John A. Warden’s theory the enemy as a system has been influential and attributed to large scale victories, such as Operation Desert Storm. It advocates offensive use of air power by parallel attacks on the enemy’s strategic center. While doctrines of small states are dependent and influenced by the military thinking of great power nations, its capacity and necessary priorities for the use of air power may differ. This study examines Warden’s theory through two cases, the Six Day War and the Second Lebanon War. Both relied on air power executed by a small state, Israel. The result show that Warden’s theory can partly explain Israelic victory during the Six Day War, but with substantial differentiations from the theory’s advocation of attacks on the enemy strategic leadership. The findings are ambiguous and neither strengthens nor weakens the theory. The analysis of the Second Lebanon War indicates that air power was insufficient in achieving strategic victory in the war against Hezbollah, even though the execution of the air operation had significant resemblance to Warden’s theory, thus weakening the theory.

This study examines if theory of deception can be understood in successful air operations on a tactical level. Research on deception is mostly conducted on a strategic level and the different theories vary in aim and tend to be comprehensive. Studies of air power are mostly conducted on a tactical level and deception within air power has become more common throughout the years. This study aims, using a theory testing case study, to explain how theories of deception work on a tactical level. The analysis is based on Barton Whaley’s structure of deception, and the cases that were analyzed were the Six-Day War and Operation Desert Storm. The result showed that the theory partly could describe deception on a tactical level as a majority of the different categories of Whaleys theory were present in both conflicts. However, the priority of the different categories in the theory did not correspond to either of the cases. This led to the conclusion that Barton Whaley’s theory of structure of deception does not alone describe success in air operations on a tactical level.

This study intends to contribute to the understanding of air power theory by studying the contrasting theories of John A. Warden and Robert A. Pape onto a single case. Warden advocates strategic bombing, while Pape condemns it. The theories are applied onto the Israeli air power in the Six-Day War, a war which played an important role for air power and where air power played an important role for the outcome. Both theories are among the most discussed and criticized ones, including by the other author respectively. By thoroughly examining them onto the same single case, their generalizability is evaluated in relation to each other. The empirical data consisted of six descriptive works of the war, from which each event of air sorties was analysed and matched with the theories. The air sorties of each theory were then evaluated by occurrence and effect to the wars outcome, i.e. the contribution to the Israeli victory. The results of the analysis imply that Warden’s theory have a better ability to explain the success of the Israeli Air Force than Pape’s theory, but no major conclusions of their generalizability can be drawn. None of the theories where found fully sufficient to explain the case, i.e. some parts of the theories did not occur in Six-Day War according to the study.

During the cold war small states Air Forces operated as tactical resources in coalitions led by superpowers. After the cold war small states face new threats where the ability to fight independently is crucial to survival. Most of today’s air power theories focus on superpowers and do not mention specific details about its applicability within the small state’s context which leave small states in a state of confusion regarding their creation of doctrinal focus. Shaun Clarkes air power theory focuses directly on small states Air Forces and constitutes factors that conforms to the war principle of surprise. Clarke’s theory and the principle of surprise are both in need of critical empirical studies. This study contributes by supplementing the theory with the principle and conduct a case study on the Israeli Air Force performance during the six-day war and Yom Kippur war.  The result of the study strengthens the explanatory power of the theory by the conformance of its aspects with the successful operations of the six-day war while not being able to explain the operations of the less successful Yom Kippur war. The observation of underlying variables that may have affected the outcome means that the result cannot be generalized to other cases but indicates that it is an interesting aspect for small states as Sweden to consider during the creation of a doctrinal orientation.

This study examines the Six-Day War from an asymmetric airpower perspective. There are two main problems which motivates the study. One is the asymmetry between Israel and the Arab nations. The other is a research problem, that prior studies fail to offer a full understanding of the use of air power in the war. The research question is: How can we understand Israel's success in the Six-Day War using The Underdog's Model? The main purpose is to provide a better understanding of the case which is being studied, the Six-Day War, and what role air power played during the war from a perspective of asymmetry in conflicts. Questions based on the different factors from the theory are used to analyse the literature. The results show that for some specific factors from the theory, it is hard to say exactly which side performed better. However, when analysed as a whole, the results indicate that Israel performed better than the Arab nations in general across the six domains. The results also indicates that Israel managed to reach several of their goals and denied their opponents from doing so in an efficient manner.

<p>Yom Kippurkriget 1973 kan sägas vara det första sjökriget då sjömålsrobotar nyttjades av krigets respektive parter. Hur påverkade denna teknikutveckling av sjömålsroboten Israels sjötaktiska agerande? Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka hur teknikutvecklingen av sjömålsroboten har påverkat Israels sjökrigföring, samt undersöka huruvida det är tekniken som styr taktiken, eller tvärtom. Detta sker med en komparation av israelernas sjökrigföring under två krig, sexdagarskriget 1967 samt Yom Kippurkriget 1973. Analysverktyg för denna jämförelse utgörs av Wayne P. Hughes och Christopher Werners teorier angående samspelet mellan teknik och taktik. Denna teori och empiri redogörs deskriptivt med kvalitativ textanalys. Jämförelsen leder fram till att israelernas sjötaktiska agerande förändrades. I bägge krigen rådde god teknisk analys vilket påverkade deras taktik. Tekniken under Yom Kippurkriget möjliggjorde dock en offensivare taktik än agerandet under sexdagarskriget. Teknikutvecklingen av sjömålsroboten ledde således fram till en effektiv taktikanpassning. Undersökningen leder även fram till att teknik och taktik ständigt påverkar varandra.      </p> / <p>The Yom Kippur War in 1973 is known to be the first naval war when surface-to-surface missiles were used by both sides. How did this development of technology affect the tactical actions of Israel?</p><p>This paper examines how the development of technology, in form of the surface-to-surface missile, has affected the naval warfare of Israel and if technology affects tactics or vice versa. To find answers, the Israelis tactical actions are compared, in two wars, Six-Day War in 1967 and Yom Kippur war in 1973. Theories regarding the interplay between technology and tactics, by Kevin P. Hughes and Christopher Werner, are used as tool for the analysis.</p><p>The result of the study shows that the tactical actions of Israel did change by the development of technology. Common in both wars is the fact that analyses of technology were carried out and affected their tactical actions. Technology during the Yom Kippur War though made more offensive tactics possible, than during the Six-Day War.</p><p>Thus development of the surface-to-surface missile did lead to an effective adaptation of tactics. The result of the study also shows that tactics and technology constantly affects each other.     </p>

Yom Kippurkriget 1973 kan sägas vara det första sjökriget då sjömålsrobotar nyttjades av krigets respektive parter. Hur påverkade denna teknikutveckling av sjömålsroboten Israels sjötaktiska agerande? Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka hur teknikutvecklingen av sjömålsroboten har påverkat Israels sjökrigföring, samt undersöka huruvida det är tekniken som styr taktiken, eller tvärtom. Detta sker med en komparation av israelernas sjökrigföring under två krig, sexdagarskriget 1967 samt Yom Kippurkriget 1973. Analysverktyg för denna jämförelse utgörs av Wayne P. Hughes och Christopher Werners teorier angående samspelet mellan teknik och taktik. Denna teori och empiri redogörs deskriptivt med kvalitativ textanalys. Jämförelsen leder fram till att israelernas sjötaktiska agerande förändrades. I bägge krigen rådde god teknisk analys vilket påverkade deras taktik. Tekniken under Yom Kippurkriget möjliggjorde dock en offensivare taktik än agerandet under sexdagarskriget. Teknikutvecklingen av sjömålsroboten ledde således fram till en effektiv taktikanpassning. Undersökningen leder även fram till att teknik och taktik ständigt påverkar varandra. / The Yom Kippur War in 1973 is known to be the first naval war when surface-to-surface missiles were used by both sides. How did this development of technology affect the tactical actions of Israel? This paper examines how the development of technology, in form of the surface-to-surface missile, has affected the naval warfare of Israel and if technology affects tactics or vice versa. To find answers, the Israelis tactical actions are compared, in two wars, Six-Day War in 1967 and Yom Kippur war in 1973. Theories regarding the interplay between technology and tactics, by Kevin P. Hughes and Christopher Werner, are used as tool for the analysis. The result of the study shows that the tactical actions of Israel did change by the development of technology. Common in both wars is the fact that analyses of technology were carried out and affected their tactical actions. Technology during the Yom Kippur War though made more offensive tactics possible, than during the Six-Day War. Thus development of the surface-to-surface missile did lead to an effective adaptation of tactics. The result of the study also shows that tactics and technology constantly affects each other.

Denna uppsats granskar Shaun Clarkes teori om strategic persuation oriented targeting. Teorin beskriver hur strategisk påverkan av beslutsfattare ska ske genom utnyttjandet av luftmakt. En nation med begränsade resurser bör nyttomaximera användningen av stridsflyg. Israeliska offensiva flygoperationer analyseras i en jämförande studie av Sexdagarskriget, 1967 och Yom Kippurkriget 1973. Resultatet medger att framgången för Israel i luftkrigen delvis kan förklaras med Clarkes teori. Mätning av strategisk effekt och psykologisk påverkan är svår och kan ibland endast medges genom subjektiv bedömning. Detta påverkar förklaringskraften i teorin. Jämförelsen visar att specifika variabler i Clarkes teori kan verka till fördel för resultatet i enskilda fall. Enligt teorin är det den sammanlagda effekten som ska beaktas för nationer med begränsade resurser. Teoribildningen stärks genom studien och nationer med begränsade resurser kan med fördel analysera denna vid översyn av egen doktrin. Det viktiga är att göra det ur eget hot- och förmågeperspektiv. Fallstudien påvisar att undvikande av symmetriska konfrontationer och resurssplittring är en förutsättning som medger ökad möjlighet till framgång. Väl övervägda, planerade och effektiva offensiva företag tillsammans med riktad strategisk kommunikation kan innebära ökad psykologisk påverkan. Detta kan ge förutsättningar för en strategisk förändring. En instrumentell implementering av offensiva operationer kan dock ge motsatt effekt.

Principen överraskning är en av de äldsta principer som finns att använda i striden. Principen ses som grunden för striden och för vilka metoder som kan använda för att lyckas i striden. Men vad innebär överraskning egentligen och hur har den använts? Uppsatsen kommer att problematisera principen överraskning och anknyta till forskningen om överraskning till Pearl Harbor och sexdagarskriget, som har setts vara typiska överraskningsanfall. Såg anfallen likadana ut och vilka indikatorer utifrån litteraturen påvisar att det var en överraskning? Inledningsvis kommer överraskning beskrivas utifrån vald litteratur för att åskådliggöra innebörden. Litteraturen kommer att analyseras och göra underlag för senare del av uppsatsen. Därefter appliceras och granskas de på de två olika överraskningsanfallen med vilka indikatorer som användes vid respektive anfall till litteraturteorin. Avslutningsvis diskuteras resultatet och författaren ger förslag på ny forskning med anknytning till ämnet. Syftet med uppsatsen är att problematisera principen överraskning och vilka indikatorer som påverkar principen överraskning. Jag kommer att genomföra en komparativ modell mellan Pearl Harbor och sexdagarskriget. Denna analys genomförs genom en kvalitativ textanalys och uppsatsens analytiska ram är principen överraskning. De teoretiska utgångspunkterna i denna uppsats är analys utifrån teorin överraskning samt litteratur om Pearl Harbor och sexdagarskriget. / The principle of surprise is one of the oldest principles that is to used in battle. Principle as the basis of the conflict and the methods you can use to succeed in battle. But what does surprise really mean, and how is it used? The essay will problematize the principle of surprise and connect the research on surprise to Pearl Harbor and the Six Day War that has been seen to be typical surprise attacks. Did the attacks look the same and do the indicators from the literature show that it was a surprise?Initially the principle surprise will describe the selected literature to illustrate the meaning. The literature will be analyzed and make a basis for the later part of the essay. Then I will analyze the literature and apply it on the two surprise attacks, if they were using the same indicators. Finally it discusses the results and the author suggests new research related to the topic. The purpose of this paper is to problematize the principle of surprise and the indicators that affect the principle of surprise. The essay will conduct a comparative method between Pearl Harbor and the Six Day War. This analysis is performed by a qualitative text analysis and essay analytical framework is the principle of surprise. The theoretical basis of this paper is the analysis based on the theory and literature surprise of Pearl Harbor and the Six-Day War.

Studiens syfte var att analysera Israels roll innan och efter Sexdagarskriget med utgångspunkt inom rättfärdig krigsteori och dess kriterier. Det jag ville göra med studien var att analysera om Israel uppfyllde kraven för att initiera ett krig rättfärdigt, och sedan använde sig av rättfärdiga åtgärder vid efterkrigstiden. Studiens metodval var en kvalitativ innehållsanalys med en deduktiv ansats där material hämtades från olika arkiv och andra relevanta källor för att besvara syftet. Resultatet redovisades i en kronologisk ordning för att visa ett tydligt händelseförlopp mellan den 15 maj och 22 november 1967. Analysen visade på att Israel uppfyllde kriterierna för jus ad bellum genom ett tydligt casus belli vilket var stängningen av Tiran-sunden för israelitiska fartyg. Analysen om kriterierna för Israels jus post bellum uppfylldes däremot inte eftersom inga åtgärder som krävdes tas av Israels regering. Israel visade i stället på en motvilja att förhandla och till slut gjordes omöjlig med de arabiska tre nej. / This study aimed to assess Israel's role before and after the Six-Day War, utilizing the framework of just war theory and its associated criteria. The primary objective was to examine whether Israel adhered to the prerequisites for justly initiating a war and subsequently implemented just measures in the post-war period. The study employed a qualitative content analysis with a deductive approach, data were sourced from state archives and other pertinent materials. The results were organized chronologically, offering a coherent depiction of events unfolding between May 15 and November 22 1967. The analysis indicated that Israel satisfied the criteria for jus ad bellum by presenting a clear casus belli, namely the closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships. However, the examination of Israel's jus post bellum criteria revealed failure to take any just measures. The Israeli government did not undertake any of the required actions. Instead, Israel exhibited a reluctance to engage in negotiations as they did not want to engage first, a stance that ultimately led to the arabs’ three nos.