both the operation and the principle of surprise. The aim of this paper is to contribute to this research by utilising existing military theories on the principle of surprise in order to identify indicators that are representative of surprise.  These indicators are thereafter used in a study of Operation Moked in order to examine the extent of in which the principle was utilised. The result of this research goes to show that the principle of surprise was utilised in great extent by Israel during Operation Moked. / Det har bedrivits mycket forskning kring Sexdagarskriget och det lyckade israeliska luftanfallet Operation Moked men det finns vissa brister i forskningen på operationen kopplat till krigföringsprincipen överraskning. Denna uppsats syftar till att bidra till detta forskningsläge genom att använda militära teoribildningar kring principen överraskning och bryta ut indikatorer på vad som kännetecknar principen. Dessa indikatorer används sedan i en studie av Operation Moked för att undersöka i vilken utsträckning principen tillämpades. Resultatet av denna undersökning påvisar att överraskning tillämpades i stor utsträckning av Israel under Operation Moked.

The Air Power theories of today are often written from a superior air force perspective where the overall focus is on the offensive nature of Air Power. Very little is spoken about Air Power and its defensive role as well as the inferior states opportunities against superior opponents. A state that successfully has used Air Power through history is Israel. During both the Six Day War in 1967 and Yom Kippur in 1973, Israel faced superior opponents consisting of a coalition of Arab states, including Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. Despite Israel being the initially inferior state during both wars, they managed to gain initiative against the superior Arab states. This study will set the Air Power theories of Philip S Meilinger to a test through a validation process against two cases, the Six Day War in 1967 and Yom Kippur in 1973. The aim is to analyse the Israeli air force during these two wars. The main goal is to try to explain how inferior states can succeed against superior opponents through Air Power. The result of the study demonstrates that an inferior state has the opportunity to achieve success through Air Power against superior opponents. The analyses of Meilingers theories indicates that high readiness, early employment of forces, use of Air Powers psychological effect and timing constitutes successful factors in gaining initiative. An additional important factor for achieving success through these variables is highly relevant intelligence.

This study examines the unexpected outcome of the six day war between Israel and it’s neighboring countries. Israel who managed to fend off four aggressors in a war that lasted only six days, where the success was greatly attributed to the Israeli air force. This outcome played an important role for the future of airpower and gave rise to the theoretical framework we have today. Two of the most established theories that arised after the war is John. A. Wardens ”The enemy as a system” and Robert. A. Papes ”Bombing to win”. These theories advocates different approaches to the use of airpower and how to generate success. The aim of the study is to analyze in which way Israel used their air-force to generate this success and to challenge the view of a single theoretical framework as superior over the other. The result indicate that the success in the use of airpower in the six day war was achieved by a combination of methods from both theories where air superiority was a critical factor. The result also challenges the view of Wardens five ring model and how strategic effect is actually generated. The final conclusions of the study is hard to generalize due to the specific circumstances of the war and more research is needed.

Nya hot gör sig ständigt påtagliga där asymmetriska inslag blir alltmer förekommande. Luftmakt finns idag som ett kraftfullt maktmedel i de allra flesta stater men det finns få luftmaktsteorier ämnade för kvantitativt underlägsna stater. Luftmaktsteorier är relevanta för staters luftmaktsstrategier då teorier skänker svar till varför vi utbildas och tränas på ett visst sätt. The Underdog´s model, en luftmaktsteori gällande asymmetrisk luftmakt, påvisar teoretiskt hur kvantitativt underlägsna stater kan öka sina chanser mot en överlägsen motståndare genom att använda sina resurser på bästa sätt. Syftet med denna studie är att teoripröva ”The Underdog´s model” och undersöka dess validitet. Genom att pröva denna luftmaktsteori utifrån två fall, Sexdagarskriget 1967 och Gulfkriget 1990–1991, kan även ny kunskap om asymmetriska luftmaktskonflikter skapas. Fallen studeras utifrån ett luftmaktsperspektiv. Studiens resultat visar på att chanserna för en stat kan öka om teorins sex faktorer uppfylls och den underlägsna staten presterar bättre än sin motståndare, teorins validitet bedöms som stor. Däremot kan inte analysen med säkerhet säga om det finns andra aspekter som kan vara avgörande för en stats framgång som inte analyseras under teorins framträdande faktorer.

The use of air power has become more important in modern warfare, and the ability to use the full potential of air power is significant for a beneficial outcome of conflict. Today’s most established air power theories are developed from a military superpower perspective, leaving a void of knowledge for the smaller air forces. This study intends to find out how the air power advocate Robert Pape’s theory theater air power is applicable to small states and small air forces by testing Pape’s theory against the Six Day War in 1967 and the Georgia War in 2008 and thus contribute to a greater basis for the debate on how the air forces should be used and which role they play in conflict. The result show, in contrast to Pape’s theory, that air superiority is beneficial but not decisive. Instead, the coordination between arms is crucial for high combat efficiency and utilization of airspace. Also, the result shows that operational interdiction is the most efficient course of action for small state to use their air power, particularly if lacking the ability to defeat heavily armoured combat vehicles and battle tanks. Finally, the result clarifies that the air power cannot win conflicts by their own but are a vital contributor to the favourable outcome of conflict.

This study examines the theory of Robert Leonhard about combined arms and in what extent it can explain the outcome of the Six-day war and the second Lebanon war. Since both the Six-day war and the second Lebanon war involved Israel but the outcome differs, a gap and the need for further studies appears. The theory of combined arms consists of three principles that to some extent needs to be fulfilled in order to optimise the chances of winning. Since some of the Swedish Armed Forces doctrines are based out of this theory, it is of importance to further test the ideas of Leonhard. By testing the explanatory value of the theory, the study aims to create deeper and wider knowledge to the subject which in a broader perspective also contributes to the strengthening of the Swedish Security Politics as well as the Swedish Armed Forces. The result of this multiple case study shows that the theory to a high degree can explain the outcome of the wars. Since few studies have analysed the theory applied on a small state like Israel, the ability to generalize has increased with this study, although further studies are needed.

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The study conducted raises the research problem and issue regarding the debate about the six-day war in year 1967, and the asymmetric part of air warfare. The aim of the study is to answering the research question; How can the air warfare under the six-day war be understood trough The Underdog´s Model and SPOT-bombing? The study is also aiming to increase the understanding of air warfare and its asymmetry as well as address the crucial factors for an inferior part. The study uses two theories focusing on asymmetry and small states, The Underdog´s Model and SPOT-bombing. An analysis of the six-day war is conducted with the usage of the two theories to explain, through a text analysis.  The analysis presents the understanding of how Israel acted in line with The Underdog´s Model regarding most of the theories factors, to a better level then its opponent. By looking at the six-day war trough SPOT-bombing the analysis enables an understanding of the case but also how Israel’s actions for the most part was not in line with the theory. The overall conclusion is that Israel’s actions and success in the six-day war can, to a better extent, be understood and was more in line with The Underdog´s Model then SPOT-bombing. This study contributes to the understanding of the six-day war as well as the understanding of an inferior part in an asymmetric air warfare, relevant for today’s air warfare.

On 5 June 1967, the Israeli Air Force launched a surprise attack against the Egyptian Air Force and started what was to be known as the Six Day War. The Six Day War is a good example of when a small nation manages to singlehandedly defeat a superior adversary. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the success of the Israeli Air Force and their contribution to the victory. The use of air power in the Six Day War will be analyzed, using John Warden’s Five Ring Model and Shaun Clarke’s theories about risk-based coercion and SPOT-bombing. Research findings indicate that Shaun Clarke’s theories about coercion may to some extent explain the success of the Israeli Air Force. Attacking the armed forces created the threat of further violence against more valuable and vulnerable targets causing the Arabic leaders to choose peaceful solutions instead of continued fighting. Furthermore, the SPOT-bombing analyzes show that the psychological effect that the Israeli Air Force had on their adversary played a significant role in the campaign against Egypt. However, Warden’s model could not explain the reasons behind the outcome of the war.