Only with a comprehensive detailed theory of the practical processes which agents engage in prior to successful action can one get a picture of all those junctures at which the mechanism of rationality may be applied, and at which irrationality may therefore occur. Rationality, I argue, is the exercise of normatives, such as believable and desirable, whose function is to control the formation of the stages in practical processes by determining what content and which functions of practical states are allowed into the process. Believable is a functional concept, and for an agent to wield it requires that he possess beliefs or a theory he can justify about which states are goal-functional. Desirable is likewise a functional concept, and its exercise requires that agents possess justifiable beliefs or a theory about which goals are to be functional. When the desirability belief functions, it does so according to ideals of the theory. For example, it functions saliently where desires become intentions. So long as the normatives function in these ways the agent is rational. To so function is to satisfy the ideal for agency itself. Chapter 2 presents a fine-grained model of the fundamental terms and relations necessary for practical reasoning and agency. In this model, the functions of belief, desire and intention are described in naturalized terms. On the basis of this account of the terms of agency, a taxonomy of the possible failures of rationally controlled practicality is presented in chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents a comprehensive and detailed account of intention formation comprised of the functions of belief, desire and intention. Wherever one of those functions occurs in the process is a juncture at which rationality may be exercised, and therefore a point at which irrationality may occur. In chapter 5 I describe some of the main ways that dysfunctional states may disrupt agency, creating irrationality. The measures agents may take to ameliorate or otherwise control such failures are discussed and distinguished according to the ideal of agency. Finally, and in these terms, I address the problem of akrasia, in particular the views of Davidson and Mele, and show that the room they make for strict akratic action involves a significant compromise of the ideals of agency, and therefore is not as "strict" as they and others have claimed.

M.A. (Philosophy) / Please refer to full text to view abstract

Only with a comprehensive detailed theory of the practical processes which agents engage in prior to successful action can one get a picture of all those junctures at which the mechanism of rationality may be applied, and at which irrationality may therefore occur. Rationality, I argue, is the exercise of normatives, such as believable and desirable, whose function is to control the formation of the stages in practical processes by determining what content and which functions of practical states are allowed into the process. Believable is a functional concept, and for an agent to wield it requires that he possess beliefs or a theory he can justify about which states are goal-functional. Desirable is likewise a functional concept, and its exercise requires that agents possess justifiable beliefs or a theory about which goals are to be functional. When the desirability belief functions, it does so according to ideals of the theory. For example, it functions saliently where desires become intentions. So long as the normatives function in these ways the agent is rational. To so function is to satisfy the ideal for agency itself. Chapter 2 presents a fine-grained model of the fundamental terms and relations necessary for practical reasoning and agency. In this model, the functions of belief, desire and intention are described in naturalized terms. On the basis of this account of the terms of agency, a taxonomy of the possible failures of rationally controlled practicality is presented in chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents a comprehensive and detailed account of intention formation comprised of the functions of belief, desire and intention. Wherever one of those functions occurs in the process is a juncture at which rationality may be exercised, and therefore a point at which irrationality may occur. In chapter 5 I describe some of the main ways that dysfunctional states may disrupt agency, creating irrationality. The measures agents may take to ameliorate or otherwise control such failures are discussed and distinguished according to the ideal of agency. Finally, and in these terms, I address the problem of akrasia, in particular the views of Davidson and Mele, and show that the room they make for strict akratic action involves a significant compromise of the ideals of agency, and therefore is not as "strict" as they and others have claimed. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

Issued also as thesis, Vienna 1944, under title: Das Irrationale im Werk Gerhart Hauptmanns. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [289]-290) and index.

Issued also as thesis, Vienna 1944, under title: Das Irrationale im Werk Gerhart Hauptmanns. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [289]-290) and index.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Villanova University, 2006. / Philosophy Dept. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hong Kong, 2008.

Orientador: Angélica Lovatto / Banca: Mauro Luis Iasi / Banca: Sávio Cavalcante / Banca: Anderson Deo / Banca: Jefferson Rodrigues Barbosa / Resumo: Nas discussões sobre as diversas manifestações do pós-modernismo, existe uma formulação crítica que merece atenção: a de que existiria a aproximação entre o pensamento pós-modernista e o fascista. Esta pesquisa pretende, então, avaliar o alcance dessa crítica, apresentando a tese de que realmente existe uma conexão entre fascismo e pós-modernismo, se consideradas enquanto expressões ideológicas. O objetivo implicado é o de traçar o processo de constituição e permanência do irracionalismo, algo promovido pela predominância das formas de sociabilidade norteadas pela reprodução do capital. Estas forjam um padrão ideológico de viés irracionalista, que recusa a avaliação crítica das experiências anteriores ao favorecerem uma conduta apologética sobre si. / Abstract: In the discussions about various manifestations of postmodernism, there is a critical formulation that deserves attention: there would be a rapprochement between postmodernist and fascist thinkings. This research intends to evaluate the scope of this criticism, suggesting the hypothesis that really there is a connection between fascism and postmodernism, if considered as ideological expressions. This connection would be due to the transformation of the cultural broth promoted by the form of sociability guided by the reproduction of capital, forging an ideological pattern of irrationalist bias. Given the hypothesis presented, the main objective of the research is to trace the process of constitution and permanence of irrationalism. / Riassunto: Nelle discussioni sulle varie manifestazioni del postmodernismo, esiste una formulazione critica che merita attenzione: che ci sarebbe un ravvicinamento tra il pensiero postmoderno e il fascista. Questa ricerca intende, quindi, valutare l'ambito di questa critica, presentando la tesi secondo cui esiste veramente una connessione tra il fascismo e il postmodernismo, considerata come espressioni ideologiche. L'obiettivo implicito è quello di tracciare il processo di costituzione e di permanenza dell'irrazionalismo, qualcosa promosso dalla predominanza delle forme di socialità guidate dalla riproduzione del capitale. Questi formano un modello ideologico irrazionalista che rifiuta di valutare criticamente le esperienze precedenti, favorendo il comportamento apologetico su se stessi. / Doutor

Orientador: Oswaldo Giacoia Junior / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-12T03:52:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rodrigues_EliVagnerFrancisco_D.pdf: 821071 bytes, checksum: c5bfe2d7d917ca8672d8c563ef2ce90d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 / Resumo: O tema desse trabalho baseia-se na hipótese de que a filosofia de Schopenhauer pode ser caracterizada como um pensamento niilista. Procura-se explicitar como a crítica de Nietzsche à moral da compaixão de Schopenhauer encontra sua inserção e ganha densidade teórica no contexto de suas análises do niilismo da fraqueza, traço destacado por Nietzsche como característica da decadência cultural européia. Examina-se também o problema do nada na filosofia de Schopenhauer, com o propósito de situá-lo em relação à temática do niilismo, bem como para tentar evidenciar o sentido em que a ética do filósofo de Frankfurt configura uma soteriologia. As bases para tal interpretação repousam nas seguintes características dessa filosofia: o apontamento de uma ausência de finalidade (negação do finalismo, "ateleologia") para a vontade e, conseqüentemente, a ausência de um telos inteligível para o mundo, a postura pessimista baseada na metafísica da vontade, e na soteriologia defendida pelo filósofo na sua doutrina da negação da vontade, que aponta para o estatuto do nada, alvo da vontade na ética da compaixão. Essa caracterização, a nosso ver, está relacionada com a recepção, interpretação e crítica nietzscheana da filosofia de Schopenhauer, sobretudo na caracterização que Nietzsche faz do niilismo da fraqueza. / Abstract: The theme of this work is based upon the hypothesis that the Schopenhauer's philosophy could be characterized as a nihilist thought. We try to explain away how the criticisms made by Nietzsche to the morals of compassion of Schopenhauer finds place, and obtain some theoretical density, in the context of his analysis of the nihilism of weakness, which Nietzsche points as the main characteristic of the European cultural decadency. The problem of the nothingness is as well under examination, with the purpose of put it in relation to the broad thematic of nihilism, and to show the sense in which the ethics of the philosopher from Frankfurt frames a soteriology. The basis for this interpretation lay on the following characteristics: to point out to an absence of finality (a finalism negation, a-teleology) to the will and, consequently, to the absence of an intelligible telos to the world, the pessimist attitude based on the metaphysic of the will, and on the soteriology, defended by the philosopher himself in his doctrine of a negation of the will, which, by its turn, points out to the nothingness status, the will's target in the morals of compassion. This characterization, as we see it, is related to the reception, to the interpretation and to the nietzschean criticism of Schopenhauer's philosophy, chiefly on the characterization that Nietzsche made of the nihilism of the weakness. / Doutorado / Filosofia / Doutor em Filosofia

published_or_final_version / Social Work and Social Administration / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy