The research regarding the six day war and the aerial operations named Operation Moked is extensive but there are certain shortcomings in the research that examines both the operation and the principle of surprise. The aim of this paper is to contribute to this research by utilising existing military theories on the principle of surprise in order to identify indicators that are representative of surprise.  These indicators are thereafter used in a study of Operation Moked in order to examine the extent of in which the principle was utilised. The result of this research goes to show that the principle of surprise was utilised in great extent by Israel during Operation Moked. / Det har bedrivits mycket forskning kring Sexdagarskriget och det lyckade israeliska luftanfallet Operation Moked men det finns vissa brister i forskningen på operationen kopplat till krigföringsprincipen överraskning. Denna uppsats syftar till att bidra till detta forskningsläge genom att använda militära teoribildningar kring principen överraskning och bryta ut indikatorer på vad som kännetecknar principen. Dessa indikatorer används sedan i en studie av Operation Moked för att undersöka i vilken utsträckning principen tillämpades. Resultatet av denna undersökning påvisar att överraskning tillämpades i stor utsträckning av Israel under Operation Moked.

In the form of a theory testing case study based upon the seminal works of Kenneth Waltz and Stephen Walt, this thesis seeks to uncover whether defensive realism can be applied with focus on Israeli international conduct. This is defined by their wartime actions as well as their peacekeeping efforts. The paper analyses two major historical events; namely the six-day-war and the recent Israeli-Arab peace treaties. Thereafter it delves into the preexisting conditions of each combattant in the war, then reviews the events unfolding during the conflict in the first part of the analysis, followed by the second part examining the contents of the Abraham Accords, as well as the official statements of Bahrain and Sudan regarding peace with Israel.  Following this, the thesis examines the details and terms of the Abraham Accords and treaties between Israel, Bahrain and Sudan. A hypothesis is presented predicting that both tenets of defensive realism will be applicable to their respective parts of Israeli history. It is subsequently found that the first tenet of defensive realism has explanatory value with regards to the six-day-war, the second tenet of defensive realism that follows also proves to hold significant merit, and the thesis concludes that the given hypothesis therefore is correct. Both tenets of defensive realism are applicable to respective units of analysis on Israel, which therefore suggests that the theory of defensive realism offers a good framework for explaining the actions of the Israeli state.

The thesis inquires into the progressively worsening international role of Israel after the Six-Day War. It begins with analysis of some aspects of the aforementioned conflict and finishes with declaration of resolution no. 3379, which condemned Zionism as a form of racial discrimination.The goal of the thesis is to analyse process that led the state constituted with the help of UN to the position as one of the most criticized members of the organization, all in less than its thirty years old existence.In addition to the Six-Day War, the analysis deals with other significant moments of the Arab-Israeli conflict between years 1967-1975 with the declaration of the said resolution taking the largest extent.Further, the author attempted to define a group of states actively objecting to Zionism and Israel. Simultaneously, he attempted to define the meaning of the fight against Zionism to individual members of the inhomogeneous anti-Israeli bloc.The thesis mainly stands on the analysis of UN documents concerning the Palestine problem in the observed time period. Based on the performed research, the author comes to the conclusion that the condemnation of Zionism as a form of racial discrimination was possible not solely by development of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and by drawing attention to the...

John A. Warden’s theory the enemy as a system has been influential and attributed to large scale victories, such as Operation Desert Storm. It advocates offensive use of air power by parallel attacks on the enemy’s strategic center. While doctrines of small states are dependent and influenced by the military thinking of great power nations, its capacity and necessary priorities for the use of air power may differ. This study examines Warden’s theory through two cases, the Six Day War and the Second Lebanon War. Both relied on air power executed by a small state, Israel. The result show that Warden’s theory can partly explain Israelic victory during the Six Day War, but with substantial differentiations from the theory’s advocation of attacks on the enemy strategic leadership. The findings are ambiguous and neither strengthens nor weakens the theory. The analysis of the Second Lebanon War indicates that air power was insufficient in achieving strategic victory in the war against Hezbollah, even though the execution of the air operation had significant resemblance to Warden’s theory, thus weakening the theory.

The diploma thesis aims to describe and reconstruct the media image of the Six-Day War based on the analysis of selected articles from official contemporary Polish and Czechoslovak daily newspapers, which were being published during the event, from 5 to 10 June 1967 until the War of Attrition. An emphasis is placed on the portrayal of the Six-Day War and the comparison of media images of the conflict in Czechoslovak and Polish daily newspapers. The thesis also attempts to show the impact of a different domestic policy situation and historical factors on shaping media discourse in Czechoslovakia and Poland. The thesis is divided into two parts - theoretical and practical. The theoretical part presents the historical context of the event in relation to Czechoslovakia and Poland, the development of the media and selected daily newspapers. The theoretical part is also dedicated to the principles of propaganda, newspeak and critical discourse analysis. This method is used to analyse texts from the Czechoslovak and Polish daily newspapers - Rudé právo, Svobodné slovo, Mladá fronta, Lidová demokracie, Zemědělské noviny, Pravda, Trybuna Ludu, Żołnierz Wolności, Głos Robotniczy, Słowo Polskie, Życie Warszawy, Express Wieczorny. The results of the analysis are presented in the final chapter. Key words...

L'objectif de cette thèse est d'étudier la politique de la Grande-Bretagne vis-à-vis du conflit israélo-arabe au prisme de ses intérêts au Proche-Orient entre la première guerre israélo-arabe (1948-1949) jusqu'à la guerre des Six-Jours en 1967. Nous avons essayé de préciser, en ce sens, qu'en plus des intérêts politiques, géostratégiques et économiques, cette politique a été aussi marquée par les changements des rapports de force qui s'imposaient inévitablement dans le monde entier, notamment l'avènement des États-Unis et de l'URSS comme superpuissances mondiales, le nationalisme arabe…etc. Dans ce cadre d'intérêts politiques et économiques, nous avons souligné que la création de l'État d'Israël répondait aux besoins stratégiques des puissances occidentales au Moyen-Orient. D'ailleurs, cette approche prouvera sa validité dès 1956 quand l'État d'Israël va jouer un rôle déterminant pendant l'expédition de Suez. Nous avons mis l'accent sur la place qu'occupait l'industrie du pétrole et les intérêts commerciaux dans le processus de la décolonisation britannique du Moyen-Orient pendant les années 1950 et 1960. Bien que l'étude de la politique britannique au Proche-Orient soit négligée, et ce, en raison de son « déclassement politique », notre recherche a bien montré que la Grande-Bretagne a joué un rôle aussi important que celui des Américains dans la sauvegarde de leurs intérêts à travers une « gestion » commune des affaires du Moyen-Orient. / The aim of this thesis is to study the British policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict through the prism of British interests in the Middle East from the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948-1949 to the Six-Day War in 1967. In addition to economic and political interests, we show that in the years under review the British policy has also been marked by a change in the world balance of power, namely the emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as the world's leading superpowers, Arab nationalism ... etc. In this context, we emphasize that the creation of the State of Israel met the strategic needs of Western powers in the Middle East. This approach will prove its effectiveness only eight years after the creation of Israel when the latter played a decisive role during the tripartite invasion of Egypt in late 1956. Moreover, we point out the place occupied by oil industry and commercial interests in the process of British decolonization in the Middle East in the 1950s and 1960s. The study of British foreign policy in the Middle East has been neglected because of the “demise of Britain's political supremacy” worldwide. Nevertheless, we show that Britain has played a role as important as that of the United States in safeguarding their common interests in the Middle East through a close collaboration.

<p>Yom Kippurkriget 1973 kan sägas vara det första sjökriget då sjömålsrobotar nyttjades av krigets respektive parter. Hur påverkade denna teknikutveckling av sjömålsroboten Israels sjötaktiska agerande? Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka hur teknikutvecklingen av sjömålsroboten har påverkat Israels sjökrigföring, samt undersöka huruvida det är tekniken som styr taktiken, eller tvärtom. Detta sker med en komparation av israelernas sjökrigföring under två krig, sexdagarskriget 1967 samt Yom Kippurkriget 1973. Analysverktyg för denna jämförelse utgörs av Wayne P. Hughes och Christopher Werners teorier angående samspelet mellan teknik och taktik. Denna teori och empiri redogörs deskriptivt med kvalitativ textanalys. Jämförelsen leder fram till att israelernas sjötaktiska agerande förändrades. I bägge krigen rådde god teknisk analys vilket påverkade deras taktik. Tekniken under Yom Kippurkriget möjliggjorde dock en offensivare taktik än agerandet under sexdagarskriget. Teknikutvecklingen av sjömålsroboten ledde således fram till en effektiv taktikanpassning. Undersökningen leder även fram till att teknik och taktik ständigt påverkar varandra.      </p> / <p>The Yom Kippur War in 1973 is known to be the first naval war when surface-to-surface missiles were used by both sides. How did this development of technology affect the tactical actions of Israel?</p><p>This paper examines how the development of technology, in form of the surface-to-surface missile, has affected the naval warfare of Israel and if technology affects tactics or vice versa. To find answers, the Israelis tactical actions are compared, in two wars, Six-Day War in 1967 and Yom Kippur war in 1973. Theories regarding the interplay between technology and tactics, by Kevin P. Hughes and Christopher Werner, are used as tool for the analysis.</p><p>The result of the study shows that the tactical actions of Israel did change by the development of technology. Common in both wars is the fact that analyses of technology were carried out and affected their tactical actions. Technology during the Yom Kippur War though made more offensive tactics possible, than during the Six-Day War.</p><p>Thus development of the surface-to-surface missile did lead to an effective adaptation of tactics. The result of the study also shows that tactics and technology constantly affects each other.     </p>

Yom Kippurkriget 1973 kan sägas vara det första sjökriget då sjömålsrobotar nyttjades av krigets respektive parter. Hur påverkade denna teknikutveckling av sjömålsroboten Israels sjötaktiska agerande? Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka hur teknikutvecklingen av sjömålsroboten har påverkat Israels sjökrigföring, samt undersöka huruvida det är tekniken som styr taktiken, eller tvärtom. Detta sker med en komparation av israelernas sjökrigföring under två krig, sexdagarskriget 1967 samt Yom Kippurkriget 1973. Analysverktyg för denna jämförelse utgörs av Wayne P. Hughes och Christopher Werners teorier angående samspelet mellan teknik och taktik. Denna teori och empiri redogörs deskriptivt med kvalitativ textanalys. Jämförelsen leder fram till att israelernas sjötaktiska agerande förändrades. I bägge krigen rådde god teknisk analys vilket påverkade deras taktik. Tekniken under Yom Kippurkriget möjliggjorde dock en offensivare taktik än agerandet under sexdagarskriget. Teknikutvecklingen av sjömålsroboten ledde således fram till en effektiv taktikanpassning. Undersökningen leder även fram till att teknik och taktik ständigt påverkar varandra. / The Yom Kippur War in 1973 is known to be the first naval war when surface-to-surface missiles were used by both sides. How did this development of technology affect the tactical actions of Israel? This paper examines how the development of technology, in form of the surface-to-surface missile, has affected the naval warfare of Israel and if technology affects tactics or vice versa. To find answers, the Israelis tactical actions are compared, in two wars, Six-Day War in 1967 and Yom Kippur war in 1973. Theories regarding the interplay between technology and tactics, by Kevin P. Hughes and Christopher Werner, are used as tool for the analysis. The result of the study shows that the tactical actions of Israel did change by the development of technology. Common in both wars is the fact that analyses of technology were carried out and affected their tactical actions. Technology during the Yom Kippur War though made more offensive tactics possible, than during the Six-Day War. Thus development of the surface-to-surface missile did lead to an effective adaptation of tactics. The result of the study also shows that tactics and technology constantly affects each other.

Principen överraskning är en av de äldsta principer som finns att använda i striden. Principen ses som grunden för striden och för vilka metoder som kan använda för att lyckas i striden. Men vad innebär överraskning egentligen och hur har den använts? Uppsatsen kommer att problematisera principen överraskning och anknyta till forskningen om överraskning till Pearl Harbor och sexdagarskriget, som har setts vara typiska överraskningsanfall. Såg anfallen likadana ut och vilka indikatorer utifrån litteraturen påvisar att det var en överraskning? Inledningsvis kommer överraskning beskrivas utifrån vald litteratur för att åskådliggöra innebörden. Litteraturen kommer att analyseras och göra underlag för senare del av uppsatsen. Därefter appliceras och granskas de på de två olika överraskningsanfallen med vilka indikatorer som användes vid respektive anfall till litteraturteorin. Avslutningsvis diskuteras resultatet och författaren ger förslag på ny forskning med anknytning till ämnet. Syftet med uppsatsen är att problematisera principen överraskning och vilka indikatorer som påverkar principen överraskning. Jag kommer att genomföra en komparativ modell mellan Pearl Harbor och sexdagarskriget. Denna analys genomförs genom en kvalitativ textanalys och uppsatsens analytiska ram är principen överraskning. De teoretiska utgångspunkterna i denna uppsats är analys utifrån teorin överraskning samt litteratur om Pearl Harbor och sexdagarskriget. / The principle of surprise is one of the oldest principles that is to used in battle. Principle as the basis of the conflict and the methods you can use to succeed in battle. But what does surprise really mean, and how is it used? The essay will problematize the principle of surprise and connect the research on surprise to Pearl Harbor and the Six Day War that has been seen to be typical surprise attacks. Did the attacks look the same and do the indicators from the literature show that it was a surprise?Initially the principle surprise will describe the selected literature to illustrate the meaning. The literature will be analyzed and make a basis for the later part of the essay. Then I will analyze the literature and apply it on the two surprise attacks, if they were using the same indicators. Finally it discusses the results and the author suggests new research related to the topic. The purpose of this paper is to problematize the principle of surprise and the indicators that affect the principle of surprise. The essay will conduct a comparative method between Pearl Harbor and the Six Day War. This analysis is performed by a qualitative text analysis and essay analytical framework is the principle of surprise. The theoretical basis of this paper is the analysis based on the theory and literature surprise of Pearl Harbor and the Six-Day War.

Studiens syfte var att analysera Israels roll innan och efter Sexdagarskriget med utgångspunkt inom rättfärdig krigsteori och dess kriterier. Det jag ville göra med studien var att analysera om Israel uppfyllde kraven för att initiera ett krig rättfärdigt, och sedan använde sig av rättfärdiga åtgärder vid efterkrigstiden. Studiens metodval var en kvalitativ innehållsanalys med en deduktiv ansats där material hämtades från olika arkiv och andra relevanta källor för att besvara syftet. Resultatet redovisades i en kronologisk ordning för att visa ett tydligt händelseförlopp mellan den 15 maj och 22 november 1967. Analysen visade på att Israel uppfyllde kriterierna för jus ad bellum genom ett tydligt casus belli vilket var stängningen av Tiran-sunden för israelitiska fartyg. Analysen om kriterierna för Israels jus post bellum uppfylldes däremot inte eftersom inga åtgärder som krävdes tas av Israels regering. Israel visade i stället på en motvilja att förhandla och till slut gjordes omöjlig med de arabiska tre nej. / This study aimed to assess Israel's role before and after the Six-Day War, utilizing the framework of just war theory and its associated criteria. The primary objective was to examine whether Israel adhered to the prerequisites for justly initiating a war and subsequently implemented just measures in the post-war period. The study employed a qualitative content analysis with a deductive approach, data were sourced from state archives and other pertinent materials. The results were organized chronologically, offering a coherent depiction of events unfolding between May 15 and November 22 1967. The analysis indicated that Israel satisfied the criteria for jus ad bellum by presenting a clear casus belli, namely the closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships. However, the examination of Israel's jus post bellum criteria revealed failure to take any just measures. The Israeli government did not undertake any of the required actions. Instead, Israel exhibited a reluctance to engage in negotiations as they did not want to engage first, a stance that ultimately led to the arabs’ three nos.