Thesis (LLM (Public Law))--University of Stellenbosch, 2009. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The 1996 Constitution provides in s 25(7) that individuals and communities who had been dispossessed of rights in land after 19 June 1913, as a result of past discriminatory laws, may claim restitution or equitable redress. The Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 reiterates the 1913 cut-off date for restitution claims. The cut-off date appears to preclude pre-1913 land dispossessions. Various reasons are cited for this date, the most obvious being that it reflects the date on which the Black Land Act came into effect. The Richtersveld and Popela decisions of the lower courts appear to confirm the view that historically based land claims for dispossessions that occurred prior to 1913 are excluded from the restitution process. In Australia and Canada restitution orders have been made possible by the judicially crafted doctrine of aboriginal land rights. However, historical restitution claims based on this doctrine are constrained by the assumption that the Crown, in establishing title during colonisation, extinguished all existing titles to land. This would have meant that the indigenous proprietary systems would have been lost irrevocably through colonisation. In seeking to overcome the sovereignty issue, Australian and Canadian courts have distinguished between the loss of sovereignty and the loss of title to land. In this way, the sovereignty of the Crown is left intact while restitution orders are rendered possible. South African courts do not have to grapple with the sovereignty issue since post-apartheid legislation authorises the land restitution process. The appeal decisions in Richtersveld and Popela recognised that some use rights survived the colonial dispossession of ownership. This surviving right was later the subject of a second dispossession under apartheid. By using this construction, which is not unlike the logic of the doctrine of aboriginal title in fragmenting proprietary interests, the second dispossession could then be said to meet the 1913 cut-off date, so that all historically based land claims are not necessarily excluded by the 1913 cut-off date. However, it is still possible that some pre-1913 dispossessions could not be brought under the umbrella of the Richtersveld and Popela construction, and the question whether historically based restitution claims are possible despite the 1913 cut-off date will resurface, especially if the claimants are not accommodated in the government’s land redistribution programme / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die 1996 Grondwet bepaal in a 25(7) dat individue en gemeenskappe wat na 19 Junie 1913 van ‘n reg in grond ontneem is, as gevolg van rasgebaseerde wetgewing en praktyke, geregtig is om herstel van sodanige regte of gelykwaardige vergoeding te eis. Die Wet op Herstel van Grondregte 22 van 1994herhaal die 1913-afsnydatum vir grondeise. Dit lyk dus asof die afsnydatum die ontneming van grond voor 1913 uitsluit. Verskeie redes word vir hierdie datum aangevoer, waarvan die bekendste is dat dit die datum is waarop die Swart Grond Wet in werking getree het. Dit beslissing van die laer howe in beide die Richtersveld- en die Popela-beslissings bevestig blykbaar dat ontneming van grond of regte in grond voor 1913 van die restitusie-proses uitgesluit word. In Australië en Kanada is restitusiebevele moontlik gemaak deur die leerstuk van inheemse grondregte. Historiese restitusie-eise in hierdie jurisdiksies word egter aan bande gelê deur die veronderstelling dat die Kroon, deur die vestiging van titel gedurende kolonialisering, alle vorige titels op die grond uitgewis het. Dit sou beteken dat die inheemsregtelike grondregsisteme onherroeplik verlore geraak het deur kolonialisering. Ten einde die soewereiniteitsprobleem te oorkom het die Australiese en Kanadese howe onderskei tussen die verlies van soewereiniteit en die verlies van titel tot die grond. Op hierdie wyse word die soewereiniteit van die Kroon onaangeraak gelaat terwyl restitusiebevele steeds ‘n moontlikheid is. Suid-Afrikaanse howe het nie nodig gehad om die soewereiniteitskwessie aan te spreek nie omdat post-apartheid wetgewing die herstel van grondregte magtig. Die appélbeslissings in Richtersveld en Popela erken dat sekere gebruiksregte die koloniale ontneming van eiendom oorleef het. Die oorblywende gebruiksregte is later ‘n tweede keer ontneem as gevolg van apartheid. Deur gebruikmaking van hierdie konstruksie, wat dieselfde logika volg as die leerstuk van inheemsregtelike regte en berus op fragmentasie van eiendomsaansprake, kan gesê word dat die tweede ontneming van grond wel binne die 1913-afsnydatum val. Gevolglik sal alle historiese restitusie-eise nie noodwendig deur die 1913- afsnydatum uitgesluit word nie. Dit is steeds moontlik dat sommige pre-1913 ontnemings nooit onder die vaandel van die Richtersveld- en Popela-beslissings gebring sal kan word nie, en die vraag of histories gebaseerde eise moontlik is ongeag die 1913-afsnydatum sal daarom weer opduik, veral indien die grondeisers nie geakkommodeer word in die grondherverdelingsprogram van die staat nie.

Thesis (LLD)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Ownership, and especially the ownership of land, consists of rights as well as duties. The social responsibilities of the owner depend on the prevailing needs of the public (as expressed in legislation) and are subject to change. Section 25(1) of the Constitution impliedly recognises the social obligations of the property owner insofar as it confirms that ownership can be regulated by the state in the public interest. Section 25(1) also sets requirements for the interference with property rights and, in so doing, recognises that the social obligations of the property owner are not without boundaries. In its landmark FNB decision the Constitutional Court gave content and structure to a section 25(1) challenge. The Constitutional Court held that deprivations will be arbitrary for purposes of section 25(1) if the law of general application does not provide sufficient reason for the deprivation or is procedurally unfair. The Constitutional Court elaborated that ‘sufficient reason’ had to be determined with reference to eight contextual factors which reflect the complexity of the relationships involved in the dispute. With reference to section 25(1) and FNB this dissertation considers the constitutional implications of two types of statutory interference with the owner’s right to use, enjoy and exploit his property. Firstly, the dissertation considers the owner’s statutory duty in terms of the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 to demolish unlawful and illegal building works in certain instances. Secondly, the dissertation considers the limitations imposed by the National Heritage Resources Act of 25 of 1999 and the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE) on the owner’s right to demolish historic or unlawfully occupied structures. This dissertation argues that building and development controls, historic preservation laws and anti-eviction legislation are legitimate exercises of the state’s police power. Generally, these statutory interferences with ownership will not amount to unconstitutional deprivation of property. Nevertheless, there are instances where regulatory laws cannot be applied inflexibly if doing so results in excessive interferences with property rights. The FNB substantive arbitrariness test indicates when the law imposes disproportionate burdens on land owners. Furthermore, the non-arbitrariness tests shows when it might be necessary to mitigate disproportionate burdens, imposed in terms of otherwise legitimate regulatory laws, by way of German-style equalisation measures, which are comparable to the constitutional damages granted by South African courts. This dissertation concludes that in the past century the South African legal system has progressed from the apartheid regime, which protected the rights and interests of the white minority, to a constitutional regime which safeguards the rights of all South Africans. There are two legal developments that may lead to positive change in the next century, namely active pursuance of the notion that ownership consists of rights and duties and the development of equalisation-style measures, incorporated into legislation, to alleviate excessive burdens imposed on property owners in the public interest. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Eiendomsreg, veral eiendomsreg op grond, bestaan uit regte sowel as pligte. Die sosiale verantwoordelikhede van die eienaar word bepaal deur die heersende behoeftes van die publiek (soos in wetgewing beliggaam) en is onderhewig aan verandering. Artikel 25(1) van die Grondwet erken implisiet die sosiale verpligtinge van die eienaar in soverre dit bevestig dat eiendomsreg nie ʼn absolute reg is nie en dat dit deur die staat in die openbare belang gereguleer kan word. Artikel 25(1) koppel vereistes aan statutêre beperkings wat op die eienaar se regte geplaas kan word en erken daardeur dat die sosiale pligte van die eienaar nie onbegrens is nie. In die invloedryke FNB-beslissing het die Grondwethof inhoud en struktuur aan grondwetlike analise ingevolge artikel 25(1) gegee. Die Grondwethof het bepaal dat ʼn ontneming arbitrêr sal wees vir die doeleindes van artikel 25(1) as die algemeen geldende reg nie genoegsame rede vir die ontneming verskaf nie of as die ontnemingsproses prosedureel onbillik was. Die Grondwethof het uitgebrei dat ‘genoegsame rede’ bepaal moet word met verwysing na agt kontekstuele faktore wat die kompleksiteit van die verhoudinge wat in die geskil betrokke is, weerspieël. Met verwysing na artikel 25(1) en FNB oorweeg hierdie proefskrif die grondwetlike implikasies van twee tipes statutêre beperkinge wat deur wetgewing op eienaars se regte geplaas word. Eerstens neem die proefskrif die eienaar se statutêre plig ingevolge die Wet op Nasionale Bouregulasies en Boustandaarde 103 van 1977 om onwettige en onregmatige geboue en bouwerke te sloop, in oënskou. Tweedens oorweeg die proefskrif die beperkinge ingevolge die Wet op Nasionale Erfenishulpbronne 25 van 1999 en die Wet op die Voorkoming van Onwettige Uitsettings en Onregmatige Besetting van Grond 19 van 1998 op die eienaar se reg om historiese en onregmatige bewoonde strukture te sloop. Die proefskrif betoog dat bou- en ontwikkelingsbeheermaatreëls, historiese bewaringswette en uitsettingsvoorkomingswetgewing legitieme uitoefening van die staat se polisiëringsmag is. In die algemeen sal hierdie statutêre inmenging nie uitloop op ongrondwetlike ontneming van eiendom nie. Nietemin is daar gevalle waar die regulerende wette nie onbuigsaam toegepas kan word nie indien dit tot uitermatige inmenging met die eienaar se regte lei. Die FNB-toets vir substantiewe arbitrêre ontneming dui aan wanneer ‘n wet ʼn disproporsionele las op grondeienaars plaas. Verder wys die FNB-toets wanneer dit nodig mag wees om oneweredige laste, wat deur andersins regmatige regulerende wette opgelê is, te versag. Dit kan gedoen word deur middel van ʼn statutêre maatreël, geskoei op Duitse voorbeeld, wat vergelykbaar is met grondwetlike skadevergoeding wat deur Suid-Afrikaanse howe toegeken is. Hierdie proefskrif kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat die Suid-Afrikaanse regstelsel oor die afgelope eeu ontwikkel het van die apartheidsbestel, wat die regte en belange van die wit minderheid beskerm het, tot die huidige grondwetlike bestel wat die regte van alle Suid-Afrikaners beskerm. Twee ontwikkelinge kan tot positiewe verandering in die volgende eeu lei, naamlik aktiewe bevordering van die gedagte dat eiendomsreg uit regte en verpligtinge bestaan en ontwikkeling van statutêre maatreëls wat die uitermatige las wat in die openbare belang op eienaars geplaas word, te verlig.