Air power has shown its usefulness throughout many wars and has been an effective tool for military interventions during the last decades. How airpower should be applied has been a highly debated topic for as long as it has been around. However, its use in humanitarian interventions is comparatively unresearched. One theorist that have received a lot of attention is John Warden and his five-ring-model. The purpose of this thesis is to test Wardens theory in humanitarian interventions, in order to contribute with research on the use of airpower in humanitarian interventions. This thesis is a comparative case study examining two similar and successful humanitarian interventions, Operation Deliberate Force and Operation Odyssey Dawn/Unified Protector. Results show that Wardens theory can not explain the success of the use of airpower in the operations. There are however some interesting similarities between the two operations that could be the key to success in humanitarian interventions. Further research is required to investigate this conclusion. / <p>Uppsatsen skriven VT 2018 under Termin 4 Officersprogrammet 16-19 med inriktning mot flyg. Examen genomförs VT 2019.</p>

Air power has shown its usefulness throughout many wars and has been an effective tool for military interventions during the last decades. How airpower should be applied has been a highly debated topic for as long as it has been around. However, its use in humanitarian interventions is comparatively unresearched. One theorist that have received a lot of attention is John Warden and his five-ring-model. The purpose of this thesis is to test Wardens theory in humanitarian interventions, in order to contribute with research on the use of airpower in humanitarian interventions. This thesis is a comparative case study examining two similar and successful humanitarian interventions, Operation Deliberate Force and Operation Odyssey Dawn/Unified Protector. Results show that Wardens theory can not explain the success of the use of airpower in the operations. There are however some interesting similarities between the two operations that could be the key to success in humanitarian interventions. Further research is required to investigate this conclusion.

During the last decades airpower has become a useful tool for military interventions. Earlier research argues that air operations during the first Gulf war proved that strategic bombing could be effective due to modern technology and precision guided munitions. John Warden developed a theory based on strategic bombing, where he sees the enemy as a system, which is illustrated by a five-ring-model. The theory is widely discussed in the modern airpower debate, and has also been criticized because it has not been proved in any large-N study. Therefore, this essay aims to test Wardens five-ring-model in a comparative case study where two modern air operations have been chosen for investigation. The two operations are Operation Deliberate Force that took place Bosnia, 1995, and Operation Odyssey Dawn/Unified Protector that took place in Libya, 2011. The two operations have many similarities but differ in the time it took to reach their designated goals. The results indicate that Wardens theory is not capable of explaining why the two operations differed in the time it took to achieve its goals. The operations did not act according to Wardens five-ring-model to a sufficiently large extent when other targets were more frequently attacked than the ones that Warden advocates to be the most effective. Warden states that his theory is very general and can be used for any opponent, but the results of this essay indicate that it may be to general to be able to explain the outcome of an operation.

The 2001 campaign in Afghanistan where precision airpower and special operation forces alongside indigenous allies were used to topple the Talibans has brought debaters to argue whether it was a revolution of warfare or a fluke. Stephen Biddle has argued that this Afghan Model is deeply dependent on the indigenous ally being at least as skilled as its enemy. Ten years later, a similar concept was used in Libya to overthrow the Gaddafi-regime. This paper examines and compares the skill of the rebels and the regime forces fighting on the ground in Libya, in order to test Biddle’s Afghan Model theory. Hence, the purpose for this study is to broaden the understanding as to when and how often the Afghan Model may be used. Initially, rebels demonstrated low levels of tactical skill in comparison to regime forces. However, rebels gradually improved their skills and by the end of the fighting, months later the skill gap had been reduced considerably. Without drawing a definite conclusion, the analysis indicates, that skill of the indigenous ally in order for the Afghan Model to work is of importance, however not to the same degree as presented by Biddle.

Airpower has shown its usefulness throughout many wars and was seen as a key instrument in the Libyan war 2011. However, the use of airpower and how it should be applied has been a highly debated topic for as long as airpower has been around. Two theorists, John A. Warden III and Robert A. Pape, have received a lot of attention and there is a debate regarding which one of these theorists has the best solution on how to use airpower. The purpose with this essay is to apply some of the two theorists’ ideas on the Libyan war 2011 and investigate their explanatory power in the conflict. To reach an answer, a case study has been used with a theory testing method which would further seek to contribute to the debate that exists between the two theorists. Results show that some parts of the theorists’ ideas have a high explanatory power in the conflict and some parts do not. As individuals, they cannot explain the whole war, but together their ideas have a high explanatory power in the conflict. Based on the ongoing debate that provides two different ways of using airpower, the conclusions suggest that a combination of the two theorists’ ideas might be the answer to how airpower can be employed in the best way for future operations. Further research is required to investigate this thesis. / <p><strong>Uppsatsen skriven VT 2017 under Termin 4 Officersprogrammet 15-18 med inriktning</strong><strong>mot flyg. Examen genomförs VT 2018. </strong></p>

John A. Warden's airpower theory, The Enemy as a System, has had a major influence on the strategic discourse ever since the foundation of this normative framework was presented in The Air Campaign in 1988. Warden’s theoretical impact was reinforced by the American successes during the Gulf War, but since then, little research has tested the theory outside the context of conventional wars of aggression. This study analyzes The Enemy as System against a peace enforcing context, characterized by multilateral cooperation. It also identifies intermediate variables that help explain why the theory is strengthened or weakened in relation to this particular context. Through qualitative methods, Operation Allied Force and Operation Unified Protector are analyzed against operational indicators within the central concepts of the five-ring model and parallel attacks. The results of the study show that NATO did not use airpower in accordance with Warden's normative theory in either of the examined operations. The absence of operational indicators could hypothetically explain why NATO failed to produce strategic effects within the operational time limits, although this remains a speculative conclusion. The result instead suggests a number of intermediate variables, such as political disagreement and strategic dissonance, which combined reduced the possibility of using airpower in accordance with Warden's theory. In addition, the fear of civilian casualties and the risk of exacerbating the post-war humanitarian situation, further reduced the possibility of attacking targets within certain subsystems of the five-ring model. The conclusion is therefore that Warden’s theoretical applicability, and thus universal validity, is weakened within the examined context.

This study revolves around the NATO-led Operation Unified Protector in Libya 2011. The military campaign was executed under a UN mandate to protect the Libyan civilian population. Despite the mandate civilians died because of NATO bombings. The purpose of this study is to identify inadequate measures in avoiding civilian casualties during the operation and to continue to work towards minimizing civilian casualties caused by military organizations in international interventions. Early in the operation, NATO’s objective altered from protecting the civilians to over­throwing the Libyan regime. At the same time NATO changed its military targeting. This study concludes that the alteration of the primary objective to have increased the risk of harming innocent civilians in the area of operation because the protection of civilians became a secondary objective.

In 2011, a coalition of member states in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization together with partner nations outside of the alliance cooperated against the Libyan regime led by Colonel Muammar Khadaffi. The primary goals of the operations in Libya were to protect the civil population from attacks by the Libyan regime, maintain the no-flyzone and arms embargo. The operations in Libya proved to be successful and many authors claims that airpower were the main key to the victory.John A. Warden III and Robert A. Pape have been mentioned in discussions about airpower and there have also been a debate regarding which theory that best describes how air power should be used. Some authors who have examined the Libyan war claims that the outcome can be understood with John Wardens theories while other claims that it can be understood from Robert Papes theories.This study aims to examine and try to understand the outcome of the air campaign in Libya 2011. Based on the accomplishment of air power in the Libyan civil war along with the debate between John Warden and Robert Pape the conclusion of this study is that the success in the war can be identified in both theories. John Warden’s theory about strategic airpower together with Robert Pape’s theory about direct support of ground forces seems to be the key factor that ended the war with a successful outcome.

Diploma thesis Relation between the concepts of humanitarian intervention and regime change: the case of Libya is concerned with the study of military interventions after 1989 in the context of current theoretical discourse. It's main goal is assessing the 2011 NATO operation Unified Protector. The key question of thesis is, whether the intervention, due to the extensive reading of UNSC Resolution 1973, mandate still can be described in the terms of humanitarian intervention concept (in accordance with international law paradigm of R2P), or whether it rather had been a regime change. Based on primary data analysis, the paper shows that actors (most significantly the USA, France and Great Britain) contributing with a theoretically impartial military force, despite the immediate positive humanitarian outcome, helped significantly to overthrow the regime of Muammar Gaddafi. Due to the specifics of the operation, it can rather be described as a hidden regime change - a definition is also offered in the thesis. Based on the theoretical framework created by Michael Reisman, the author also assesses legitimacy of such deeds. The text is divided into three main chapters. Chapter one gives an account of broader context of just war theories, humanitarian intervention and regime change concepts. In the second...

This paper seeks to conduct a first test of the explanatory potential of the poliheuristic theory of foreign policy decision-making in the context of small states. The case studied is the Swedish decision to contribute to the UN-sanctioned and NATO-led Operation Unified Protector in 2011. The paper conducts a theory-testing Causal Process Tracing (CPT) study drawing on a variety of different sources including news articles, parliamentary records, government bills, official statements and remarks made by key individuals, and secondary sources. The result of the analysis demonstrate the potential validity of the poliheuristic understanding of the decision- making process operating in a small state, but fall short of demonstrating actual validity. The final results are thus more akin to results typically found in a plausibility probe case study, and future research is deemed merited based on the potential validity found.