abstract: As securities companies occupy an increasingly important position in the national economy, and the most valuable competitive advantage for whom is human resources; therefore, Security Industry practitioners pay close attention to the influences of securities companies' incentive mechanisms regarding to various business types.
This paper finds that asymmetry of information in business models is the motivation of the gaming for all participants, through analyzing the differences of various business models of securities brokerage services. Further, various incentive mechanisms under different circumstances result in diverse strategies of gaming. It varies development paths of securities companies. Therefore, the purpose of the paper is to theoretically deduce the most reasonable and optimal securities companies’ incentive mechanism.
This paper intends to identify the principle component factors influencing securities brokerage services via questionnaire investigations towards 75 branches under the same securities company and 13 different securities companies, respectively. In addition, based on historical data, the paper aim to explain rationales between adjustments of incentive mechanisms and market shares of securities brokerage services.Lastly, combining author’s personal experience of various incentive mechanisms and development tracks in four securities companies that hopefully presents valuable information and clues for deducing the optimal securities company incentive mechanism.
There are two critical agency relationships in securities brokerage services. One is between principals, securities companies, and agents which are directors of branches. The other is between principals, securities companies, and agents which are securities marketers or brokers. Because of such operational setup, information is highly asymmetrical between all parties. It brought prominent problems regarding agency relationship and motivation aspects.
Under the certain circumstances, implementation of Incomplete Contracting Theory with franchising models in securities companies is quite useful. Specifically, for the former relationship between securities companies and marketers, the motivation effects of sub-license franchising are better than bonus compensation structure. Fixed salaries without bonus have the worst stimulating effects in such business model. For the latter relationship between securities companies and directors of branches, the agents focus on long term residual value claim rights, since it coincides with agents’ appraisals, focusing on incremental market shares and profit drawings. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Business Administration 2018
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:asu.edu/item:49117 |
| Date | January 2018 |
| Contributors | Zhang, Xiangdong (Author), Pei, Ker-Wei (Advisor), Li, Feng (Advisor), Gu, Bin (Committee member), Arizona State University (Publisher) |
| Source Sets | Arizona State University |
| Language | Chinese |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Doctoral Dissertation |
| Format | 145 pages |
| Rights | http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/, All Rights Reserved |
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