The thesis analyzes the capability transformation process of NATO to measure the progress made by the European NATO member states in narrowing the capability gap between the United States and European forces. Since the end of the Cold War, the capability gap among the NATO members has become a major concern because it hinders NATO's operational ability. Operation Allied Force and new strategic and operational challenges of the 21st century have driven NATO's capability transformation process. The thesis analyzes NATO military capabilities exhibited in Operation Allied Force by analyzing the individual national contributions of the Allies to highlight the imbalance in the capabilities of the Alliance. The thesis then examines the capability transformation process regarding the commitments made by the Allies at the Washington, Prague and Istanbul Summits to reinforce capabilities for modern warfare in high threat environments and narrow the growing capability gap. It focuses on the decisions and achievements of each summit to measure the progress made by the European NATO member states in bridging the capabilities gap between the United States and European forces. To do this, it analyzes military expenditures, defense capabilities, national regulations and strategies that slowed down or reinforced the capability transformation process. The conclusion is that, despite encouraging trends in the capability transformation process, the balance in the military capabilities continues to favor the United States by a wide margin.

Det serbiska luftvärnet sköt ner ytterst få av NATO:s flygplan under Kosovokonflikten. Trots det så visar det sig att NATO:s luftoperationer indirekt påverkades i stor skala av luftvärnet. Även om man sköt ner ytterst få av de anfallande flygplanen uppnådde serberna indirekta effekter på NATO som försvårade hela operationen. Syftet med denna uppsats är att problematisera och definiera begreppet indirekt effekt inom ramen för luftvärn samt att applicera detta begrepp på en vald konflikt. Uppsatsen består i huvudsak av två sammanhängande undersökningar. Först sker en begreppsutredande studie som resulterar i en definition av begreppet indirekt effekt. Därefter sker en fallstudie på Kosovokonflikten för att konkretisera och exemplifiera indirekt effekt. Dessa metoder kombineras med metoden kvalitativ textanalys. Valet av att använda denna konflikt gjordes då parterna använde sig främst av enbart flygstridskrafter respektive luftvärn mot varandra. Studien resulterade i en definition av indirekt effekt som kan användas för att beskriva effekter av luftvärnsoperationer. När begreppet analyserades i fallstudien visade det sig att luftvärnets indirekta effekter hade stor betydelse för konfliktens utveckling och i slutändan bland annat kan ha fördröjt Milosevics kapitulation. / The Serbian Air Defence shot down a small number of airplanes during the Kosovo War. Even so, it turns out that NATO’s air operations were indirectly affected a lot by the Serbian Air Defence. The purpose of this dissertation is to problematize and define the term of indirect effect in the context of air defence and to apply it to an authentic conflict. The dissertation consists primarily of two interrelated studies. The first is an investigative study that culminates in a definition of the term indirect effect. Thereafter, a case study on the Kosovo conflict is used to concretize and exemplify the indirect effect. This conflict was chosen as both parties used primarily air power and air defence against each other. The study resulted in a definition of indirect effects that can be used to describe the effects of air defence operations. The case study showed that the indirect effect of the air defence were important for the progression of the conflict and ultimately may have delayed Milosevic's capitulation.

24 mars 1999 påbörjar NATO för första gången i organisationens historia krigshandlingar med luftstridskrafter. Detta mot ett Serbien med Slobodan Milosevic i spetsen som utförde etniska rensningar på kosovoalbaner i Kosovo. Denna konflikt kom att från NATOs håll kallas operation Allied Force. Tre år innan denna konflikt urartade släppte Dr. Robert A. Pape en bok vid namn Bombing to win där Pape framför sina teorier för hur luftkrig och framförallt luftmakt skall genomföras. Tidigare forskning om Pape´s teorier och operation Allied Force visar att det finns vissa kopplingar mellan dennes teorier och den använda taktiken under luftkriget i konflikten. Syftet med denna undersökning är att försöka urskilja faktorer som påverkade utgången genom användandet av Pape´s teorier. Slutsatsen är att delar av Pape´s teorier inte applicerades tillräckligt mycket så att ett positivt resultat kunde nås. Analysen visar att NATO´s taktik i detta luftkrig är en blandning av olika teoretikers teorier, vilket kan förklaras med att flera olika politiska viljor har haft en stor inverkan på den utförda taktiken.

Thesis (M.S.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. / Cover title. "June 2002." AD-A406 036. Includes bibliographical references. Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (M.A in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2005. / Thesis Advisor(s): Hans-Eberhard Peters. Includes bibliographical references (p. 113-125). Also available online.

Dr. Robert A. Pape publicerar 1996 boken Bombing to Win. Kvantitativa studier av 33 konflikter där luftstridskrafter använts har genomförts. Detta för att söka ett samband mellan lyckade respektive misslyckade slutresultat. De teorier som Pape framför har därför en empirisk förankring och de slutsatser som förs fram är att strategisk bombning väldigt sällan fungerar och att luftstridskrafter istället bör användas för att neka fiendes styrkor framgång på slagfältet. Tre år efter att Bombing to Win publiceras inleds Operation Allied Force. En operation ledd av NATO för att förhindra den etniska rensningen av albaner i Kosovo. Syftet med detta arbete är att se om Robert A. Pape:s teorier uppmärksammats. Detta genom att leta efter händelser där NATO använder luftstridskrafterna på ett sätt som överensstämmer med Pape:s teorier. Slutsatsen är att det finns vissa händelser i konflikten där NATO:s agerande överensstämmer med de teorier Pape presenterar i Bombing To Win. Det finns däremot inte en koppling till ett särskilt skede eller del av operationen. Genom uttalanden av militära beslutsfattare går det att påvisa att teorierna har uppfattats av dessa. Politiska viljor har haft stor inverkan, och vissa militära strategiska viljor har fått stå tillbaka.

On the evening of the 24th of March, 1999, the first air strikes hit multiple targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The “Operation Allied Force” had begun. The air raids lasted for 78 days. The Milošević regime used the “state of exception” (Agamben 2004) to further and deepen its own propagandistic imperatives of national unity and to advertise the necessity of the “war of defence” within the nation. The state started to offer a wide range of events that not only entertained its citizens but also created forums for them to meet and to “unite” against the enemy. Beyond the state-prescribed cultural events, numerous efforts sprang up throughout the city to maintain a social and cultural life. This paper will tell of the diverse ways in which the people of Belgrade spent their time between and during the air raids.

In the spring of 1999 NATO started the air campaign Operation Allied Force against the Serb president Slobodan Milošević’s dictatorship. Operation Allied Force unfolded during a 78-day long campaign in former Yugoslavia. The aim of the operation was to stop the ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians in the Serb province Kosovo. The operation, that initially was supposed to be over in a week, continued for almost three months. Why did the campaign take such a long time compared to what was predicted? The aim of this study was to analyze Operation Allied Force from a time perspective to be able to tell why the operation became so protracted. The analyze was made by consuming two of the best well-known air power theories written by Robert A. Pape and John A. Warden. The result showed that there were several different factors that contributed to the protracted process. Too strict rules of engagement, few targets, lack of resources and the lack of a unified strategy inside NATO are believed to be the main factors that caused the lengthy process.

John A. Warden's airpower theory, The Enemy as a System, has had a major influence on the strategic discourse ever since the foundation of this normative framework was presented in The Air Campaign in 1988. Warden’s theoretical impact was reinforced by the American successes during the Gulf War, but since then, little research has tested the theory outside the context of conventional wars of aggression. This study analyzes The Enemy as System against a peace enforcing context, characterized by multilateral cooperation. It also identifies intermediate variables that help explain why the theory is strengthened or weakened in relation to this particular context. Through qualitative methods, Operation Allied Force and Operation Unified Protector are analyzed against operational indicators within the central concepts of the five-ring model and parallel attacks. The results of the study show that NATO did not use airpower in accordance with Warden's normative theory in either of the examined operations. The absence of operational indicators could hypothetically explain why NATO failed to produce strategic effects within the operational time limits, although this remains a speculative conclusion. The result instead suggests a number of intermediate variables, such as political disagreement and strategic dissonance, which combined reduced the possibility of using airpower in accordance with Warden's theory. In addition, the fear of civilian casualties and the risk of exacerbating the post-war humanitarian situation, further reduced the possibility of attacking targets within certain subsystems of the five-ring model. The conclusion is therefore that Warden’s theoretical applicability, and thus universal validity, is weakened within the examined context.

This thesis examines whether NATO’s air operation Allied Force was appropriate to expect concession when compelling the Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic, or if there were other circumstances to explain the NATO failure of success. I analyse the conditions in accordance with previous research and theories of compellent threats. I find that NATO’s efforts meet the expectations for successive coercion and therefore it has to be other explanations why they failed. I argue that NATO misjudged Milosevic when he did not follow the tacit and expected rules of reaction and behaviour, which explains why the outcome became unpredictable and resulted in failure. To complete the theories of successful compellent threats, I suggest that future research should consider the target states strategic culture and ethnic, cultural and historical heritage as well as the state’s public defense will and leadership.