Only with a comprehensive detailed theory of the practical processes which agents
engage in prior to successful action can one get a picture of all those junctures at
which the mechanism of rationality may be applied, and at which irrationality
may therefore occur. Rationality, I argue, is the exercise of normatives, such as
believable and desirable, whose function is to control the formation of the stages in
practical processes by determining what content and which functions of practical
states are allowed into the process. Believable is a functional concept, and for an
agent to wield it requires that he possess beliefs or a theory he can justify about
which states are goal-functional. Desirable is likewise a functional concept, and its
exercise requires that agents possess justifiable beliefs or a theory about which
goals are to be functional. When the desirability belief functions, it does so
according to ideals of the theory. For example, it functions saliently where desires
become intentions. So long as the normatives function in these ways the agent is
rational. To so function is to satisfy the ideal for agency itself.
Chapter 2 presents a fine-grained model of the fundamental terms and
relations necessary for practical reasoning and agency. In this model, the
functions of belief, desire and intention are described in naturalized terms. On the
basis of this account of the terms of agency, a taxonomy of the possible failures of
rationally controlled practicality is presented in chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents a comprehensive and detailed account of intention
formation comprised of the functions of belief, desire and intention. Wherever one
of those functions occurs in the process is a juncture at which rationality may be
exercised, and therefore a point at which irrationality may occur.
In chapter 5 I describe some of the main ways that dysfunctional states may
disrupt agency, creating irrationality. The measures agents may take to
ameliorate or otherwise control such failures are discussed and distinguished
according to the ideal of agency. Finally, and in these terms, I address the
problem of akrasia, in particular the views of Davidson and Mele, and show that
the room they make for strict akratic action involves a significant compromise of
the ideals of agency, and therefore is not as "strict" as they and others have
claimed. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UBC/oai:circle.library.ubc.ca:2429/8749 |
| Date | 05 1900 |
| Creators | Campbell, Peter G. |
| Source Sets | University of British Columbia |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, Thesis/Dissertation |
| Format | 10045612 bytes, application/pdf |
| Rights | For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use. |
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