When are aerial bombing strategies effective in coercing target states? According to the recent research debate there is a consensus that denial strategies may be an effective instrument for coercing states to change their politics. This study is based on Belkin’s theory which argues that the effectiveness of denial strategies may depend in part on the domestic legitimacy of the target states’ regimes. From a political standpoint, aerial denial effectiveness can be considered more likely to coerce when political leaders of target states lack domestic legitimacy rather than when they are legitimate.     The purpose of this study is to contribute an explanation of a condition where denial strategies are more likely to succeed. The study has a two-sided focus where the first focus lies on Pape’s work on denial strategies in order to investigate how the Allies used their air power during Operation Desert Storm. The second focus is on legitimacy theory which will be used to investigate whether Iraq lacked legitimacy during the time of the war and what consequences that might have had in a denial perspective.   The study concludes that Iraq lacked legitimacy and may therefore have been vulnerable to a sub-category of denial called operational interdiction. Thus, the study provides a possible development of Belkins theory into: Operational interdiction may be an effective instrument for coercing states to charge their policies.

Robert A. Pape, an American political scientist, have created a universally known theory about how to successfully conduct military coercion. In his comprehensive quantitative research from multiple cases of coercion Pape’s conclusion is that the denial strategy of air power is what historically have been working. From his cases where he draws his conclusion there is one case missing. Pape has excluded the case of the Falklands war. According to some researchers, the Falklands war which was won by Great Britain, had a successful outcome due to their utility of the air power. This essay aims to test if Papes theory of military coercion has the potential to explain the victory of Great Britain in the Falklands War. By conducting a single case study by means of a qualitative text analysis, the answer is to be found. The results shows that Great Britain mainly used a denial strategy with the air powers. The Falklands war could have been predicted by this usage. Although it is a conventional conflict, involving both the navy, army and the airforce, it is hard to believe it was only because of the air powers the war was won. The use of a denial strategy can therefore not explain the victory for Great Britain, but it can be a part of the explanation. / <p><strong>Uppsatsen skriven VT 2017 under Termin 4 Officersprogrammet 15-18 med inriktning</strong><strong>mot flyg. Examen genomförs VT 2018.  </strong></p>