A popular concept in contemporary metaphysics is that of metaphysical simplicity - the idea that an existent can have no parts. One reason for this is that the notion of a simple is crucial to discussions of the composition of single objects. Simples, if real, are the basic units that, when combined in various ways, make up all other objects. Keith Campbell claims that tropes - particularized properties - can be simple. In this essay I argue, against Campbell, that tropes cannot be simple. They are made up of at least two parts - a bare particular and a universal. In Section 1 I give an exhaustive account of what it is to be a simple. Then in Section 2 I discuss basic particulars and what conditions must hold for a simple to be basic. Then in Section 3 I explain the nature of tropes and sketch out the parameters of Campbell's trope ontology. In Section 4 I argue that simple tropes actually have universal properties as parts. In Section 5 I give a logical argument to prove the correctness of the argument in Section 4. Then in Section 6 I take up several possible objections to my claim that tropes are not simple and argue that each one fails. Finally in Section 7 I conclude that tropes need to have an individuating component as a part and remark that tropes' location is not sufficient to be this component. My final claim is that tropes are not simple and they cannot be basic units in any robust sense.

This thesis examines the trope of the child in South African literature from the early years of apartheid to the contemporary moment. The chapters focus on some of the most established and prolific authors in South African literary history and roughly follow a chronological sequence: autobiographies by the exiled Drum writers (Es'kia Mphahlele and Bloke Modisane) in the early 1960s; Nadine Gordimer's writing during the apartheid era; confessional novels by Afrikaans-speaking authors (Mark Behr and Michiel Heyns) in the transitional decade; and J. M. Coetzee's late and post apartheid works. I argue that, while writing from diverse historical and political positions in relation to South Africa's literary culture, these authors are all in one way or another able to articulate their subjectivities-with their underlying ambiguities, contradictions, and negations-by imagining themselves as the child or/and through childhood. My analyses of the works under discussion attend to the subversive and transformative potential of, and the critical energies embedded in the trope of the child, by investigating narrative reconfigurations of temporality and space. Firstly, I will be looking at the ways in which the images, structures, and aesthetics making up the imaginings of the child disrupt a linear temporality and serve as critique of a teleological historiography of political emancipation and the liberation struggle. Secondly, I will pay attention to the spatial relations with which representations of the child are bound up: between the country and the city, black townships and white suburbs, the home and the street. By attending to specific transgressions and reorderings of these spatial relations, my reading also explores the ways in which spatial underpinnings and ideological boundaries of national identities are contested, negotiated, and restructured by forces of the transnational, the diasporic, and the global around the figure of the child.

Thèse numérisée par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

Zugl.: La Rioja, Univ., Diss., 2008

No description available.

The purpose of this work is to provide a metaphysical theory of properties and scientific laws. This sentence will require some unpacking. By a ‘metaphysical’ theory here, I mean a theory of what exists in the world. In this investigation I am primarily concerned with a theory of what properties there are in the world and the role they play in scientific laws. This may be contrasted with a linguistic or epistemic project, as it is not primarily about our language, ideas, or theorizing but rather about what is in the world itself. Properties are what we may pre-philosophically think of as the characteristics of an object: such as its height, weight, color, etc. Investigation may cause us to doubt whether some of these pre-philosophical properties are genuine in a metaphysical sense: whether or not the property is actually present as a feature of the world. By scientific laws, I mean the statements we make in the form of exceptionless generalities about the world within the sciences. Here I do not mean to evaluate how science comes about these generalizations, only that they do and how these generalizations may be grounded in a metaphysical theory of properties. The link between these two things: properties and scientific laws, comes about because our scientific laws prominently feature properties: velocity, temperature, charge, viscosity, etc. After a review of some of the theories currently proposed in the philosophical literature along with a treatment of some of the problems that arise out of these theories, I will propose a new theory. This theory, entitled ‘Constitutive Trope Theory’ is a form of a ‘bundle trope theory’ as it proposes that objects in the world are composed entirely out of particularized properties. However, rather than proposing a primitive relation that does the bundling, this theory will propose that, at least for the objects we are familiar with, properties arise out of relations between lower-level properties that instantiate them. For example, a mammal may exist because of the relationship between the organs that lead to its unique properties as a mammal. Those organs in turn exist because of relationships between their cells that lead to their unique properties as a particular kind of organ. And so on down the chain until we hit ‘foundational properties’: properties which are not dependent on any other properties for their existence. I will say very little about these properties as I do not believe that any such properties have currently been found and will argue that such theorizing is premature before such properties have been empirically identified. Following this account, I will consider some of the problems that must be overcome and some final considerations in favor of this theory over other competing theories of properties and scientific laws.

According to natural class trope nominalism, properties are natural classes of tropes, where the "naturalness" of natural classes is taken to be primitive and unanalyzable. In this thesis I defend natural class trope nominalism from two objections: i) that the naturalness of natural classes is analyzable, and ii) that natural class trope nominalism cannot account for certain modal facts (namely, that there could have been more or fewer tropes of any given type), an objection raised by Nicolas Wolterstorff. I defend natural class trope nominalism from (i) indirectly by presenting several putative analyses (namely, those of D. M. Armstrong, Keith Campbell, and Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereya) of natural classes and arguing that they are all deficient, thereby undermining the claim that natural classes are analyzable. Douglas Ehring has recently defended natural class trope nominalism from (ii) by developing a counterpart theory for types of tropes. However, counterpart theory is not universally accepted. So I present three non-counterpart-theoretic alternatives. The natural class trope nominalist can meet Wolterstorff's objection a) by positing existent, but uninstantiated, tropes, b) by accepting modal realism, and c) by accepting a thesis called 'transworld property exemplification'. / October 2005

According to natural class trope nominalism, properties are natural classes of tropes, where the "naturalness" of natural classes is taken to be primitive and unanalyzable. In this thesis I defend natural class trope nominalism from two objections: i) that the naturalness of natural classes is analyzable, and ii) that natural class trope nominalism cannot account for certain modal facts (namely, that there could have been more or fewer tropes of any given type), an objection raised by Nicolas Wolterstorff. I defend natural class trope nominalism from (i) indirectly by presenting several putative analyses (namely, those of D. M. Armstrong, Keith Campbell, and Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereya) of natural classes and arguing that they are all deficient, thereby undermining the claim that natural classes are analyzable. Douglas Ehring has recently defended natural class trope nominalism from (ii) by developing a counterpart theory for types of tropes. However, counterpart theory is not universally accepted. So I present three non-counterpart-theoretic alternatives. The natural class trope nominalist can meet Wolterstorff's objection a) by positing existent, but uninstantiated, tropes, b) by accepting modal realism, and c) by accepting a thesis called 'transworld property exemplification'.

According to natural class trope nominalism, properties are natural classes of tropes, where the "naturalness" of natural classes is taken to be primitive and unanalyzable. In this thesis I defend natural class trope nominalism from two objections: i) that the naturalness of natural classes is analyzable, and ii) that natural class trope nominalism cannot account for certain modal facts (namely, that there could have been more or fewer tropes of any given type), an objection raised by Nicolas Wolterstorff. I defend natural class trope nominalism from (i) indirectly by presenting several putative analyses (namely, those of D. M. Armstrong, Keith Campbell, and Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereya) of natural classes and arguing that they are all deficient, thereby undermining the claim that natural classes are analyzable. Douglas Ehring has recently defended natural class trope nominalism from (ii) by developing a counterpart theory for types of tropes. However, counterpart theory is not universally accepted. So I present three non-counterpart-theoretic alternatives. The natural class trope nominalist can meet Wolterstorff's objection a) by positing existent, but uninstantiated, tropes, b) by accepting modal realism, and c) by accepting a thesis called 'transworld property exemplification'.

Cet essai explore les singularités du nom propre, à la fois propriété d’un x et désignateur de l’x nommé. Le nom porté par l’x n’est pas tout à fait le nom qui réfère à cet x, et l’on envisage la propriété dénominative « être appelé Npr » aussi bien d’un point de vue « ontologique » que d’un point de vue linguistique. La dissociation des deux « parties » du nom propre permet de reprendre la question de son « sens » (sens du nom propre qui réfère à l’x, signification du nom porté par l’x), avant que soient examinées certaines des constructions dites « modifiées » du nom propre. On essaie de montrer que trois types de concepts (individuel, dénominatif, non dénominatif) échelonnent un continuum qui mène du nom propre au nom commun.On propose également une analyse des noms propres du type « le Philosophe », « la Ville Lumière » ou « le Docteur angélique », qu’on considère habituellement comme des surnoms. Un examen diachronique du terme d’« antonomase » précède une réhabilitation de l’antonomase de nom commun destinée à identifier un seuil dénominatif en synchronie. / This essay explores the singularities of the proper name, which is both owned by x and refers to x. The name which x bears is not exactly the name that refers to that x and I’ll try to describe the denominative property « being called N » from an « ontological » as well as a linguistic point of view. The dissociation of the proper name’s two parts allows us to reconsider the question of its « meaning » (meaning of the proper name which refers to x and what the name that x bears signifies), before some proper names’ constructions, that are deemed « modified », are examined. I’ll try to show that three types of concepts (individual, denominative and non denominative) stratify a continuum that leads from proper names to common nouns.In a second time, I’ll try to analyze proper names such as « the Philosopher », « the City of Life » or « the Angelic Doctor », that are usually considered as nicknames. A diachronic study of the word « antonomasia » precedes a rehabilitation of the antonomasia of common noun, which aims at identifying a synchronic denominative level.