With the ever-expanding speed of technological development and the dependence of social media outlets in everyday life. Information warfare can be used to strike targets with information operations from leaders down to the average person. Therefore, it is important to acknowledge the fact that attacks are being performed on our media corporations to influence are opinion. By influence opinion via deception the outcome of an attack even changes an election. The aim of this paper intends to shed light on the behaviour of hacktivist groups. The Syrian Electronic Army will be the main character in this paper do to the groups plausible deniability connections to the Syrian regime. As this paper will show with the works of a case studies on this group with the theoretical framework of John Warden. Hacker groups with connections to a regime work towards influencing the public via the power of disinformation.

On 5 June 1967, the Israeli Air Force launched a surprise attack against the Egyptian Air Force and started what was to be known as the Six Day War. The Six Day War is a good example of when a small nation manages to singlehandedly defeat a superior adversary. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the success of the Israeli Air Force and their contribution to the victory. The use of air power in the Six Day War will be analyzed, using John Warden’s Five Ring Model and Shaun Clarke’s theories about risk-based coercion and SPOT-bombing. Research findings indicate that Shaun Clarke’s theories about coercion may to some extent explain the success of the Israeli Air Force. Attacking the armed forces created the threat of further violence against more valuable and vulnerable targets causing the Arabic leaders to choose peaceful solutions instead of continued fighting. Furthermore, the SPOT-bombing analyzes show that the psychological effect that the Israeli Air Force had on their adversary played a significant role in the campaign against Egypt. However, Warden’s model could not explain the reasons behind the outcome of the war.

John Warden är en inflytelserik luftmaktsteoretiker som låg bakom koalitionens luftkampanj mot Irak 1991. Han menar att luftmakt bör användas för att slå ut motståndarens motståndskraft genom att rikta anfall mot kritiska tyngdpunkter. Han illustrerar tyngdpunkterna genom att måla upp motståndaren som ett system bestående av fem ringar som visar hur systemet bör angripas. Shaun Clarke menar att småstater inte kan använda Wardens luftmaktsteori eftersom det kräver stor massa och därför en stormakts resurstillgångar. Han lanserar därför SPOT-paradigmet som en väg för småstaten att anamma strategisk bombning på ett resurseffektivt sätt. Denna studie prövar Wardens och Clarkes förklaringskraft genom en fallstudie på Israels luftmaktsutövande under operation Protective Edge 2014, för att se om Clarkes påstående är giltigt och om SPOT-paradigmet är användbart för småstaten.Studien visar att femringsmodellen har låg förklaringskraft på Israels nyttjande av luftmakt. Man har i huvudsak inte följt Wardens rekommendationer. SPOT-paradigmet har däremot hög förklaringskraft och studien förefaller stärka teorin i småstatens luftanfall mot en svagare motståndare.

In 2011, a coalition of member states in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization together with partner nations outside of the alliance cooperated against the Libyan regime led by Colonel Muammar Khadaffi. The primary goals of the operations in Libya were to protect the civil population from attacks by the Libyan regime, maintain the no-flyzone and arms embargo. The operations in Libya proved to be successful and many authors claims that airpower were the main key to the victory.John A. Warden III and Robert A. Pape have been mentioned in discussions about airpower and there have also been a debate regarding which theory that best describes how air power should be used. Some authors who have examined the Libyan war claims that the outcome can be understood with John Wardens theories while other claims that it can be understood from Robert Papes theories.This study aims to examine and try to understand the outcome of the air campaign in Libya 2011. Based on the accomplishment of air power in the Libyan civil war along with the debate between John Warden and Robert Pape the conclusion of this study is that the success in the war can be identified in both theories. John Warden’s theory about strategic airpower together with Robert Pape’s theory about direct support of ground forces seems to be the key factor that ended the war with a successful outcome.

The Falklands War is well studied but there are currently no theoretically based analyzes specifically aimed at explaining Operation Black Buck, a long-range bombing of Argentine targets on the Falklands with strategic bombers, despite its controversial and unique nature. By illustrating the case on the basis of a theory-consuming approach, this study examines the purpose of the operation in an effort to understand why the British Air Force justified the missions despite the great challenges.  The theoretical framework for this study is seen through the eyes of the most prominent theorists in modern air power debate; John Warden and Robert Pape. The important aspect in this study is not the authors disagreements but rather that their theories can be seen as complementary to each other in understanding this case.  The study shows that the purpose of Operation Black Buck was aimed at denying the Argentines the opportunity to use the airport at Stanley for military purposes. In addition, there was a deterrent value that indirectly gave a strategic effect by deploying strategic bombers to demonstrate will, determination and hint at the ability to strike the Argentine mainland. The driving force behind the operation was the British effort in trying to achieve air superiority which was a critical objective during the war.

The Swedish armed forces doctrine does not disclose where the knowledge about the use of airpower was acquired. Earlier research supports the fact that doctrine needs to contain theory to support its legitimacy.  The purpose of this study is to examine whether the doctrine contains air power theory. The author believes that increased internationalization may have caused international air power theories to have been integrated in the doctrine.  The research was conducted as a qualitative research of the Swedish air force doctrine documents. The research intended to see if the air power theories of John Warden and Shaun Clark have influenced the doctrine.  The result of this study shows that the ideas of Shaun Clarke had a much higher presence than the ideas of John Warden. The study has shown that the Swedish air force doctrine has theoretical support. The study concludes that internationalizing has affected but not to the point where the Swedish air force blindly copied air power theories without it suiting the Swedish air force.

Swedish air doctrine does not present the origin of its concepts, nor does it support these with theoretical claims. In addition to this, the Swedish air doctrine has not been tested in a real life conflict. Therefore, it is considered unverified. The aim of this paper is to ascertain the theoretical support for the doctrine. Using two contemporary theorists, namely John Warden and Shaun Clarke, the theoretical support for the doctrine is analyzed. This is achieved by studying two of the doctrine’s principal documents, Operativ Doktrin 14 and Reglemente: Taktik för luftoperationer, while applying a qualitative method. The thesis finds that the Swedish air doctrine has convincing theoretical support, without any evident difference in support between the two theories. Furthermore, none of the studied aspects of the doctrine are questioned by the theories. Although the study presented rather conclusive results, further research should be conducted in order to find support amongst other theories. The purpose would be to widen the theoretical scope as well as to further strengthen or question the support.