A popular concept in contemporary metaphysics is that of metaphysical
simplicity - the idea that an existent can have no parts. One reason for this is that the
notion of a simple is crucial to discussions of the composition of single objects.
Simples, if real, are the basic units that, when combined in various ways, make up all
other objects. Keith Campbell claims that tropes - particularized properties - can be
simple. In this essay I argue, against Campbell, that tropes cannot be simple. They are
made up of at least two parts - a bare particular and a universal.
In Section 1 I give an exhaustive account of what it is to be a simple. Then in
Section 2 I discuss basic particulars and what conditions must hold for a simple to be
basic. Then in Section 3 I explain the nature of tropes and sketch out the parameters of
Campbell's trope ontology. In Section 4 I argue that simple tropes actually have
universal properties as parts. In Section 5 I give a logical argument to prove the
correctness of the argument in Section 4. Then in Section 6 I take up several possible
objections to my claim that tropes are not simple and argue that each one fails. Finally
in Section 7 I conclude that tropes need to have an individuating component as a part
and remark that tropes' location is not sufficient to be this component. My final claim is
that tropes are not simple and they cannot be basic units in any robust sense.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:tamu.edu/oai:repository.tamu.edu:1969.1/85955 |
| Date | 10 October 2008 |
| Creators | Hellwig, Heinrik Ziehm |
| Contributors | Menzel, Christopher |
| Publisher | Texas A&M University |
| Source Sets | Texas A and M University |
| Language | en_US |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Book, Thesis, Electronic Thesis, text |
| Format | electronic, born digital |
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