In its many manifestations, psychosis leads to a number of clinical and philosophical debates. Despite their practical and conceptual importance, a number of these debates remain unresolved. Appealing to the connection between phenomenological descriptions, empirical evidence, and philosophical analysis, this dissertation is devoted to the careful examination of five of the main debates surrounding the occurrence of delusions of thought insertion, one of the most complex and severe symptoms of psychotic disorders. Roughly speaking, patients suffering from thought insertion report that external agents of different nature have placed certain thoughts into the patients' minds. The introduction to this compilation clarifies the main distinctions underlying the general discussions about delusions and the specific debates surrounding thought insertion. The introduction is followed by a collection of five papers. The first paper tries to explain the way in which subjects self-attribute their own conscious thoughts in terms of agency. The second paper, assuming that delusions are a type of belief, engages with the discussion about the role that experiential abnormalities have in the process of formation of the delusional belief of thought insertion. The third paper examines the role that affective impairments might have in the process of production of thought insertion, an issue that is often overlooked by current dominant approaches to thought insertion. Taken altogether, the first three papers of this collection offer a novel understanding of the aetiology and architecture of thought insertion. The fourth paper examines a much larger discussion that overlaps with the debate about the subjective features of thought insertion. It is argued that cases of thought insertion - in conjunction with other psychotic phenomena - undermine the current self-presenting theory of consciousness, a theory meant to explain the most fundamental subjective character of conscious experiences. Finally, the fifth paper of the compilation engages with a more general discussion about the nature and role that delusions might play in a subject's life. It is argued against the dominant view that there are good reasons to characterize a certain type of monothematic delusions (including some cases of thought insertion) as biologically adaptive.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:756791 |
| Date | January 2015 |
| Creators | LoĢpez Silva, Pablo |
| Contributors | Smith, Joel |
| Publisher | University of Manchester |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Source | https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/on-the-architecture-of-psychosisthoughts-and-delusions-of-thought-insertion(d5a49b7e-1074-4fcc-bb53-7d56cd8baa87).html |
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