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Whether we have free-will and whether it matters

Student Number : 9112588A -
MA Dissertation -
School of Social Sciences -
Faculty of Humanities / There is a concern that causal determinism might render free-will impossible. I compare some
different perspectives, namely Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, Libertarianism, and Hard
Determinism, and conclude that Hard Determinism is correct—we lack free-will. To further
bolster the case, I consider the work of Libet, who has found neuropsychological evidence that
our brains non-consciously cause our actions, prior to our being aware of it. Thus we are also
not choosing consciously. I then consider Dennett’s work on the role of the conscious self. I
defend his model—of a fragmented self—which could not cause our actions. Finally I argue that
many things that free-will purportedly provides, eg., justification for the penal system and
reactive attitudes, can be reconstructed without free-will. I then end with some speculations about
why people still want free-will.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:netd.ac.za/oai:union.ndltd.org:wits/oai:wiredspace.wits.ac.za:10539/2182
Date01 March 2007
CreatorsOstrowick, John Montague
Source SetsSouth African National ETD Portal
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeThesis
Format930160 bytes, 37229 bytes, application/pdf, application/pdf, application/pdf, application/pdf

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