Until 1980 in Australia, occupational superannuation had played only a peripheral role in securing retirement savings for the workforce at large with less than 40% of all employees at this time receiving superannuation benefits. By the time the twenty-first century began, however, 91% of all Australian employees and 81% of all workers were covered by superannuation, and, by 2007, total superannuation assets had reached $1.2 trillion with superannuation fund balances the largest financial asset held by households. This substantial growth in superannuation coverage did not occur as a result of free market forces operating between producers and consumers in the superannuation industry. Rather, this increase was found to be directly related to the level of intervention in the industry by both the Labor and Coalition Governments throughout the last three decades. / The rationale provided by these Governments highlighted the public interest necessity of ensuring that there was an adequate coverage, level and rate of growth of retirement savings. Criticisms of this rationale have, however, continued to grow unabated. These concerns focus on the failure of the regulatory regime changes introduced to actually achieve their public-interest rationales in terms of improving Australia’s national savings rates or to produce effective governance mechanisms to protect the security of the worker-owned trillion-dollar asset pool now under investment. / The primary objective of this thesis was to investigate these opposing claims (within the framework of the public interest and private interest theories of regulation), via the combination of a detailed literature review and a statistical analysis which utilised factor analysis, and logistic and multiple regression modelling techniques. / This combined analysis suggested three primary conclusions: / (1) the origins of the regulatory regime change process needed to be considered as a political game with the simultaneously experienced detriments of key interest groups resulting in a groundswell of pro-regulatory reform activity which sought to obtain relief from “suffering”. The private interest prediction that governments/politicians in electoral democracies were concerned about finding a support coalition to promote their re-election chances was, therefore, confirmed; / (2) in comparison, there was less than convincing evidence to support the public interest claims of bothgovernments in relation to the origins of the regime change process; and / (3) as opposed to these origins-related findings, the regulatory impact story analysis of the review period confirmed that the primary “winner” of the regulatory regime changes was the fund manager group in general and the large, incumbent, life office entities in particular with statistically significant improvements in fund manager “detriments” (e.g. in terms of the total superannuation assets held within the statutory funds of life offices variable). While the government/politicians group was also a “winner” given the significant increases in the “bureaucratic empire building” variable, it was a significant “loser” in terms of the downturn in the public interest variables of household savings rates, net personal savings rates and voluntary superannuation contributions. The ACTU, the employers and workers in general were also all “losers” in that: union membership rates were characterised by downturns; employers do not appear to have been able to “offset” increased occupational superannuation benefits with reductions in wages and/or employment levels; and there was no significant improvement in either of the fund member indicators (i.e. in terms of the fund member welfare index or their real rate of returns). Thus, the private interest prediction that, in terms of regulatory impacts/outcomes, there would be significant wealth transfers away from fund members primarily to the fund managers was confirmed. / These findings raise implications for the ongoing development of regulation in this area which will need further consideration. For example, is it likely that future, private interest-based regulatory changes will be imposed on the occupational superannuation industry which will lead to further detriments to fund members and increasing wealth transfers to the fund managers? Alternatively, is it likely that, at some point, a regulatory backlash will occur which could lead to more public interest outcomes? Or, is it possible that the interest groups studied might “mutate” or change to adapt to future circumstances which could then, in some future period, change the “winning” and “losing” profiles highlighted in this research? Also of interest is whether these findings, which were performed within a relatively unique set of political circumstances, are robust to alternative settings or time periods? These issues are ideal topics for future research projects.

Until 1980 in Australia, occupational superannuation had played only a peripheral role in securing retirement savings for the workforce at large with less than 40% of all employees at this time receiving superannuation benefits. By the time the twenty-first century began, however, 91% of all Australian employees and 81% of all workers were covered by superannuation, and, by 2007, total superannuation assets had reached $1.2 trillion with superannuation fund balances the largest financial asset held by households. This substantial growth in superannuation coverage did not occur as a result of free market forces operating between producers and consumers in the superannuation industry. Rather, this increase was found to be directly related to the level of intervention in the industry by both the Labor and Coalition Governments throughout the last three decades. / The rationale provided by these Governments highlighted the public interest necessity of ensuring that there was an adequate coverage, level and rate of growth of retirement savings. Criticisms of this rationale have, however, continued to grow unabated. These concerns focus on the failure of the regulatory regime changes introduced to actually achieve their public-interest rationales in terms of improving Australia’s national savings rates or to produce effective governance mechanisms to protect the security of the worker-owned trillion-dollar asset pool now under investment. / The primary objective of this thesis was to investigate these opposing claims (within the framework of the public interest and private interest theories of regulation), via the combination of a detailed literature review and a statistical analysis which utilised factor analysis, and logistic and multiple regression modelling techniques. / This combined analysis suggested three primary conclusions: / (1) the origins of the regulatory regime change process needed to be considered as a political game with the simultaneously experienced detriments of key interest groups resulting in a groundswell of pro-regulatory reform activity which sought to obtain relief from “suffering”. The private interest prediction that governments/politicians in electoral democracies were concerned about finding a support coalition to promote their re-election chances was, therefore, confirmed; / (2) in comparison, there was less than convincing evidence to support the public interest claims of bothgovernments in relation to the origins of the regime change process; and / (3) as opposed to these origins-related findings, the regulatory impact story analysis of the review period confirmed that the primary “winner” of the regulatory regime changes was the fund manager group in general and the large, incumbent, life office entities in particular with statistically significant improvements in fund manager “detriments” (e.g. in terms of the total superannuation assets held within the statutory funds of life offices variable). While the government/politicians group was also a “winner” given the significant increases in the “bureaucratic empire building” variable, it was a significant “loser” in terms of the downturn in the public interest variables of household savings rates, net personal savings rates and voluntary superannuation contributions. The ACTU, the employers and workers in general were also all “losers” in that: union membership rates were characterised by downturns; employers do not appear to have been able to “offset” increased occupational superannuation benefits with reductions in wages and/or employment levels; and there was no significant improvement in either of the fund member indicators (i.e. in terms of the fund member welfare index or their real rate of returns). Thus, the private interest prediction that, in terms of regulatory impacts/outcomes, there would be significant wealth transfers away from fund members primarily to the fund managers was confirmed. / These findings raise implications for the ongoing development of regulation in this area which will need further consideration. For example, is it likely that future, private interest-based regulatory changes will be imposed on the occupational superannuation industry which will lead to further detriments to fund members and increasing wealth transfers to the fund managers? Alternatively, is it likely that, at some point, a regulatory backlash will occur which could lead to more public interest outcomes? Or, is it possible that the interest groups studied might “mutate” or change to adapt to future circumstances which could then, in some future period, change the “winning” and “losing” profiles highlighted in this research? Also of interest is whether these findings, which were performed within a relatively unique set of political circumstances, are robust to alternative settings or time periods? These issues are ideal topics for future research projects.

Pasirinkto tyrimo objektas yra viešieji ir privatūs interesai pasireiškiantys užtikrinant viešąją tvarką ir visuomenės saugumą. Darbo dalykas yra viešųjų ir privačių institucijų veikla, palaikant viešąją tvarką ir užtikrinant visuomenės saugumą. Darbe keliamas tikslas analizuoti viešąją ir privačią institucijų veiklą, palaikant viešąją tvarką ir užtikrinant visuomenės saugumą, įvertinti jų bendradarbiavimo galimybes. Siekiant baigiamojo darbo tikslo, reikalinga įvykdyti tokius uždavinius: - analizuoti sąvokas tvarka, viešoji tvarka, netvarka, visuomenės saugumas; - identifikuoti viešuosius ir privačius interesus tvarkos ir saugumo rinkoje; - išanalizuoti viešosios tvarkos ir visuomenės saugumo užtikrinimo veikloje dalyvaujančių subjektų veiklą; - analizuoti policijos ir privačių saugos tarnybų veiklos derinimo problemos viešosios tvarkos ir visuomenės saugumo užtikrinimo srityje bei pateikti jų sprendimo būdus. / The research of the chosen object is public and private interests and they come out ensuring public order and security of the society. It is necessary to realise such tasks: -to discuss the conception of order, public order, public security; -to identify public and private interests of order and safeness in the market; - to analyse public order and safeguarding of society which takes part in subject activity; -to create public order safeness of the society and to ensure cooperating model of the subjects. The research of the chosen theme was done by basing on such methods: -historical comparative method. It was used by comparing police and also private services of security when they were formed earlier and nowadays; -the analyzing method of documents. It was used by analyzing different deeds, contracts and other documents; -comparative method. It was used trying to reach the activity of different public securities and to ensure public security; -method of the concepts interpretation. Because of it, it was analysed and appreciated by different concepts (public order, legality or lawfulness, security of the society and etc) content. The ending of the content forms (makes) preface, laying out (parts, chapters, sections), conclusion, summary, summary in foreign language and list of literature. In the first part of work it is trying to analyse important conceptions such as public order, security of the society, public and private interests and to find out their content. In the... [to full text]

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-04-06T12:55:02Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Ceres Linck dos Santos.pdf: 1031580 bytes, checksum: 24bb61e10b252149d812fef8fb81f2fa (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-04-06T12:55:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ceres Linck dos Santos.pdf: 1031580 bytes, checksum: 24bb61e10b252149d812fef8fb81f2fa (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-03-07 / This study aims to analyze the structure of the legal transaction in the tripartite plan, focusing on the invalidities and on the principle of conservation, as normative source for the appearance of interpretations or techniques that aim at the effectiveness of the negotiation declaration and the effectiveness of the law. In the investigation of the limits of freedom and of private autonomy for the practice of legal transactions, it assesses the public interest should always be considered supreme in relation to private interest or in what form they are related. Subsequently, a number of invalidity treatment institutes, such as reduction and substantial conversion, are analyzed. In the end, it focuses on the autonomy provided for in article.217, item I of the Federal Constitution, aimed at the organizational and functional regulation of leading sports organizations and associations, analyzing the applicability of the conservation principle and techniques for dealing with disability in the scope of the legal relations of sports law, exemplifying two practical cases / O presente trabalho tem como objetivo analisar a estrutura dos negócios jurídicos no plano tripartite, focando nas invalidades e no princípio da conservação, enquanto fonte normativa para o surgimento de interpretações ou técnicas que visem à eficácia da declaração negocial e à efetividade do direito. Na investigação dos limites da liberdade e autonomia privada para a prática de negócios jurídicos, avalia-se se o interesse público deve ser considerado sempre supremo em relação ao interesse privado ou de que forma se relacionam. Posteriormente, analisa-se, pontualmente, alguns institutos de tratamento de invalidades, como a redução e a conversão substancial. Ao final, foca-se na autonomia prevista no art.217, inciso I da Constituição Federal, destinada à regulamentação organizacional e funcional de entidades desportivas dirigentes e associações, analisando-se a aplicabilidade do princípio da conservação e de técnicas de tratamento das invalidades no âmbito das relações jurídicas de direito desportivo, exemplificando com dois casos práticos