<p>Syftet med denna uppsats är att ta reda på om Försvarsmakten har förmåga att genomföra övergång av större vattendrag med tyngre materiel. Detta gör jag genom att göra en fallstudie på <em>Operation Gazelle </em>för att förklara hur israelerna nyttjade sin förmåga till övergång av vattendrag för att få ett högt tempo i sin strid<em>. </em>Jag undersöker också den materiel vilken utbildning och vilka förband Försvarsmakten har för att bygga färjor och flytande broar.</p><p>  Inledningsvis förklarar jag viktiga begrepp såsom tempo, rörlighet, OODA-loopen/beslutscykeln och vattendrag. Jag använder mig av dessa begrepp senare i uppsatsen där jag kopplar detta till hur Israel använde sig av fältarbetsresurser för rörlighet för att få ett högt tempo i sin strid.</p><p>Slutsatserna är att Israel till stor del lyckades med <em>Operation Gazelle</em> tack vare att de hade förmågan att genomföra en vattenövergång över Suezkanalen. Försvarsmakten har i dag en förmåga att genomföra övergångar av större vattendrag. En större grad av samövning mellan manöverenheter och ingenjörförband kan vara lämpligt.</p> / <p>This essay <em>Operation Gazelle - how the ability to create mobility over watercourses can contribute to a high tempo in combat. </em> The aim with this essay is to find out if the Swedish Armed Forces have an ability to implement transition of bigger watercourses with heavier equipment, such as tanks. By doing a case study on operation Gazelle I will examine the ability the Swedish Armed Forces have in the form of equipment, education and units. </p><p>  Initially, I will explain important concepts as tempo, mobility, the OODA-loopen and watercourses. I use these concepts later in the essay where I will link this to how Israeli used combat engineering to get mobility and high tempo in combat.</p><p>I use this in order to explain how the Israeli to a large extent succeeded with operation Gazelle due to their ability to make a water transition over the Suez canal. Swedish Armed Forces has today an ability to implement transitions of bigger watercourses. A bigger degree of cooperation between the maneuver units and engineering units can be appropriately.</p>

Syftet med denna uppsats är att ta reda på om Försvarsmakten har förmåga att genomföra övergång av större vattendrag med tyngre materiel. Detta gör jag genom att göra en fallstudie på Operation Gazelle för att förklara hur israelerna nyttjade sin förmåga till övergång av vattendrag för att få ett högt tempo i sin strid. Jag undersöker också den materiel vilken utbildning och vilka förband Försvarsmakten har för att bygga färjor och flytande broar.   Inledningsvis förklarar jag viktiga begrepp såsom tempo, rörlighet, OODA-loopen/beslutscykeln och vattendrag. Jag använder mig av dessa begrepp senare i uppsatsen där jag kopplar detta till hur Israel använde sig av fältarbetsresurser för rörlighet för att få ett högt tempo i sin strid. Slutsatserna är att Israel till stor del lyckades med Operation Gazelle tack vare att de hade förmågan att genomföra en vattenövergång över Suezkanalen. Försvarsmakten har i dag en förmåga att genomföra övergångar av större vattendrag. En större grad av samövning mellan manöverenheter och ingenjörförband kan vara lämpligt. / This essay Operation Gazelle - how the ability to create mobility over watercourses can contribute to a high tempo in combat.  The aim with this essay is to find out if the Swedish Armed Forces have an ability to implement transition of bigger watercourses with heavier equipment, such as tanks. By doing a case study on operation Gazelle I will examine the ability the Swedish Armed Forces have in the form of equipment, education and units.    Initially, I will explain important concepts as tempo, mobility, the OODA-loopen and watercourses. I use these concepts later in the essay where I will link this to how Israeli used combat engineering to get mobility and high tempo in combat. I use this in order to explain how the Israeli to a large extent succeeded with operation Gazelle due to their ability to make a water transition over the Suez canal. Swedish Armed Forces has today an ability to implement transitions of bigger watercourses. A bigger degree of cooperation between the maneuver units and engineering units can be appropriately.

<p>The reason for this study is to settle the balance between technology and preponderance in war. Each theory claims its own superiority to be decisive when it comes to achieving military victories, but this study will show what actually happens when the two theories are analyzed together in the same conflict. To prove the conclusions, a case-study on Operation Gazelle is used. The study will describe the theories, what a military victory is and which party in the conflict came out victorious after this specific operation. Both sides’ forces will be shown and compared. The most significant technological systems will be analysed and compared. When this is done, the victory and the theories’ importance can be explained. Operation Gazelle was an act performed by Israel in October 1973 during the conflict with Egypt. It was an attempt to cross the Suez Canal and in that way gain an improved political status during the peace negotiations that were to come. The main question that will be answered is:- Which of the two theories, numerical preponderance and technology, is decisive when it comes to achieving military goals? To answer this question three other questions are answered:- What were the numerical conditions during Operation Gazelle?- What were the technological conditions between the parties?- Which party was victorious?</p>

The reason for this study is to settle the balance between technology and preponderance in war. Each theory claims its own superiority to be decisive when it comes to achieving military victories, but this study will show what actually happens when the two theories are analyzed together in the same conflict. To prove the conclusions, a case-study on Operation Gazelle is used. The study will describe the theories, what a military victory is and which party in the conflict came out victorious after this specific operation. Both sides’ forces will be shown and compared. The most significant technological systems will be analysed and compared. When this is done, the victory and the theories’ importance can be explained. Operation Gazelle was an act performed by Israel in October 1973 during the conflict with Egypt. It was an attempt to cross the Suez Canal and in that way gain an improved political status during the peace negotiations that were to come. The main question that will be answered is:- Which of the two theories, numerical preponderance and technology, is decisive when it comes to achieving military goals? To answer this question three other questions are answered:- What were the numerical conditions during Operation Gazelle?- What were the technological conditions between the parties?- Which party was victorious?

A combination of global insecurity and recent aggressions within European borders has forced the Swedish Armed Forces to change its focus back to territorial defense. With this change in focus an increase in armed capabilities especially within rebuilding and reshaping the brigades with focus on the application of combined arms within maneuver warfare has been identified. With the current manuals and guidelines concerning combined arms a gap concerning its tactical success and origin has been identified which leads to how tactical success can be explained with combined arms. This study aims to explain tactical success with the help of Robert Leonhards theory of combined arms during the Yom Kippur war. Even though a clear absence of organizational structure favoring combined arms, several events during the war show a relative clear application of combined arms within the Israeli forces. The theory has partly explained the tactical successes within the given frames of the study, but several other factors could furthermore explain said tactical successes.

Theory of the use of air power in defensive operations is not as developed as in offensive operations. The purpose of this study is to examine if Papes strategies of air power and coercion can be used to analyze the use of air power and its effects in a defensive operation. The result shows that Papes strategies can explain the use of air power in the cases of the study but have difficulties in explaining the outcome of the conflict in a distinct and clear way. Papes Denial-strategy has the best explanatory power of the four (Punishment, Risk, Denial and Decapitation) for the outcome of the conflict. The result shows that the use of air power could not be used isolated to reach decisive effect. Only during joint operations was the decisive effects reached. The conclusions, however, are to be seen in the light of the interests of USA and the Soviet Union and their roles before, during and their influence in ending the conflict.