A combination of global insecurity and recent aggressions within European borders has forced the Swedish Armed Forces to change its focus back to territorial defense. With this change in focus an increase in armed capabilities especially within rebuilding and reshaping the brigades with focus on the application of combined arms within maneuver warfare has been identified. With the current manuals and guidelines concerning combined arms a gap concerning its tactical success and origin has been identified which leads to how tactical success can be explained with combined arms. This study aims to explain tactical success with the help of Robert Leonhards theory of combined arms during the Yom Kippur war. Even though a clear absence of organizational structure favoring combined arms, several events during the war show a relative clear application of combined arms within the Israeli forces. The theory has partly explained the tactical successes within the given frames of the study, but several other factors could furthermore explain said tactical successes.

Studiens syfte var att analysera Israels roll innan och efter Sexdagarskriget med utgångspunkt inom rättfärdig krigsteori och dess kriterier. Det jag ville göra med studien var att analysera om Israel uppfyllde kraven för att initiera ett krig rättfärdigt, och sedan använde sig av rättfärdiga åtgärder vid efterkrigstiden. Studiens metodval var en kvalitativ innehållsanalys med en deduktiv ansats där material hämtades från olika arkiv och andra relevanta källor för att besvara syftet. Resultatet redovisades i en kronologisk ordning för att visa ett tydligt händelseförlopp mellan den 15 maj och 22 november 1967. Analysen visade på att Israel uppfyllde kriterierna för jus ad bellum genom ett tydligt casus belli vilket var stängningen av Tiran-sunden för israelitiska fartyg. Analysen om kriterierna för Israels jus post bellum uppfylldes däremot inte eftersom inga åtgärder som krävdes tas av Israels regering. Israel visade i stället på en motvilja att förhandla och till slut gjordes omöjlig med de arabiska tre nej. / This study aimed to assess Israel's role before and after the Six-Day War, utilizing the framework of just war theory and its associated criteria. The primary objective was to examine whether Israel adhered to the prerequisites for justly initiating a war and subsequently implemented just measures in the post-war period. The study employed a qualitative content analysis with a deductive approach, data were sourced from state archives and other pertinent materials. The results were organized chronologically, offering a coherent depiction of events unfolding between May 15 and November 22 1967. The analysis indicated that Israel satisfied the criteria for jus ad bellum by presenting a clear casus belli, namely the closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships. However, the examination of Israel's jus post bellum criteria revealed failure to take any just measures. The Israeli government did not undertake any of the required actions. Instead, Israel exhibited a reluctance to engage in negotiations as they did not want to engage first, a stance that ultimately led to the arabs’ three nos.