<p>En av huvuddelarna i manöverkrigföringen, som Försvarsmakten nyttjar, är indirekt och direkt metod. Men då Sverige inte har varit i krig på väldigt länge så beslöt jag att skriva denna uppsats i syfte att skapa ett underlag för en ökad förståelse för nyttjandet av indirekt och direkt metod vid manöverkrigföring. För att göra detta så försökte jag svara på följande fråga:</p><ul><li>Hur ser fördelningen mellan indirekt och direkt metod ut vid flyginsatser i krig under 1990-talet?</li></ul><p>För att få ett svar på frågan så gjorde jag en fallstudie på Operation Desert Storm där jag först analyserade vilken metod de allierade styrkorna använde mot de olika anfallsmålen. Efter detta gjorde jag en undersökning i hur många anfall och uppdrag som genomfördes mot varje mål. Resultaten visade bland annat att även om de flesta målen var kritiska sårbarheter, där indirekt metod nyttjades, så gjordes de flesta anfallen med direkt metod.</p> / <p>A fundamental part of the manoeuvre warfare, which the Swedish Armed Forces use, is indirect and direct approach. But since Sweden has not been in a war for a long time I decided to write this essay with the purpose to create a basis of further understanding of how to use indirect and direct approach during manoeuvre warfare. To do this I have tried to answer the following question:</p><ul><li>How are the indirect and direct approach divided in air raids in wars during the 1990s?</li></ul><p>To answer this question I made a case study on Operation Desert Storm, where I first analysed which approach the allied forces used on the different targets. After that I made a research on how many attacks and missions they made on each target. The results showed among others that even though most of the targets were critical vulnerabilities, on which the indirect approach was used, the most part of the attacks were made using the direct approach.</p>

En av huvuddelarna i manöverkrigföringen, som Försvarsmakten nyttjar, är indirekt och direkt metod. Men då Sverige inte har varit i krig på väldigt länge så beslöt jag att skriva denna uppsats i syfte att skapa ett underlag för en ökad förståelse för nyttjandet av indirekt och direkt metod vid manöverkrigföring. För att göra detta så försökte jag svara på följande fråga: Hur ser fördelningen mellan indirekt och direkt metod ut vid flyginsatser i krig under 1990-talet? För att få ett svar på frågan så gjorde jag en fallstudie på Operation Desert Storm där jag först analyserade vilken metod de allierade styrkorna använde mot de olika anfallsmålen. Efter detta gjorde jag en undersökning i hur många anfall och uppdrag som genomfördes mot varje mål. Resultaten visade bland annat att även om de flesta målen var kritiska sårbarheter, där indirekt metod nyttjades, så gjordes de flesta anfallen med direkt metod. / A fundamental part of the manoeuvre warfare, which the Swedish Armed Forces use, is indirect and direct approach. But since Sweden has not been in a war for a long time I decided to write this essay with the purpose to create a basis of further understanding of how to use indirect and direct approach during manoeuvre warfare. To do this I have tried to answer the following question: How are the indirect and direct approach divided in air raids in wars during the 1990s? To answer this question I made a case study on Operation Desert Storm, where I first analysed which approach the allied forces used on the different targets. After that I made a research on how many attacks and missions they made on each target. The results showed among others that even though most of the targets were critical vulnerabilities, on which the indirect approach was used, the most part of the attacks were made using the direct approach.

De svenska insatsförbanden anpassas för de konflikter som är normgivande idag. Konceptuellt innebärdetta att doktriner och metoder måste utvecklas för att möta utvecklingen på dagens stridsfält. Denkonceptuella utvecklingen är förhållandevis billig jämfört med den tekniska, vilket innebär attförmågeutvecklingen mer anpassas till de materiella förutsättningarna som råder. Plattformar för CloseAir Support symboliserades under 80- och 90-talet av tungt beväpnade och särskilt anpassade flygplanoch helikoptrar som verkade i nära anslutning till markförbandens strid. Idag representeras dessaplattformar av andra flygsystem som sedan tidigare är utvecklade utifrån andra kravprofiler. Dennaobservation ligger till grund för undersökningen och formulerar därmed uppsatsens problem.Har innebörden av konceptet Close Air Support på senare tid förändrats och på så vis öppnat förandra typer av flygsystem att utöva detta koncept?Uppsatsens syfte är att undersöka hur Close Air Support tillämpats under tre moderna operationer föratt därmed finna orsaker till hur konceptet utvecklats till vad det representerar idag. Dessutom syftaruppsatsen till att klarlägga begreppets innebörd och därmed bidra med kunskap inom konceptet förClose Air Support.Undersökningen analyserar Close Air Support historiska ursprung och teorierna bakom kombineradevapen. Denna analys lägger grunden till den fallstudie som omfattar tre militära operationergenomförda efter 1990. Studien fokuseras mot samordning, plattformar och operativ och taktisk effekt.Avslutande diskussion påvisar att samordning av Close Air Support tillämpats olika under de studeradeoperationerna. De förutsättningar som råder för dagens konflikter möjliggör att användningsområdenför olika vapensystem kan utökas. Detta är en av förklaringarna till varför andra typer avstridsflygsystem idag utnyttjas för Close Air Support. Studien har visat att CAS som koncept inteförändrats. Däremot har Close Air Support tillämpats olika beroende på de operativa förutsättningarnasom rådde inför respektive operationUppsatsen föreslår tre områden inom ämnet som kan vara föremål för djupare analys. / The Swedish Armed Forces are transforming to be able to conduct military operations in today’sstandard conflicts. To meet the demands that the new type of conflict represents the transformationrequires a development of new doctrines and tactical manuals. .Developments of new weapon systems are proportionately much more expensive than conceptualdevelopments. The armed forces’ combat capability must be adapted to existing military technologicalconditions. During the 1980s and 1990s Close Air Support aircrafts were represented by heavily armedand armoured fixed- and rotary-wing aircrafts which carried out CAS missions in close proximity tofriendly forces. These CAS platforms are today, more or less, represented by traditional fighter andstriker aircrafts. This observation will form the basis of this research and thereby formulate thescientific question.Has the significance of Close Air Support been changed and is it therefore made it possible to useother combat aircrafts for Close Air Support missions?The purpose of this thesis is to examine how Close Air Support has been put in practise in threemodern operations and to ascertain how this has developed the concept to what it is today.Furthermore the thesis will also clarify the significance of the concept and thereby contribute withknowledge to the concept of Close Air Support.The research will analyze the concept’s historical origin and the theory behind combined arms. Thisanalysis will form the basis for the following case studies, which comprise three military operationscarried out after 1990. The research will focus on coordination, platforms and operational and tacticaleffects.The final discussion will show that coordination of CAS has been executed differently during the threestudied operations. Today’s conflicts make it possible to use weapon systems in an extended role. Thiswill explain why different combat aircraft could be used in a CAS role. The research shows that theCAS concept hasn’t changed. However, CAS has been performed in different ways depending on theoperational circumstances within each operation.The thesis suggests three new research areas within the subject that could be appropriate for furtherexaminations. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps. Hylla: Upps. ChP 06-08

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of History / Donald J. Mrozek / During the Cold War, the United States’ foreign policy relied heavily on its ability to project military power. More often than not, the central component of force projection rested on the United States military’s effectiveness in employing air power both by establishing air superiority and through accurate delivery of ordnance. As the primary service tasked with conducting aerial warfare, the United States Air Force (USAF) was expected to maintain this capability either to achieve deterrence or, when necessary, to military action. In January 1973, the USAF seemed incapable of performing the latter task due to the North Vietnamese Integrated Air Defense System’s (NV-IAD’s) effectiveness in Operation Rolling Thunder and its successor, Operation Linebacker. Eighteen years later, Air Force aircraft spearheaded the Coalition’s air attack on the Iraqi Integrated Air Defense System (I-IADS) in January 1991. Considered by many to be the most effective air defense system outside the Soviet Union’s, the I-IADS was expected to exact heavy casualties from the allied forces. Instead, in less than twenty days, the USAF’s dominance was so complete that politicians, analysts and military historians quickly proclaimed a “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA). The majority of the current historiography credits advances in precision-guided munitions (PGMs), airframes, and computer technology as the impetus for the RMA. Others have claimed that the USAF’s training methodology and construction of advanced training sites such as the Red Flag complex at Nellis Air Force Base were the primary drivers for the Air Force’s success. While acknowledging the role all of these factors played, this dissertation also demonstrates the key role played by the development of Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) doctrine from January 1973 through August 1991. In the aftermath of the American war in Vietnam, the Air Force considered defense suppression a tactical task that was secondary to the primary mission of putting ordnance on target. At the end of Desert Storm, proponents of the Air Force’s SEAD doctrine had convincing evidence that an enemy IADS was not just an ancillary weapons array, but functioned a critical national system just like manufacturing, government, or the people’s will. The process by which this viewpoint changed had effects on the development of the United States Air Force’s Cold War conventional capability in general, and the development of training methods, electronic warfare platforms, and modern airframes specifically.

This study examines if theory of deception can be understood in successful air operations on a tactical level. Research on deception is mostly conducted on a strategic level and the different theories vary in aim and tend to be comprehensive. Studies of air power are mostly conducted on a tactical level and deception within air power has become more common throughout the years. This study aims, using a theory testing case study, to explain how theories of deception work on a tactical level. The analysis is based on Barton Whaley’s structure of deception, and the cases that were analyzed were the Six-Day War and Operation Desert Storm. The result showed that the theory partly could describe deception on a tactical level as a majority of the different categories of Whaleys theory were present in both conflicts. However, the priority of the different categories in the theory did not correspond to either of the cases. This led to the conclusion that Barton Whaley’s theory of structure of deception does not alone describe success in air operations on a tactical level.

This thesis examines how the use of combined arms according to Robert Leonhards theory can explain the military success on the tactical level of war in two historical cases. Previous studies focus mainly on how combined arms shall be understood and how it shall be used and not how combined arms has contributed to military success. This thesis uses a theory testing case study to examine how combined arms contributed to the military success of the Israeli forces in the Yom Kippur-war and to that of American forces in  Operation Desert Storm.   The analysis is based on Robert Leonhards three principles of combined arms. The result of the analysis shows that both the Israeli forces and the American forces used the different principles of combined arms. The analysis also showed that the use of combined arms created military success at the tactical level of the different wars, but combined arms cannot by itself explain the military success as the technical advantages, moral and educational level also had a significant impact on the outcome.

Recent aggressions and geopolitical insecurities in the Baltic region have made it necessary for the Swedish armed forces to change their focus from an international defense policy to a territorial defense strategy. This change focuses mainly on strengthening the defensive capabilities of the Swedish armed Forces by reshaping the brigade structures with a focus on combined arms warfare in conjunction to maneuver warfare. Current doctrine and manuals show a lack in combined arms concerning its contribution to tactical success as well as its origin. As such a question whether tactical success can be explained with combined arms has been raised. This thesis aims to examine if Robert R Leonhard’s theory on combined arms can explain success at a tactical level during Operation Desert Storm and the Yom Kippur war and the analysis focuses on Robert Leonhards three principles of combined arms. The result of the study shows that the theory can partly explain success at a tactical level in both cases. But further studies must be conducted on the subject in order to increase the theories explanatory power.

Amsterdamfördraget som trädde i kraft 1999 hade bland annat som mål att, med unionens svagaagerande på Balkan i minnet, reformera och utveckla den gemensamma utrikes- och säkerhetspolitikenskapad sex år tidigare genom Maastrichtfördraget. Denna uppsats syftar till att analysera de förändringarsom skedde i EU:s aktörskapacitet inom den andra pelaren i samband med Amsterdamfördraget samtpåvisa dessa förändringar i unionens konkreta arbete i ett fall. För detta ändamål används en modell avGunnar Sjöstedt framtagen för värdering av unionen utifrån dess strukturella förutsättningar. Detempiriska materialet utgörs till stor del av unionens officiella dokument och fördragstexter men även förområdet relevant litteratur har använts.Analysen visar på den grundproblematik som råder inom området i form av en intressekonflikt mellangemensamt agerande och medlemsländernas inflytande över förd politik. Uppsatsen lyfter fram tvåförändringar som trots denna konflikt stärkt unionens förutsättningar att agera på det internationellaplanet. Dessa är införandet av befattningen hög representant för den gemensamma utrikes- ochsäkerhetspolitiken samt ökade möjligheter till flexibilitet vid beslutsfattande. Unionens konkreta arbetehar analyseras utifrån dess agerande mot Makedonien. Här visar analysen på ett stärkt engagemang frånunionens sida där den höge representanten med sina resurser spelat en stor roll. Unionens stärkta förmågatill agerande i Makedonien måste anses som en framgång för den gemensamma utvecklingen, dockkvarstår att se om detta går att upprepa i ett större och mer komplext fall. / The Amsterdam Treaty which entered into force 1999 had as one of theobjectives, in light of the European Union’s weak actions in the Balkans, toreform and develop the Common Foreign and Security Policy that was createdsix years earlier through the Maastricht Treaty.The aim of this essay was to analyse the changes in EU’s actor capabilitywithin the second pillar as the Amsterdam Treaty came into force, as well asshowing how these changes influenced the work performed by the EU in oneparticular case. In order to achieve this, a model by Gunnar Sjöstedt was used.The model was developed to evaluate the EU based on its structuralprerequisites. The empirical material used, came, to a large extent, from theEU’s official documents and treaties, but other relevant literature within thefield has been used as well.The analysis identified the fundamental issue within this field, namely, aconflict of interest between the joint action and the member countries´influence on the policies. The essay underlined two changes which havestrengthened the EU´s prerequisites to act at the international level. These arethe appointment of a High Representative for the Common Foreign andSecurity Policy, as well as the creation of increased possibilities for flexibilityin the decision making process. The work of EU was analysed from its actionsin Macedonia which showed a strengthened engagement from its side, wherethe High Representative and its resources have played an important part. TheEU’s strengthened ability to act in Macedonia must be seen as a success for thejoint development. It remains to be seen, however, whether this can be repeatedin a bigger, more complex case. / <p>Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps. Hylla: Upps. ChP 01-03</p>

Denne studien har hatt som mål å undersøke om vestlig offensiv luftmakt benytteroperasjonskunst i planlegging og gjennomføring av militære operasjoner, og omoperasjonskunst er nødvendig for effektiv utnyttelse av luftmakt? Hensikten har vært å seom det konsept som er valgt på felles (joint) nivå - operasjonskunst - også brukes avluftkomponenten. Som teoriforankring har studien benyttet en operasjonalisering avClausewitz sin teori om nødvendigheten av en balanse i ”treenigheten” mellom folket,feltherren og fyrsten, og metoden har innebært å studere problemet utifra tre uvahenigevariabler; teori, doktriner og praksis. Empiridelen omfatter dermed en studie av tekster frabåde operasjonskunstens utvikling, og såvel tidligere luftmaktsteoretikere som mermoderne teorier (Warden, Boyd og effekt baserte operasjoner). NATO og amerikanskefelles- og luftforsvarsdoktriner ble studert for å påvise eventuelle relasjoner til studiensspørsmål. Den praktiske bruk av moderne offensiv luftmakt ble undersøkt ved å studereluftkampanjen under operasjon Desert Storm i 1991, og noen av de trender som tegnet seg ioperasjon Iraqi Freedom i 2003.Studiens resultat viser at vestlig offensiv luftmakt i liten grad har kjent til og benyttetteoriene rundt begrepet operasjonskunst, og at dens konsepter har vært mye tuftet påluftspesifikk teori og doktrine. Videre konkluderer den med at noen av effektene avoperasjonskunst likevel kommer frem i praksis, og at trendene som Irakkrigen tegner tyderpå en større fokus på fellesoperasjoner også i luftmiljøet. Studien konkluderer til slutt medat luftmakten kan være best tjent med å ta til seg konseptet med operasjonskunst for å ståbest mulig rustet til å møte de forskjellige utfordringer i moderne krigføring. / This thesis examines two basic questions. Does Western airpower practice operationalart as a guiding principle of warfare, and is operational art necessary to achieve successin modern air warfare? The purpose was to study whether the use of offensive airpowerwas set on the conceptual basis of operational art, used at the joint level of warfare, or ifit was just a question of “targeting”. The study applied Clausewitz’ theory of a “trinity”between what is commonly represented as the people, the military, and the governmentas its theoretical base. To reflect the relative complexity of the study, it used a methodof examining the questions from three different angles; theory, doctrine andemployment of offensive airpower. Through the study of these subjects and use ofairpower in Operation Desert Storm (and to a limited degree during Operation IraqiFreedom), the focus and essence of airpower is highlighted. Airpower theorists havealways tried to put emphasis on the unique capabilities of the airplane and operations inthe third dimension. Strategic use of airpower, they have proclaimed, is the best use ofairpower, tactical use, and especially in support to land, is the least effective. Much inopposition to and in competition with the older Navy and Army, a separate mission forthe Air Force has been stressed.Modern airpower doctrine has in large followed suit. At the same time operational art isbeing introduced as the conceptual basis for first land- and then joint operations. The aircampaign(s) in this study gives insight into an airpower shaped both by theory and bydoctrine. Modern airpower was used with success in operations that in large focus onoverwhelming force and superior technology, but at the same time tried to achieve someof the leverage and synergy of the joint battlespace. The study concludes that westernoffensive airpower up to now did not practice operational art in warfare, and that itsconcepts largely were founded on airpower specific theory and doctrine. It alsoconcludes that the trends shown in Iraq 2003 indicate a change toward a more jointthinking in the airpower community. It also concludes that airpower would be bestsuited to meet the challenges of modern warfare by considering employing the conceptof operational art in joint operations. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 02-04