Dr. Robert A. Pape gav 1996 ut sin bok Bombing to Win – Airpower and Coercion in War där han presenterar sin teori om hur luftmakt bäst ska användas för att påtvinga sin vilja över en motståndares. Genom empiriska studier argumenterar han för att strategisk bombning inte fungerar utan luftstridskrafterna ska istället användas till att bekämpa fiendens militära strategi.Detta självständiga arbete presenterar kärnan ur Pape's teori, samt tar ut tre centrala kriterier som verkar sammanfattande för teorin och undersöker sedan om det går att urskilja dessa inom Nato's nyttjandet av luftmakt under Operation Deliberate Force i Bosnien 1995. Luftkampanjen användes som ett politiskt instrument för att få slut på ett krig som präglades av etniska rensningar och territoriella dispyter. Stödet från världssamfundet att genomföra Deliberate Force var skört, vilket gjorde att utrymmet för misstag var litet.Slutsatsen är att Pape's resonemang kring lokal luftöverlägsenhet delvis går att urskilja, medan den nekande operationskonsten samt hammare och städ-taktiken tydligt går att urskilja. En slutsats är även att luftkampanjen var en avgörande faktor vid upphävandet av belägringen i Sarajevo, och hade stor påverkan på de strider som utspelade sig på marken, som sedan skulle bli avgörande för att Dayton-avtalet skrevs.

Air power has shown its usefulness throughout many wars and has been an effective tool for military interventions during the last decades. How airpower should be applied has been a highly debated topic for as long as it has been around. However, its use in humanitarian interventions is comparatively unresearched. One theorist that have received a lot of attention is John Warden and his five-ring-model. The purpose of this thesis is to test Wardens theory in humanitarian interventions, in order to contribute with research on the use of airpower in humanitarian interventions. This thesis is a comparative case study examining two similar and successful humanitarian interventions, Operation Deliberate Force and Operation Odyssey Dawn/Unified Protector. Results show that Wardens theory can not explain the success of the use of airpower in the operations. There are however some interesting similarities between the two operations that could be the key to success in humanitarian interventions. Further research is required to investigate this conclusion. / <p>Uppsatsen skriven VT 2018 under Termin 4 Officersprogrammet 16-19 med inriktning mot flyg. Examen genomförs VT 2019.</p>

Air power has shown its usefulness throughout many wars and has been an effective tool for military interventions during the last decades. How airpower should be applied has been a highly debated topic for as long as it has been around. However, its use in humanitarian interventions is comparatively unresearched. One theorist that have received a lot of attention is John Warden and his five-ring-model. The purpose of this thesis is to test Wardens theory in humanitarian interventions, in order to contribute with research on the use of airpower in humanitarian interventions. This thesis is a comparative case study examining two similar and successful humanitarian interventions, Operation Deliberate Force and Operation Odyssey Dawn/Unified Protector. Results show that Wardens theory can not explain the success of the use of airpower in the operations. There are however some interesting similarities between the two operations that could be the key to success in humanitarian interventions. Further research is required to investigate this conclusion.

During the last decades airpower has become a useful tool for military interventions. Earlier research argues that air operations during the first Gulf war proved that strategic bombing could be effective due to modern technology and precision guided munitions. John Warden developed a theory based on strategic bombing, where he sees the enemy as a system, which is illustrated by a five-ring-model. The theory is widely discussed in the modern airpower debate, and has also been criticized because it has not been proved in any large-N study. Therefore, this essay aims to test Wardens five-ring-model in a comparative case study where two modern air operations have been chosen for investigation. The two operations are Operation Deliberate Force that took place Bosnia, 1995, and Operation Odyssey Dawn/Unified Protector that took place in Libya, 2011. The two operations have many similarities but differ in the time it took to reach their designated goals. The results indicate that Wardens theory is not capable of explaining why the two operations differed in the time it took to achieve its goals. The operations did not act according to Wardens five-ring-model to a sufficiently large extent when other targets were more frequently attacked than the ones that Warden advocates to be the most effective. Warden states that his theory is very general and can be used for any opponent, but the results of this essay indicate that it may be to general to be able to explain the outcome of an operation.

The two operations in Bosnia and Kosovo named Deliberate Force and Allied Force took place in 1995 and 1999. Both operations show clear signs that the use of air power was the main contributor to the outcome of the operations. Earlier research states that there are signs of coercive air power in both of these operations but fail to explain in what way. The purpose of this essay is to examine if Robert A. Papes theory about denial strategy in air operations can explain the different outcomes of the operations as the operation in Bosnia took 21 days and the operation in Kosovo took 78 days to reach its designated goals. This essay will also test Papes Theory on what constitutes a successful air campaign by comparing the two operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. The result supports Papes theory and shows that operation Deliberate Force acted according to Papes theory on denial in five out of six parts, excluding the strategic interdiction. Whereas operation Allied Force acted according to the theory as well but in a smaller extent. It can be argued that there are other background factors that also contributed to the outcome of the operations but by looking at the usage of the air power in both operations it shows that by acting accordingly to Papes theory the outcome was a success. By supporting Papes theory this essay adds to the earlier research a wider knowledge about coercive air power in military interventions. / <p><strong>Uppsatsen skriven VT 2017 under Termin 4 Officersprogrammet 15-18 med inriktning </strong><strong>mot flyg. Examen genomförs VT 2018.</strong></p>