I augusti 2008 utspelades ett litet, men betydelsefullt krig mellan Ryssland och Georgien. Ryssland vann kriget övertygande, men ändå beordrades en nästan total omstrukturering av de ryska väpnade styrkorna. Den nya idén var att initiativ och beslutsfattning skulle tryckas ned på brigad- och bataljonchefer och mycket pekar på ett införande av manöverkrigföring på den taktiska nivån, likt länderna i väst. I den här uppsatsen undersöks vilka förutsättningar som fanns för ett eventuellt införande av manöverkrigföring på den taktiska nivån. Med utgångspunkt i just manöverteorin genomförs en fallstudie av Rysslands senaste reguljära krig, Georgienkriget. Uppsatsens resultat visar att de ryska väpnade styrkorna har stora hinder att överkomma om manöverkrigföring framgångsrikt ska kunna införas på den taktiska nivån. Brister i framförallt officerarnas utbildning måste åtgärdas, men även utrustningsmässigt finns stora brister som försvårar ett eventuellt införande.

Theories about victory in modern wars are well established by different scientists with different arguments on how states or non-state actors should use their military forces to achieve strategic victory. However, few existing studies have explored tactical victory in modern warfare. The aim of this study is, therefore, to understand better the phenomenon of tactical victory by examining how American military forces conducted tactical operations during the starting phase of the Iraq War 2003 and the invasion of Baghdad. To analyze the relative tactical success gained by the American forces’ way of warfare, this study conducts a single case study design informed by Lars Henåker’s (2020) eight factors of tactical success in warfare. Based on a qualitative analysis of empirics from secondary sources, the study finds that the American military forces achieved all factors specified by Henåker to increase the chances for success in a war, compared to the Iraqi military forces that achieved far less. In conclusion, the study deepens our understanding of the tactical conduct of the American military forces in line with Henåker’s (2020) theory on tactical success in warfare.

This thesis examines how the use of combined arms according to Robert Leonhards theory can explain the military success on the tactical level of war in two historical cases. Previous studies focus mainly on how combined arms shall be understood and how it shall be used and not how combined arms has contributed to military success. This thesis uses a theory testing case study to examine how combined arms contributed to the military success of the Israeli forces in the Yom Kippur-war and to that of American forces in  Operation Desert Storm.   The analysis is based on Robert Leonhards three principles of combined arms. The result of the analysis shows that both the Israeli forces and the American forces used the different principles of combined arms. The analysis also showed that the use of combined arms created military success at the tactical level of the different wars, but combined arms cannot by itself explain the military success as the technical advantages, moral and educational level also had a significant impact on the outcome.