Getting Exclusionary Reasons Right offers a defense of exclusionary reasons as originally conceptualised by Joseph Raz. Exclusionary reasons are second-order reasons to refrain from acting for some reasons and are used to explain the ordered nature of practical normativity, and the various normative concepts that are said to follow from it, i.e. mandatory rules, rule-following, authority, and promises to name just a few. Exclusionary reasons differ from other kinds of defeaters in that they exclude valid reasons, i.e. reasons that still justify or make eligible the actions they count for. According to Raz, this is because excluded reasons are defeated not qua reasons, but as reasons we can act for, or that motivate, which explains why exclusionary reasons are reasons to refrain from acting for a reason. However, the coherence and distinctiveness of the idea of an exclusionary reason—understood in this way—has faced serious challenges. I take up these challenges in what follows. Chapter one presents a coherent account of exclusionary reasons as reasons to refrain from acting for a reason, or to ‘not-φ-for-p’. It both clarifies the sense in which exclusionary reasons concern motivations and motivating reasons, and rejects alternative accounts according to which exclusionary reasons have as their object other normative reasons. It is argued that when they are understood as excluding some considerations as reasons that can rationally motivate, exclusionary reasons confer value on or point to an agent’s not acting for otherwise valid reasons. That is, they justify our not being responsive to certain values on some occasions. Chapter two vindicates the notion of acting-for-a-reason on which Raz’s account relies. It considers objections which claim that not acting for otherwise valid reasons presupposes a level of control over our reasons and motivations that is incompatible with the rational constraints on attitudes (beliefs, intentions, etc.), and shows how exclusionary reasons, as they are restated in chapter one, avoids them. Perhaps surprisingly, it is argued that instances where exclusionary reasons are relevant, when properly understood, are not instances where reasoning about what we ought to do involves choice. Getting Exclusionary Reasons Right concludes by considering the implications the account offered herein has for rationalist approaches to obligations and authority. Namely, it makes clear how fully rational agents can ever be moved to act for, or out of an awareness of their obligations. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA) / Getting Exclusionary Reasons Right investigates the distinctiveness and coherence of the idea of an exclusionary reason—a reason to not act for other reasons (i.e. promises, rules, commands, etc.). It first defends exclusionary reasons as reasons to ‘refrain from acting for some reason(s)’. Understood in this way, exclusionary reasons are relevant where it matters not just what we choose to do, but how we choose to do it. Promises, rules, commands, etc. are features of the world that make it valuable to or justify our not acting for otherwise good reasons when they apply. It then considers what ‘refraining from acting for some reason(s)’ consists in. While exclusionary reasons are thought to be reasons to have motivations of certain kinds, they are not reasons to choose to be motivated in some way. They are instead, reasons that determine for us the reasons we ought to act for. It is argued that while there are some instances where determining what we have reason to do is up to us, exclusion is not one of them.
Getting Exclusionary Reasons Right concludes by considering the implications the account offered herein has for rationalist approaches to obligations and authority.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:mcmaster.ca/oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/27963 |
| Date | 11 1900 |
| Creators | Areias, Nicole |
| Contributors | Sciaraffa, Stefan, Philosophy |
| Source Sets | McMaster University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
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