The 2011 military intervention in Libya relied solely on air and naval assets and is considered a great success. In some contexts the intervention is even seen as a model for future military interventions, despite some studies highlighting circumstances that makes the conflict in Libya unique. This thesis analyses the underlying dynamics that might be able to explain the NATO-coalition’s success in Libya. More specifically this thesis investigates whether the domestic legitimacy of the Gaddafi regime might have affected the Libyan armed forces’ ability to withstand aerial denial. This in turn, may have made the regime vulnerable to coercion. Using a case study-approach and a qualitative method, the purpose of this thesis is to give military decision-makers further basis for decision-making in terms of when a similar concept might be effective in the future.  Conclusions drawn from the analysis show that the Libyan armed forces might have been a weakened organisation even before the conflict began, due to elements relating to domestic legitimacy. Further conclusions show that despite the intervention being a coercive failure, the use of aerial denial might have enabled the rebel victory on the ground.