Before the 16th century, Ottoman claims to legitimacy went through several such stages as associating with dervises called abdals, being Warriors of the Faith, being the legal heirs to the Selcuks, being descendants of Kayi, the story of Edebali's dream foretelling the future ascendancy of the dynasty. In the 16th century, however, there was a marked shift towards finding a justification for Ottoman rule in canonical Islamic sources, as a result of, not only the intellectual dominance of the ulema', but also political developments. The propaganda of the "heterodox" Safawids after c. 1502 required an "orthodox" counter propaganda; and the conquest of the Mamluks and the acquisition of Mecca and Medina in 1511-17, led the Ottomans to claim supremecy among Islamic rulers. The new legitimacy argument was that the Ottomans were leaders and defenders of the ahl al-sunna. The Ottoman ulema' supported and formulated this claim. They issued fetvas against the Safawids, rawing their arguments from sharti texts, and declaring the Safawids to be enemies within Islam. In these fetvas, a clear definition of heresy -and of heretical enemy- was not fully developed. Alongside external enemies, the Ottomans also perceived the existence of internal enemies to their rule from the beginning of the 16th century, encouraged particularly by the dynasty's need to present itself as defenders of orthodoxy against the Safawids. The Melametiyye are an example of a group opposed to Ottoman rule. Individuals such as Molla Kabiz and Karamanli seyh were certainly perceived by the Ottoman authorities as threats to their own legitimacy. The Ottoman authorities, however, faced difficulties in dealing with "heretics" since they had not yet formulated an adequate definition of what "heresy" was. Kemal Paqazade's judicial definition of the term zindik through his risäla on zandaka was a major step in creating the legal instruments to oppose heresy. He clearly adopted the concept from fukahä' of the 11th-12th centuries who had used it against the Ismä ills and Bä inis of their own day. The risäla also had a role in claims to legitimacy as representative and protectors of sunni Islam. Together with the risäla on zandaka, Kemal Pagazade, as a result of Molla Kabiz case, produced another risäla on sabb al-Nab! which also serves to define heretical enemy of the Ottoman dynasty. In his fatwä against al- Rawäfi , he deals with the offence of cursing the Companions and indicates that the offence merited execution. The inspiration for this view was clearly the Ottoman's need to justify action against Kizilbas.

This thesis employs newly declassified material in order to examine relations between the British government, King Abdullah and the Jewish Agency between 1921-1951. It starts by placing this relationship within the context of British Imperial strategy in the Middle East. It describes this relationship during the period when the British became the hegemonic power in the Middle East after World War I, and then the period of decolonisation after 1945. The underlying premise of this thesis is that the British were motivated by a combination of diplomatic and strategic considerations in Palestine and Transjordan. This study employs the conceptual framework of imperial historians. It shows that the British relied on a combination of 'formal' and 'informal' techniques in Transjordan. This study advances the historical debate by exemplifying the limited effect of these methods on a ruler who was determined to pursue his own interests and not those of the British. This thesis provides a positive reassessment of Abdullah's relations with the British. It takes advantage of untapped sources in order to challenge the argument that the British 'colluded' with Abdullah to occupy the West Bank in 1948 This thesis focuses on relations between Abdullah and the Jewish Agency. It is based on the assumption that this relationship was only one aspect of Abdullah's unrealised dynastic plan that sought to create a Hashemite monarchy over 'Greater Syria'. In this context Abdullah envisaged a rump Jewish entity with a certain degree of autonomy, but not sovereignty, within this Kingdom. Although Abdullah's ideas varied over the years, he consistently stuck to this idea. This study argues that the likelihood of a long-term political agreement between the two sides was quite unlikely because it was contrary to the Zionist objective of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. As far as the Jewish Agency is concerned, it is hard to define a coherent policy on relations with the neighbouring Arab states, and Transjordan in particular, using the extant documentation. This thesis argues that there was no collusion between Abdullah and the Jewish Agency to carve up Palestine at the expense of the Palestinians. Hence it is possible to conclude that this relationship was not nearly as significant as is often assumed. Ultimately, the two most important periods in this study are between 1936-1939 and 1945-1951. In order to understand these complex events it is crucial to take into consideration wider issues, especially the amorphous process of decolonisation. It is possible to argue that the British withdrawal from Palestine was a result of a combination of circumstances. Even after the British departure from Palestine in 1948, they still retained a diminished but important role in relations between Abdullah and the Israelis until the murder of Abdullah in July 1951. This was manifested in the contentious supply of arms to Transjordan, and the application of the 1948 Anglo-Transjordan Treaty. This thesis contends that the Treaty deterred the Israelis from invading the West Bank in 1948, and contributed to the acrimonious nature of Anglo-Israeli relations in the years immediately after 1948.

This Ph.D. thesis is a political, social and economic study of the Christians of the Jazira during the period 17-132 A.H./638-750 A.D. More specifically doctrinal aspects are not dealt with here, since they have already received considerable attention from many scholars and researchers. This subject was chosen mainly because the history of the Christians of the Jazira in the early Islamic period has suffered from a lack of academic interest; this is in contrast to the history of the Jazira before the rise of Islam which has been well researched and investigated.

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This thesis takes the powerful explanatory tools of discourse analysis and applies them to the history of Britain's attempts at state-formation in Iraq. In order to do this, theories of discourse within social science are critically reviewed, assessing their power to explain the agency of those who oversaw the building of the state. The thesis then examines British policy towards Iraq under the League of Nations Mandate. Faced with imperial over-reach British foreign policy had little choice but to agree to United States' plans to re-order international relations by using the selfdetermining state as a universal unit. Under League of Nations supervision, colonial civil servants were involved in a serious attempt to build a self-sustaining modern state in Iraq. British conceptions of Iraqi society were crucial to how that state was built and how it interacted with society. The central focus of the thesis is an investigation into how British civil servants understood Iraq. At the heart of this understanding was an ideational dichotomy focused on the causal weight to be given to individual agency or to societal organisation; could and should the state form direct links with individuals or should it rule through tribal organisations and their shaikhs? The thesis maps the parameters of British conceptions; the rural-urban divide and how tribal structures and the role of the shaikh were understood. It then examines how dominant social conceptions shaped the nature of state institutions. Tribal life, for the British, was organised around the benign but powerful presence of the shaikh. democratically responsible to his tribespeople, bound to them by custom and interest. It is this vision of the Iraqi countryside that came to dominate British policy. The thesis concludes by suggesting that the social ontology that drove policy in Iraq sprang from a much wider divide in the discourses of modernity themselves.

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This thesis is an attempt to find some concerte scientific historical explanation and interpretation of the many questions which have arisen concerning the reasons behind the inaccuracies and contradictions in the early Islamic narratives and sources with regard to the first Islamic conquest of Aelia (Islamic Jerusalem). The study attempts to establish new evedence and to develop new evidence for anacademic debate concerning the early Islamic history of Aelia. It examines the historical evidence of the first Islamic conquest of Aelia by critically analysing the early historical narratives and sources as well as examining the historical background of some important narrators who related these accounts. It also critically examines the topography and geographical boundaries of the Aelia (Islamic Jerusalem) region in order to define its true historical boundaries. Thesegeographical boundaries later become most useful in finding plausible explanations for the reasons behind the inaccuracies in the early Islamic sources regarding many issues relating to the first Islamic conquest. In order to provide more support for an accurate picture of the first Islamic conquest of Aelia (Islamic Jerusalem) the study further analyses the history of Aelia beginning from the start of the first Islamic conquests in Syria in 13 A.H/ 634 A.D until the arrival of Umar Ibn al-Khattab in the region in 16 A.H/ 637 A.D. This is done in two ways. First, it examines early narratives in order to accurately define the period of time that the Muslim army spent besieging the walled part of Aelia. Secondly, it endeavours to explain and clarify the reasons behind the uncertainty and inconsistency in the identity of the military leader who carried out the siege operation. This has been clear done by critically analysing the relevant narrations and defining the accurate identity of the military leaders who lead the conquest of Aelia and dates of the conquest. Further support of the view taken in the basis are provided by discussing the true reason behind ‘Umar Ibn al-Khattab first historic visit to Aelia (Islamic Jerusalem), analysing the early narrations and sources, linking the reasons mentioned therein with the surrounding contemporary circumstances and explaining the reasons for the inaccuracies of the Islamic sources and accounts. It further highlights the reasons behind the different visits of ‘Umar’s to Syria and his activities in each visit, and also examined the attitude of Aelia people towards the first Islamic conquest in the light of ‘Umar’s Assurance of Safety (aman) to its people. Lastly, the study examines the early Muslims organisation and administration of Aelia (Islamic Jerusalem) as well as the clear Islamic interest in the region.