I begin by examining Moore's notion of common sense because it is my contention that his work is not neatly separated; rather, his ethical and non-ethical philosophy have common sense as an underlying theme. For Moore, common sense was not reducible to indubitable, cracker-barrel wisdom; it is popularized science, what would be a matter of common sense if we were to take the trouble to learn.
Moore's allegiance to science is the cord that connects his ethical and non-ethical work. In Principia Ethica, he attempts to introduce the spirit of scientific investigation into ethics. The 'naturalistic fallacy', to which special attention is given, is shown to be a guide to avoiding the error of essentialism, that is, of presuming that there is a unique good-making property or quality, common to all good things. Essentialism is rejected because it leads away from the open investigation characteristic of science, toward dogmatism. From this perspective, several popular criticisms of Moore's ethics are shown to be misguided.
In the last chapter, an interpretation of Moore's non-naturalism based on my understanding of the naturalistic fallacy is given, that is quite different from the one most commonly accepted. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:mcmaster.ca/oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/15789 |
| Date | 09 1900 |
| Creators | McKenna, David |
| Contributors | Simpson, E., Philosophy |
| Source Sets | McMaster University |
| Language | en_US |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
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