Thesis (LLM (Public Law))--University of Stellenbosch, 2009. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The 1996 Constitution provides in s 25(7) that individuals and communities who
had been dispossessed of rights in land after 19 June 1913, as a result of past
discriminatory laws, may claim restitution or equitable redress. The Restitution of
Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 reiterates the 1913 cut-off date for restitution claims.
The cut-off date appears to preclude pre-1913 land dispossessions. Various
reasons are cited for this date, the most obvious being that it reflects the date on
which the Black Land Act came into effect. The Richtersveld and Popela
decisions of the lower courts appear to confirm the view that historically based
land claims for dispossessions that occurred prior to 1913 are excluded from the
restitution process.
In Australia and Canada restitution orders have been made possible by the
judicially crafted doctrine of aboriginal land rights. However, historical restitution
claims based on this doctrine are constrained by the assumption that the Crown,
in establishing title during colonisation, extinguished all existing titles to land. This
would have meant that the indigenous proprietary systems would have been lost
irrevocably through colonisation. In seeking to overcome the sovereignty issue,
Australian and Canadian courts have distinguished between the loss of
sovereignty and the loss of title to land. In this way, the sovereignty of the Crown
is left intact while restitution orders are rendered possible.
South African courts do not have to grapple with the sovereignty issue since
post-apartheid legislation authorises the land restitution process. The appeal
decisions in Richtersveld and Popela recognised that some use rights survived
the colonial dispossession of ownership. This surviving right was later the subject
of a second dispossession under apartheid. By using this construction, which is
not unlike the logic of the doctrine of aboriginal title in fragmenting proprietary
interests, the second dispossession could then be said to meet the 1913 cut-off
date, so that all historically based land claims are not necessarily excluded by the
1913 cut-off date. However, it is still possible that some pre-1913 dispossessions
could not be brought under the umbrella of the Richtersveld and Popela
construction, and the question whether historically based restitution claims are
possible despite the 1913 cut-off date will resurface, especially if the claimants
are not accommodated in the government’s land redistribution programme / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die 1996 Grondwet bepaal in a 25(7) dat individue en gemeenskappe wat na 19
Junie 1913 van ‘n reg in grond ontneem is, as gevolg van rasgebaseerde
wetgewing en praktyke, geregtig is om herstel van sodanige regte of
gelykwaardige vergoeding te eis. Die Wet op Herstel van Grondregte 22 van
1994herhaal die 1913-afsnydatum vir grondeise. Dit lyk dus asof die afsnydatum
die ontneming van grond voor 1913 uitsluit. Verskeie redes word vir hierdie
datum aangevoer, waarvan die bekendste is dat dit die datum is waarop die
Swart Grond Wet in werking getree het. Dit beslissing van die laer howe in beide
die Richtersveld- en die Popela-beslissings bevestig blykbaar dat ontneming van
grond of regte in grond voor 1913 van die restitusie-proses uitgesluit word.
In Australië en Kanada is restitusiebevele moontlik gemaak deur die leerstuk van
inheemse grondregte. Historiese restitusie-eise in hierdie jurisdiksies word egter
aan bande gelê deur die veronderstelling dat die Kroon, deur die vestiging van
titel gedurende kolonialisering, alle vorige titels op die grond uitgewis het. Dit
sou beteken dat die inheemsregtelike grondregsisteme onherroeplik verlore
geraak het deur kolonialisering. Ten einde die soewereiniteitsprobleem te
oorkom het die Australiese en Kanadese howe onderskei tussen die verlies van
soewereiniteit en die verlies van titel tot die grond. Op hierdie wyse word die
soewereiniteit van die Kroon onaangeraak gelaat terwyl restitusiebevele steeds
‘n moontlikheid is.
Suid-Afrikaanse howe het nie nodig gehad om die soewereiniteitskwessie aan te
spreek nie omdat post-apartheid wetgewing die herstel van grondregte magtig.
Die appélbeslissings in Richtersveld en Popela erken dat sekere gebruiksregte
die koloniale ontneming van eiendom oorleef het. Die oorblywende gebruiksregte
is later ‘n tweede keer ontneem as gevolg van apartheid. Deur gebruikmaking
van hierdie konstruksie, wat dieselfde logika volg as die leerstuk van
inheemsregtelike regte en berus op fragmentasie van eiendomsaansprake, kan
gesê word dat die tweede ontneming van grond wel binne die 1913-afsnydatum
val. Gevolglik sal alle historiese restitusie-eise nie noodwendig deur die 1913-
afsnydatum uitgesluit word nie. Dit is steeds moontlik dat sommige pre-1913
ontnemings nooit onder die vaandel van die Richtersveld- en Popela-beslissings
gebring sal kan word nie, en die vraag of histories gebaseerde eise moontlik is
ongeag die 1913-afsnydatum sal daarom weer opduik, veral indien die
grondeisers nie geakkommodeer word in die grondherverdelingsprogram van die
staat nie.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:netd.ac.za/oai:union.ndltd.org:sun/oai:scholar.sun.ac.za:10019.1/1836 |
| Date | 12 1900 |
| Creators | Dube, Phephelaphi |
| Contributors | Van der Walt, A. J., University of Stellenbosch. Faculty of Law. Dept. of Public Law. |
| Publisher | Stellenbosch : University of Stellenbosch |
| Source Sets | South African National ETD Portal |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Rights | University of Stellenbosch, Dissertations -- Law, Theses -- Law, Dissertations -- Public law, Theses -- Public law |
Page generated in 0.0038 seconds