There are several competing views on how to best utilize air power. Following his quantitative study of air power, Robert Pape developed a theory which focuses on undermining the target state's military strategy. According to Pape it is possible to explain the outcome as a result of military vulnerability. This essay seeks to determine if Pape's theory can predict the outcome of Operation Unified Protector. By using a mixed methods approach on four hypotheses, it will be determined if the operation was a successful case of coercion, if NATO acted according to Pape's model and whether this achieved the desired effects or not.   The results reveal that the theory could not successfully predict the outcome of the conflict. The operation was a coercive failure despite high military vulnerability as a consequence of denial operations. NATO's actions could be explained by Pape's model, yet this did not accomplish a behavioral change in the Gaddafi regime. Consequently, it is discussed if coercion is viable against an adversary who is not rational. Earlier claims that high demands impedes the effectiveness of coercion and that strategies of denial results in higher military vulnerability were strengthened, whereas cooperation between indigenous ground forces and foreign air power has to be further researched.

The 2011 military intervention in Libya relied solely on air and naval assets and is considered a great success. In some contexts the intervention is even seen as a model for future military interventions, despite some studies highlighting circumstances that makes the conflict in Libya unique. This thesis analyses the underlying dynamics that might be able to explain the NATO-coalition’s success in Libya. More specifically this thesis investigates whether the domestic legitimacy of the Gaddafi regime might have affected the Libyan armed forces’ ability to withstand aerial denial. This in turn, may have made the regime vulnerable to coercion. Using a case study-approach and a qualitative method, the purpose of this thesis is to give military decision-makers further basis for decision-making in terms of when a similar concept might be effective in the future.  Conclusions drawn from the analysis show that the Libyan armed forces might have been a weakened organisation even before the conflict began, due to elements relating to domestic legitimacy. Further conclusions show that despite the intervention being a coercive failure, the use of aerial denial might have enabled the rebel victory on the ground.

Den här uppsatsen söker svar på i vilken utsträckning som marina stridskrafter kan bidra till att avskräcka en irreguljär motståndare. Genom det bristfälliga forskningsläget på detta område gör uppsatsen en ansats till att skapa ett analysverktyg på taktisk nivå inom den marina kontexten och dess roll i avskräckning mot en irreguljär motståndare. Under det kalla kriget, men även efteråt, har många teoretiker försökt sig på att beskriva och förstå avskräckningens komplexitet med olika teorier. Även om historien inte alltid belönar detta som en framgångsrik metod för att påverka en motståndare med, är det ändå när det lyckas en väsenskilt mycket bättre och humanare metod än krig. Ur teorierna kring avskräckning har ett antal framgångsfaktorer identifierats. Dessa har sedan behandlats i den marina arenan och mot en irreguljär motståndare på taktisk nivå. Uppsatsen finner att det inte är avskräckningen som metod som skiljer utan motståndaren och dennes karaktär, syften och viljor. Den irreguljära motståndaren har visat sig svår att avskräcka främst på grund av att det är svårt att kommunicera de hot man vill projicera då han sällan uppträder som en enskild antagonist utan snarare flera.

Tvångsmaktsteorier försöker förstå och förklara vad som skapar framgång vid bruket av tvångsmakt. Tvångsmakt är att med hot, eller småskaliga stridshandlingar, från det militära maktmedlet åstadkomma en önskvärd förändring i en aktörs beteende. Problemet som denna uppsats hanterar är att teorierna om tvångsmakt brister i sin förmåga att förklara vad som skapar ett trovärdigt militärt hot. Detta är ett problem då flera teoretiker påtalar vikten av trovärdighet för att framgångsrikt utöva tvångsmakt. Teoretikerna gör detta utan att förklara eller undersöka denna trovärdighet. En debatt finns om vad som skapar framgång vid bruket av tvångsmakt, är det bara militära relativa kapaciteter eller är det också intresset som står på spel?   Denna teoriutvecklande uppsats syftar till att förklara vad som skapar ett trovärdigt militärt hot och hur detta bidrar till framgångsrik tvångsmakt. Genom en jämförande fallstudie mellan Haiti 1994 och Falklandsöarna 1982 undersöks trovärdigheten i det militära hotet. Det teoretiska ramverket utgörs av tvångsmaktsteorier kombinerat med teorier om militär trovärdighet.   Undersökningen visar att för att vara framgångsrik vid bruket av tvångsmakt ska det finnas en överlägsen militär kapacitet relativt motaktören. Inget samband kan påvisas mellan värdet på intresset och utfallet av tvångsmakt.

Robert A. Pape, an American political scientist, have created a universally known theory about how to successfully conduct military coercion. In his comprehensive quantitative research from multiple cases of coercion Pape’s conclusion is that the denial strategy of air power is what historically have been working. From his cases where he draws his conclusion there is one case missing. Pape has excluded the case of the Falklands war. According to some researchers, the Falklands war which was won by Great Britain, had a successful outcome due to their utility of the air power. This essay aims to test if Papes theory of military coercion has the potential to explain the victory of Great Britain in the Falklands War. By conducting a single case study by means of a qualitative text analysis, the answer is to be found. The results shows that Great Britain mainly used a denial strategy with the air powers. The Falklands war could have been predicted by this usage. Although it is a conventional conflict, involving both the navy, army and the airforce, it is hard to believe it was only because of the air powers the war was won. The use of a denial strategy can therefore not explain the victory for Great Britain, but it can be a part of the explanation. / <p><strong>Uppsatsen skriven VT 2017 under Termin 4 Officersprogrammet 15-18 med inriktning</strong><strong>mot flyg. Examen genomförs VT 2018.  </strong></p>

Framträdande luftmaktsteorier förefaller i regel vara skrivna av stormaktsföreträdare. Ett implicit antagande att dessa teorier förutsätter betydande militär kapacitet och sofistikerad teknologi gör att de uppfattas som ”stormaktsteorier” som likt en klubba slår hårt mot motståndaren, med begränsad relevans för mindre stater som saknar stormakternas omfattande resurser. Luftmakt finns dock också i länder som kan betraktas som småstater. Även småstater kan – teoretiskt – antingen enskilt eller i en småstatsallians genom välriktade nålstick också skapa strategisk effekt med befintliga resurser.   Denna studie utmanar antagandet att luftmaktsteorier kan betraktas som antingen stormakts- eller småstatsteorier. Genom att pröva Robert Papes luftmaktsteori och Shaun Clarkes SPOT-paradigm i såväl stormakts- som småstatsperspektivet på ett gemensamt fall, Georgienkriget 2008 mellan Ryssland och Georgien, skapas ny kunskap om förklaringskraften hos respektive teori. Studien visar att Papes luftmaktsteori kan förklara stormakters användning av luftmakt, men belägg saknas för att den också kan förklara småstaters luftmaktsanvändning. Vidare saknas belägg för att Clarkes SPOT-paradigm kan förklara vare sig småstaters eller stormakters användande av luftmakt i det aktuella fallet. Däremot visar analysen att SPOT-paradigmet förutsätter ett visst mått av kvantitet och kvalitet, även hos småstater, för att omsättas i en skarp operation. Då ett mått på detta inte ges, bör SPOT-paradigmet främst betraktas som ett förhållningssätt till hur strategisk effekt kan skapas med tillgängliga resurser.

The Arab Spring resulted in what came to be known as the "2015 refugee crisis", primarily in the EU. It was a paradigm shift for the EU's security strategy and for intergovernmental relations for the EU, Russia and Turkey. The study highlights the aspect of refugee flows by using the theory Coercive Engineered Migration, to understand strategic changes during the period 2012-2016. The study is a theory-consuming case study focusing on the case "refugee crisis 2015".The study combines the refugee aspect from political science with concepts from the strategy domain, deriving from war studies. This shows a course of events where the actor´s utilization of refugee flows has played a central role in an escalation duel.The conceptual development approach of the study shows the benefit of combining the theory of Coercive Engineered Migration, and how escalation increases the understanding of the case and broadens the strategic perspective. The study also claims to broaden the concept of escalation by including refugee flows.

During decades of analysing and theorising military coercion, there is still an absence of common understandings of what coercion consists of and what makes it successful. Despite those diversities, most of the coercion theories agree on that the credibility in threats is a condition for succeeding to influence an adversary. Daryl G. Press has presented a theory, Current Calculus Theory, to analyse the credibility in military threats. However, the theory is based on threats in military crisis with the focus on the actor exposed to the threats. The purpose of this study is therefore to examine the explanatory capability of the theory in coercion in war with perspective on the actor conducting the threats. The results show that the theory may be used to explain the credibility in military threats in war and not just crises, but restrictions in war that the theory does not include complicates the explanatory capability of it. For further analysis of credibility of military threats in war, the suggestions are that the theory is added with factors specifically included in war, such as how Rules of Engagement complicate the use of force, and how the international society respond to an actor threatening with disproportionate amount of force.

This thesis examines how the Swedish threshold concept can be understood and developed at the highest political and strategic level. The problem is that understanding the threshold concept with its dynamics is in its infancy. The Swedish debate shows that a disagreement exists about the concept, in particular about the extent to which the threshold can be equated with deterrence. In addition, it is problematic to use deterrence in isolation since the theory of coercive power also contains compellence. An actor that focuses on deterrence must also be prepared to use coercive diplomacy if deterrence fails. The two concepts have the same basis but operate on different dynamics. A state with a strategy that is conceptually based on deterrence alone risks being exposed to conceptual and doctrinal surprise in the event of conflict, as the difference between deterrence and coercive diplomacy disappears in conflict. In addition, it is up to the adversary to decide which of the two concepts is governing. The dissertation argues that the concept of threshold includes more than deterrence, “defense/obstacles”, marker, alarm clock and trip wire. This is done by applying discourse analysis to Swedish official political and military strategic documents dealing with the concept of threshold. This analysis is important today because of hostile actions are now taken place in the grey zone between war and peace. By examining how deterrence and coercive diplomacy are related, the dissertation increases the understanding of the concept of threshold as a conflict management tool in the gray zone. The study concludes that the threshold concept needs to be further developed, if it is to be used as a conflict management tool in the gray zone.

This thesis examines whether NATO’s air operation Allied Force was appropriate to expect concession when compelling the Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic, or if there were other circumstances to explain the NATO failure of success. I analyse the conditions in accordance with previous research and theories of compellent threats. I find that NATO’s efforts meet the expectations for successive coercion and therefore it has to be other explanations why they failed. I argue that NATO misjudged Milosevic when he did not follow the tacit and expected rules of reaction and behaviour, which explains why the outcome became unpredictable and resulted in failure. To complete the theories of successful compellent threats, I suggest that future research should consider the target states strategic culture and ethnic, cultural and historical heritage as well as the state’s public defense will and leadership.