The Air Power theories of today are often written from a superior air force perspective where the overall focus is on the offensive nature of Air Power. Very little is spoken about Air Power and its defensive role as well as the inferior states opportunities against superior opponents. A state that successfully has used Air Power through history is Israel. During both the Six Day War in 1967 and Yom Kippur in 1973, Israel faced superior opponents consisting of a coalition of Arab states, including Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. Despite Israel being the initially inferior state during both wars, they managed to gain initiative against the superior Arab states. This study will set the Air Power theories of Philip S Meilinger to a test through a validation process against two cases, the Six Day War in 1967 and Yom Kippur in 1973. The aim is to analyse the Israeli air force during these two wars. The main goal is to try to explain how inferior states can succeed against superior opponents through Air Power. The result of the study demonstrates that an inferior state has the opportunity to achieve success through Air Power against superior opponents. The analyses of Meilingers theories indicates that high readiness, early employment of forces, use of Air Powers psychological effect and timing constitutes successful factors in gaining initiative. An additional important factor for achieving success through these variables is highly relevant intelligence.

This study examines how Argentina’s failure to obtain control of the air during the Falklands war can be explained based on the theories of John A. Warden and Philip S. Meilinger. The failure is problematic due to the numerical superiority and geographical advantage of the Argentinian Air Force. Previous studies have focused on the absence of airborne early warning, air-to-sea warfare and the perspective of Clausewitz theories. The purpose of this study is therefore the to develop a theory-based explanation of the Argentinian failure from the perspective of two air-warfare theories. The first day of the war (May 1) and the landing on the shores of San Carlos constitute crucial parts of the air war. The paper utilizes a theory consuming approach to explain the two cases and then comparing them to develop an aggregated explanation of the Argentinian failure. The result of the analysis is that Argentinian failure to identify and attack Britain’s aircraft carriers/landing ships, failure to concentrate the offensive operations and selective British air defence are key parts of the explanation. The results contributes to a deeper understanding of a perspective of the Falklands air war that has not been analysed in previously analysed in earlier academic studies.