Until 1980 in Australia, occupational superannuation had played only a peripheral role in securing retirement savings for the workforce at large with less than 40% of all employees at this time receiving superannuation benefits. By the time the twenty-first century began, however, 91% of all Australian employees and 81% of all workers were covered by superannuation, and, by 2007, total superannuation assets had reached $1.2 trillion with superannuation fund balances the largest financial asset held by households. This substantial growth in superannuation coverage did not occur as a result of free market forces operating between producers and consumers in the superannuation industry. Rather, this increase was found to be directly related to the level of intervention in the industry by both the Labor and Coalition Governments throughout the last three decades. / The rationale provided by these Governments highlighted the public interest necessity of ensuring that there was an adequate coverage, level and rate of growth of retirement savings. Criticisms of this rationale have, however, continued to grow unabated. These concerns focus on the failure of the regulatory regime changes introduced to actually achieve their public-interest rationales in terms of improving Australia’s national savings rates or to produce effective governance mechanisms to protect the security of the worker-owned trillion-dollar asset pool now under investment. / The primary objective of this thesis was to investigate these opposing claims (within the framework of the public interest and private interest theories of regulation), via the combination of a detailed literature review and a statistical analysis which utilised factor analysis, and logistic and multiple regression modelling techniques. / This combined analysis suggested three primary conclusions: / (1) the origins of the regulatory regime change process needed to be considered as a political game with the simultaneously experienced detriments of key interest groups resulting in a groundswell of pro-regulatory reform activity which sought to obtain relief from “suffering”. The private interest prediction that governments/politicians in electoral democracies were concerned about finding a support coalition to promote their re-election chances was, therefore, confirmed; / (2) in comparison, there was less than convincing evidence to support the public interest claims of bothgovernments in relation to the origins of the regime change process; and / (3) as opposed to these origins-related findings, the regulatory impact story analysis of the review period confirmed that the primary “winner” of the regulatory regime changes was the fund manager group in general and the large, incumbent, life office entities in particular with statistically significant improvements in fund manager “detriments” (e.g. in terms of the total superannuation assets held within the statutory funds of life offices variable). While the government/politicians group was also a “winner” given the significant increases in the “bureaucratic empire building” variable, it was a significant “loser” in terms of the downturn in the public interest variables of household savings rates, net personal savings rates and voluntary superannuation contributions. The ACTU, the employers and workers in general were also all “losers” in that: union membership rates were characterised by downturns; employers do not appear to have been able to “offset” increased occupational superannuation benefits with reductions in wages and/or employment levels; and there was no significant improvement in either of the fund member indicators (i.e. in terms of the fund member welfare index or their real rate of returns). Thus, the private interest prediction that, in terms of regulatory impacts/outcomes, there would be significant wealth transfers away from fund members primarily to the fund managers was confirmed. / These findings raise implications for the ongoing development of regulation in this area which will need further consideration. For example, is it likely that future, private interest-based regulatory changes will be imposed on the occupational superannuation industry which will lead to further detriments to fund members and increasing wealth transfers to the fund managers? Alternatively, is it likely that, at some point, a regulatory backlash will occur which could lead to more public interest outcomes? Or, is it possible that the interest groups studied might “mutate” or change to adapt to future circumstances which could then, in some future period, change the “winning” and “losing” profiles highlighted in this research? Also of interest is whether these findings, which were performed within a relatively unique set of political circumstances, are robust to alternative settings or time periods? These issues are ideal topics for future research projects.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:ADTP/270022 |
| Date | January 2008 |
| Creators | Taylor, Suzanne Mary |
| Source Sets | Australiasian Digital Theses Program |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Rights | Restricted Access: Abstract and Citation Only |
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